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Abstract 
 
 
Chapter 1. We examine the determinants of success in venture capital transactions 
using the largest deal-level data set to date, with special emphasis on comparing 
European to US transactions. Using survival analysis, we show that for both regions 
the probability of exit via initial public offering (IPO) has gone down significantly 
over the last decade, while the time to IPO has gone up – in contrast, the probability 
of exit via trade sales and the average time to trade sales do not change much over 
time. Contrary to perceived wisdom, there is no difference in the likelihood or 
profitability of IPOs between European and US deals from the same vintage year. 
However, European trade sales are less likely and less profitable than US trade sales. 
Venture success has the same determinants in both Europe and US, with more 
experienced entrepreneurs and venture capitalists being associated with higher 
success. The fact that repeat or ‘serial’ entrepreneurs are less common in Europe and 
that European VCs lag US VCs in terms of experience completely explains any 
difference in performance between Europe and the US. Also, contrary to perceived 
wisdom, we find no evidence of a stigma of failure for entrepreneurs in Europe. 
 
Chapter 2. Association of insiders’ selling decision of VC-backed initial public 
offerings (IPOs) with the post-IPO long-run performance is analyzed. I find that the 
selling decision by insiders, measured as a fraction of shares sold by the selling 
stockholders to total shares sold in the offering, has significant positive association 
with the long-run profitability and negative association with the risk after the IPO. 
Furthermore, when venture capitalists sell shares in the IPO there is positive concave 
parabolic association between the selling decision and the post-IPO long-run market 
performance. However, venture capitalists selling of over-allotted shares and stock 
redemptions are not associated with superior post-IPO performance. Evidence on 
selling decision of venture capitalists confirms the importance of reputation as a factor 
affecting insiders’ selling decisions. 
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We examine the determinants of success in venture capital transactions using 
the largest deal-level data set to date, with special emphasis on comparing European 
to US transactions.  Using survival analysis, we show that for both regions the 
probability of exit via initial public offering (IPO) has gone down significantly over 
the last decade, while the time to IPO has gone up – in contrast, the probability of exit 
via trade sales and the average time to trade sales do not change much over time. 
Contrary to perceived wisdom, there is no difference in the likelihood or profitability 
of IPOs between European and US deals from the same vintage year. However, 
European trade sales are less likely and less profitable than US trade sales. Venture 
success has the same determinants in both Europe and US, with more experienced 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists being associated with higher success.  The fact 
that repeat or ‘serial’ entrepreneurs are less common in Europe and that European VCs 
lag US VCs in terms of experience completely explains any difference in performance 
between Europe and the US. Also, contrary to perceived wisdom, we find no evidence 
of a stigma of failure for entrepreneurs in Europe. 
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I. Introduction  
 
Entrepreneurial activity is key for long term growth, yet financing start-up 
firms is wrought with challenges.  Not only does a potential entrepreneur need to have 
the skills, the ideas, and the courage to start a new venture, but maybe most critically, 
also needs to be able to convince outside investors to provide the necessary funds.  
Because of the information problems and inherent riskiness of new ventures, 
successfully financing start-up companies requires actively involved expert investors.  
Furthermore, getting a decent return on investments into start-up firms within a 
reasonable time frame requires that capital markets are developed enough to allow for 
exits either through an initial public offering (IPO)  or trade sale. 
 
There is a widely held perception among both investors and policy makers that Europe 
is lagging behind the US in most dimensions with respect to the financing of 
entrepreneurship.  The pool of potential entrepreneurs is perceived to be smaller, 
maybe because of a ”stigma of failure” (Landier (2006)). 1 The level of expertise 
amongst venture capitalists in Europe has also been criticised (see Kaplan, Martel, and 
Stromberg (2007)), and Hege, Palomino, and Schwienbacher (2005)).  Finally, exit 
opportunities are purported to be less favorable.  These are not wholly unfounded 
perceptions; previous research shows a significant underperformance of European 
venture capital (see, for example, Hege, Palomino, and Schwienbacher (2005), who 
study a small sample of European deals from 1997 to 2003 on which return data is 
available). 
 
Our goal in this paper is to evaluate how successful European venture capital is relative 
to US venture capital using the most extensive deal-level data set developed to date, 
Dow Jones’ Venture Source, and to analyse the main determinants of performance at 
                                                 
1 This perception of a European stigma of failure is expressed in the following Communication by the 
European Commission from 1998: “In Europe, a serious social stigma is attached to bankruptcy. In the 
USA bankruptcy laws allow entrepreneurs who fail to start again relatively quickly and failure is 
considered to be part of the learning process. In Europe those who go bankrupt tend to be considered 
as “losers”. They face great difficulty to finance a new venture.” 
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the deal level.  Due to both the long investment horizon and the private nature of the 
venture market, measuring performance at the deal level is challenging.  Venture 
Source has cash flow information for a subset of deals, and wherever possible we 
complement the data with information from public sources. Still, for a significant 
number of deals we do not have exact return information due to either a lack of 
reported data or due to the fact that many deals in the data are yet to be exited. We 
therefore initially follow the extant literature (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellman (2007), 
Sorensen (2007) and Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2006)) and measure 
success as either a successful exit through an IPO or a trade sale.  We complement the 
exit analysis with return measures where feasible. We are also interested in the time it 
takes to exit, and how this has developed over time and across regions.  In contrast to 
the studies mentioned above, we use survival analysis, which is the most natural 
econometric way to handle data of this sort. 
 
Our dataset covers 35,798 companies that received VC investments between 1980 and 
2011.  12,315 of these are in Europe (where the first year we use data from is 1995) 
and 23,483 in the US.  We first confirm that US venture capital has indeed been 
substantially more successful on aggregate; a fraction of 38.8% had a successful exit 
over the entire period in the US compared to 25.3% in Europe. 
We start by investigating the extent to which this difference depends purely on 
variables that have little to do with the relative merits of European vs. US venture 
capital, but purely depends on the timing, industry, and stage of investments.  We 
show that much of the difference in success rates is due to differences in the timing of 
investments.  Once we compare success rates between investment done in the US and 
in Europe in the same year, the estimated difference in probability of success between 
the US and Europe goes down from 16.6% to 9.1%.  If we define success purely as 
exiting through an IPO, the difference between the US and Europe disappears 
completely once we control for the year of the investment – the entire difference is 
due to a lower probability of trade sales in Europe.  Although success rates differ 
depending on the industry and life-cycle stage of the company at the time of the 
investment,  differences in industry composition or stage of investment between the 
US and Europe explain none of the difference in success rates.  
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We also describe the general trend in exit probabilities and time to exit for the two 
regions.  Perhaps not surprisingly for observers of the venture capital industry, there 
has been a remarkable shift downward in the probability of exit via IPOs in both 
regions, and contingent on doing an IPO, a significant shift upward in the average time 
to exit.  What we find more surprising is that the process for trade sales is very stable 
over time, with little change in either the probability of exit or the time to exit. 
 
We next go on to investigate the extent to which entrepreneurial characteristics and 
venture capitalist characteristics influence success rates. Similarly to Gompers et al 
(2010), we find that serial entrepreneurs, and in particular previously successful serial 
entrepreneurs, tend to do better on average in both regions.  This explains part of the 
remaining difference in success rates between Europe and the US, since serial 
entrepreneurs account for only about 15% of deals done in Europe, but 35% of deals 
done in the US.  For the subsample of companies with founders that are serial 
entrepreneurs, there is no difference in success between the two regions.  We also find 
that a previously unsuccessful entrepreneur has at least as high a chance of getting 
financing for a new venture in Europe as in the US – hence, at least on this limited 
metric, we find no evidence for a ”stigma of failure” in Europe.  We also find that 
female entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs with higher education (PhD or MD) tend to 
underperform. 
 
We go on to relate success to the characteristics of venture capitalists.  The experience 
of the venture capitalists on the board of the company  – as measured by how many 
deals they have done relative to other VCs – is strongly related to success, and once 
we control for VC experience there is no difference in performance between the US 
and Europe.  Since VC experience in Europe has gone up in the last couple of years, 
this is good news looking forward.  We also find that having a VC represented on the 
board, having a VC that is specialized in the industry of the firm, using preferred 
shares, and syndicating deals are all features related to better performance, and that 
these variables have the same effect in the US and Europe. 
 
We complement the exit analyses by investigating the profitability of deals conditional 
on exits. IPOs are more profitable than trade sales, but there is no difference in 
profitability conditional on exit between Europe and the US in the subset of deals 
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where profitability can be measured. However, there is evidence of a positive selection 
bias in the set of European trade sales – the set of trade sales for which we have no 
profitability information tend to have smaller buyers, which typically is a sign of lower 
profitability, Adjusting for the selection bias, European trade sales appear to be 5-7% 
less profitable than US trade sales. 
 
After conditioning on exit type, VC experience has no effect on profitability, while 
entrepreneurial experience does seem to increase profitability. Having a VC on the 
board is associated with lower profitability conditional on exit, which together with 
the fact that VC board representation significantly increases the likelihood of a 
successful exit is consistent with VCs being able to push a larger set of marginal firms 
to successful exits when they have board power. 
 
We corroborate the findings above by performing an analyses where we impute return 
measures for deals where we have no return information, so that we directly can 
analyse determinants of returns without having to condition on successful exits. 
Although this exercise requires a number of judgement calls that may decrease the 
level of trust one has in the results, it is comforting that the results are completely 
consistent with our survival analysis.   
 
Finally, we find that the effects noted above seem quite uniform across different 
European countries.  There is some evidence of difference in performance across 
European countries, with the UK performing the best and Germany and the Benelux 
countries performing the worst. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe 
our data sources, provide some general descriptive statistics, and perform our initial 
examination of exit rates.  Section III investigates the effects of entrepreneurial and 
venture capitalist characteristics. Section IV concludes. 
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II. Data description and initial analysis 
 
Our core data comes from Dow Jones’ Venture Source (previously called 
Venture One).  Venture Source, established in 1987, collects data on firms that have 
obtained venture capital financing. Firms that have received early-stage financing 
exclusively from individual investors, federally chartered Small Business Investment 
Companies, and corporate development groups are not included in the database. The 
companies are initially identified from a wide variety of sources, including trade 
publications, company Web pages, and telephone contacts with venture investors. 
Venture Source then collects information about the businesses through interviews with 
both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The data include the identity of the key 
founders, as well as the industry, strategy, employment, financial history, and revenues 
of the company. Data on the firms are updated and validated through monthly contacts 
with investors and companies.2 
 
Venture Source has quite good coverage of European deals since at least the year 2000. 
Table 1 describes the number of deals in the US and Europe covered by Venture 
Source, relative to the number of deals reported by the North American Capital 
Association (NVCA) for US and the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) 
for Europe.  The EVCA, in particular, pools together many later-stage buyout 
investments in their definition of venture capital, which explains the large numbers 
they report from 2001 to 2005.  Venture Source does not suffer from this type of 
misclassification.  It is clear from the table that the Venture Source coverage for 
Europe is somewhat spotty before the end of the 90’s.  The internet boom around 2000 
and the following bust is evident for both samples.  Figure 1 shows the number of 
distinct firms in our sample over time and across regions.   
 
For most of the analysis we will disregard European deals done before 1995, a period 
in which Venture Source covers less than 100 deals per year and a very small fraction 
relative to the coverage in the EVCA data.  We leave these deals out because of a 
                                                 
2 The description in this paragraph of Venture Source is borrowed from Gompers, Lerner, and 
Scharfstein (2010). 
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concern that these earlier European deals are not representative of the full sample.  In 
particular, although the fraction of exits in these early cohorts is quite high (see Table 
4), a very large proportion of exits happen after more than 10 years after the initial 
investment – leading to a concern that only deals with successful and late exits were 
picked up in the dataset. 
 
Table 2 reports the split-up of firms in our sample across industries and stages of 
investment. The industry compositions are remarkably similar across the two regions, 
with the largest industry being Internet and Computer which represents 40% of all 
deals in both regions, followed by Biotech and Healthcare which represents around 
20% of all deals.  Early stage investment is more common in the US, whereas 
European venture capitalists invest more in revenue-generating businesses – revenue 
generating and profitable businesses represent 59% of all first-time investments in 
Europe, and 43% in the US.  Table 3 gives the size of the initial investment by VCs, 
and, for the subsample in which we have this data, the post-money valuations at the 
time of the first investment.  The initial ownership stake of VCs is the amount invested 
divided by the post-money valuation.  Both amounts invested and valuations are 
higher in the US than in Europe; the average amount invested in the US is $5.7 million 
while it is $3.1 million in Europe, and the average post-money valuation in the US is 
$18 million while it is $11 million in Europe (all in 2005 dollars).  Initial ownership 
stakes by VCs in both regions are around 30%. 
 
Table 4 reports the number of IPOs and trade sales for Europe and the US by vintage 
year (defined as the year of the first investment by a venture capitalist). The total 
fraction of successful exits over the whole period for Europe is 25.0% (4.7% for IPOs 
and 20.3% for trade sales), where the corresponding number for the US is 37.4% (9.2% 
for IPOs and 28.2% for trade sales).  The differences in success rates are highly 
statistically significant; Europe is clearly underperforming the US according to this 
metric.  
 
The difference in successful exit probability between Europe and the US appears big, 
but is misleading due to the difference in distribution over time of the deals made in 
the two regions. Figure 2 plots the fraction of IPOs and trade sales over vintage years 
for the two regions (with bands of one standard error of the mean above and below 
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indicated); the average difference in success rates looks much smaller once time 
effects are taken into account.  In fact, for IPOs, there is no statistical difference in 
success rates between the two regions.  Trade sales, however, are more common in the 
US than in Europe even controlling for the year of the investment.   
 
It is also apparent from Figure 2 that success rates go down over time.  A large part of 
this pattern can be explained by the fact that the final outcome for the investments 
made in the later part of the sample are still uncertain – many may still be exited 
successfully given enough time.  Using survival analysis, we can modify our estimates 
of success probabilities to take this into account.  A survival model assumes that a firm 
has a certain probability of going to IPO, being subject to a trade sale, or being 
liquidated at every point in time that it is still “alive”, so that a firm that has an earlier 
investment year is subject to more chances of exit over time. More precisely, we do 
this by modelling the “hazard rate” hj,i(t) for type of exit i (IPO or trade sale) at time t 
since first VC financing for firm j.  The hazard rate can be interpreted as the probability 
of exit during one unit of time conditional of not having exited up to time t.  We use a 
competing risk Cox proportional hazard model (see Cleves et al (2010) and Cameron 
and Trivedi (2005)), in which the hazard rates evolve according to: 
hj,i(t) = h0,i(t) * exp(β0,i + xj,i,tβx,i), 
 
where h0(t) is a non-parametric “base rate” to be estimated, xj,i,t is a vector of 
potentially time-varying explanatory variables, and β0,i  and βx,i are coefficients to be 
estimated.  Once we have estimated hazard rates, we can calculate probabilities of exit 
and expected time to exit. 
 
We start by non-parametrically estimating hazard rates without any explanatory 
variables for the two regions.  The estimated cumulative density functions for IPOs 
and trade sales combined across the two regions are plotted in Figure 3a, while Figures 
3b and 3c give the cumulative density for IPOs and trade sales separately.   The 
estimation takes into account the fact that later deals may not have had time to exit 
yet.  The total probability of exiting via an IPO is estimated to be 13.1% in the US and 
6.2% in Europe, while for trade sales the corresponding numbers are 43.7% for the 
US and 34.0% for Europe. (These numbers can be read off the graphs in Figures 3b 
and 3c and are also reported in Table 5.)  Exits tend to occur at the most intensive rate 
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between months 10 and 90, although a surprisingly large fraction of exits (almost 20%) 
occur more than 10 years after the initial investment.  The median time to exit is four 
years (Table 5, Panel B). 
 
Figure 3 hides important calendar time variation in the data, as it pools together all 
deals regardless of the year of investment.  In figure 4, we provide cumulative density 
functions for exit for each cohort year from 1995 to 2010.  Splitting up the sample 
across different vintage years provides several takeaways: 
 
1. As noted above, the difference in success rates between the US and Europe 
goes down significantly (although it does not disappear) once we compare 
deals of the same vintage year.  This is because European deals are relatively 
more prevalent in the later part of the sample, where success rates are lower 
globally. 
2. Certain periods are related to higher exit rates for all cohorts and regions, 
especially the years 1999-2000. 
3. US and European cumulative density functions look proportional. 
4. Success rates have gone down more or less uniformly across time, and time to 
exit appears to have gone up across time. 
 
In Figure 5, we separate between IPOs and trade sales.  In both regions, IPO intensity 
is the highest between 1998 and 2000 and virtually dies out after this period, while 
trade sales happen more continuously through time.  Finally, Europe and the US are 
much more similar in terms of the IPO process than the trade sales process.  Europe 
does not seem to be underperforming with respect to IPOs once we control for the 
vintage year whereas Europe definitely underperforms with respect to trade sales.   
 
We also note that for European trade sales, the earlier years (1995-1998) have a 
peculiar tendency for a large fraction of late exits.  There is a concern that this might 
be due to misrepresentative data (old firms with late exits have a higher probability of 
being back-filled into the data.)  Our results are robust to exluding these deals from 
the analysis. 
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Table 5 summarizes exit probabilities calculated with our hazard model for different 
time periods, regions, and exit types.  IPO probabilities at all horizons have gone down 
by at least two thirds since the 90s, and conditional on an IPO, the time to exit has 
gone up.  In contrast, both probability of exit and time to exit for trade sales stay 
remarkably constant throughout the sample.  
 
Using these insights, we next estimate a model where we control for time explicitly.  
We do this by pooling observations across regions, adding yearly calendar time 
dummies, and a European dummy. The idea behind the calendar time dummies is that 
market conditions in a given year affect the probability of exit in that year for all 
cohorts of “live” firms in a proportional way.  Table 8 reports the results from this 
regression.  Specifications 1 to 3 combines IPOs and trade sale exits, specifications 4 
to 6 look only at IPOs, while specifications 7 to 9 look only at trade sale exits.  For 
each type of exit, we use three sets of explanatory variables: First, a Europe dummy 
only (specifications 1, 4, and 7); second, calendar time dummies (specifications 2, 5, 
and 8), and third, both time, industry, stage, and round fixed effects (specifications 3, 
6, and 9). 
 
We note that IPOs and trade sales have very different characteristics.  Calendar time 
variation is much more important for IPOs.  All of the difference in IPO rates between 
the US and Europe are explained by time variation, whereas none of the difference 
with respect to trade sales is.  Combining IPOs and trade sales, the coefficient on the 
European dummy in Specification 3 (which includes all fixed effects) is negative 
0.265.  Interpreted in probability terms, this means that European deals have 9.1 
percentage points lower probability of exiting, while the corresponding number 
without controlling for time fixed effects is 16.6 percentage points. 
 
Also, in unreported regressions we confirm that controlling for the vintage year of the 
investment does not add much once calendar time dummies are introduced, and 
clustering by vintage year does not change the qualitative nature of the results.  The 
results also remain qualitatively the same if we restrict ourselves to deals done 1999 
or later. 
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Figure 6 plots the time dummies for IPOs and trade sales separately. This figure 
illustrates the volatility of the IPO market relative to the trade sales market, and the 
decline in IPOs in the last decade. 
 
IIB: Public Market Equivalent Measures of Profitability 
 
We measure deal performance using the public market equivalent (PME) 
measure suggested by Kaplan and Schoar (2005).  The PME compares an investment 
in a venture deal to an investment in a broad stock market index made during the same 
time period. We use the CRSP NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ Value-Weighted Market 
Index as the benchmark public index. We implement the PME calculation by 
discounting (or investing) the exit value to venture capitalists in a deal using the CRSP 
index total return and comparing the resulting value to the discounted value of the cash 
investments made by venture capitalists into the deal, again using the total return to 
the CRSP index. Using this approach, a deal with a PME greater than one has 
outperformed the CRSP index gross of fees.  Under the assumption that the 
representative investor holds the market and has log utility, Jagannathan and Sorensen 
(2013) show that the PME measure represents an estimate of the risk-adjusted excess 
return. 
 
Table 4 shows the coverage in our data of cash flow information necessary to calculate 
the PME of a deal. Note that failed deals have a PME of zero (or a return of -100%), 
so no cash flow information is necessary for failed deals. For IPOs, we have return 
information for the majority of deals (77% in Europe and 91% in the US), while a 
smaller fraction of trade sales have return information (33% in Europe and 50% in the 
US). For some tests, we resort to a rougher measure of performance for trade sales 
without return information by checking whether the buyer was big, medium, or small, 
and imputing the PME for these categories. Table 7 shows the distribution of buyer 
types in trade sales across the two regions and median PMEs within buyer types. PMEs 
are increasing in buyer size. As can be seen in Table 6, European trade sales where we 
lack return information more commonly have small buyers than in the US, which 
introduces an upward selection bias in reported European trade sale returns. We try to 
remedy this problem for some tests by including imputed returns where information 
is missing. 
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Table 6 shows descriptive statistics on PMEs over time for the two regions conditional 
on IPOs or trade sales, including only deals for which we have return information. A 
pooled PME, in contrast to a deal-level PME, is calculated by adding all the cash flows 
of a group of deals together in a portfolio and calculating a PME for the portfolio. If 
one pools all European IPOs over all time periods, the portfolio has a PME of 3.18, 
while a portfolio of US IPOs has a PME of 3.12. This difference flips if one compares 
pooled vintage year PMEs for the two regions (reported in the first two columns, and 
plotted in Figure 11). In an average year, the pooled PME for US IPOs is 0.62 higher 
than the pooled PME for European IPOs, but the difference is not statistically 
significant. When comparing deal-level PMEs (columns 3 and 4, and plotted in Figure 
12), and controlling for vintage year, the difference again flips – European deal-level 
PMEs are on average .46 higher than US deal-level PMEs, but the difference is not 
statistically significant. Overall, our conclusion is that IPO PMEs are similar for the 
two regions after controlling for the vintage year. 
 
Columns 5 to 8 of Table 6 report pooled and deal-level PMEs for trade sales, and here 
European trade sales are uniformly lower, but the difference is close to zero and 
insignificant. However, these numbers are not corrected for the positive selection bias 
of European trade sales for which we have return data. The regressions in Table 8b 
illustrates the bias. Columns 7 to 9 regresses trade sales PMEs including imputed 
PMEs where return information is missing, and shows that trade sale PMEs in Europe 
are about 7% lower than in the US even after controlling for vintage year.   We also 
try to push the PME analysis one step further by directly measuring PMEs for all deals 
rather than conditioning on successful exits. This requires a few extra leaps of faith. 
First, since we have little direct evidence about whether deals are dead or still have 
some chance of a successful exit, we have to make a judgement call in designating 
dead deals (which are included in the analysis as deals with a PME of zero). We 
assume that of all deals not exited or directly classified as dead by 2006, those deals 
who did not have a future financing round by 2011 are dead. Also, in order to keep the 
balance of successful exits the same in Europe and the US, we have to impute PMEs 
for all IPOs and trade sales for which we do not have return information. For trade 
sales, we do this by assuming the PME for a trade sale without return information is 
the same as for the median PME with the same buyer type in the same region (numbers 
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reported in Table 7). For IPOs, we assume the IPO had the same PME as the median 
IPO in the same year in the same region. Average PMEs using this procedure are 
plotted in Figure 18 for the two regions, together with upper and lower quartile bands. 
The average can be misleading as it is sensitive to outliers, but the median is 
uninteresting as it is typically zero. 
 
Column 1 of Table 12c shows that this “total PME” measure is about 20% lower in 
Europe than in the US if one does not control for time, consistent with the result on 
exit probabilities. Column 2 of Table 12c includes year, industry, stage, and round 
fixed effects, which increases the European dummy from -0.19 to -0.09, but it is still 
highly significant. This reflects the lower probability and profitability of trade sales in 
Europe. 
 
 
III.  Entrepreneurial and Venture Capitalist Variables  
 
We now go on to investigate the role of the entrepreneurial climate and the 
sophistication of VCs for success rates. 
 
IIIA. Entrepreneurial variables 
 
Having a large pool of good potential entrepreneurs is obviously important for a 
successful entrepreneurial climate, as is the capability of separating the good 
entrepreneurs from the bad when financing decisions are made.  Using the Venture 
Source data for US firms financed up to 2003, Gompers et al (2010) have shown 
evidence of persistent skill differences between entrepreneurs, and evidence that 
venture capitalists are able to identify these skills in their financing decisions.  More 
specifically, they provide three insights.  First, entrepreneurs that get financing for a 
second venture are more likely to have been successful in their first venture than the 
total population of entreprenurs, showing that venture capitalists do believe that 
success is a signal of persistent skill (or, alternatively, that entrepreneurs who have 
been successful are more eager to start a second venture than other entrepreneurs). 
Secondly, these entrepreneurs are more successful on average in their second venture 
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than the general population, showing that VCs appear to have been justified in their 
belief that success predicts success.  Finally, they show that entrepreneurs who were 
unsuccessful in their previous venture but still get financing for a second venture 
perform no worse than the average entrepreneur.  This last finding is consistent with 
VCs screening properly when financing previously unsuccessful entrepreneurs. 
 
The results in Gompers et al (2010) also suggest that the existence of a pool of serial 
entrepreneurs may be important for the success of the venture industry.  First, this pool 
of proven entrepreneurs can be dipped into when financing new ventures.  Second, it 
may be that experience itself (whether positive or negative) can build skill for future 
ventures. The existence of such a pool may be threatened if society attaches a high 
“stigma of failure” to failed entrepreneurs (see Landier (2006)), and several people 
have argued that Europe is in the “bad equilibrium” where potential entrepreneurs are 
discouraged from trying out new ventures from a fear of the consequences of failure. 
 
We extend the analysis in Gompers et al (2010) to also cover European entrepreneurs, 
and make some preliminary investigation into the existence of a stigma of failure in 
Europe.  Venture Source tracks the identity and some characteristics of founders in 
entrepreneurial firms.  We classify an entrepreneur as being experienced if Venture 
Source indicates him or her as having been a founder of a previous venture.  This may 
involve ventures that are not covered in the database.  When a previous venture of an 
entrepreneur is covered in the database, we can also measure whether the venture had 
a successful exit or not.  For a venture with several founders, we classify the firm as 
having experience if one of the founders has experience, and we classify a previous 
venture as being successful if one of the founders had a successful experience. 
 
The proportion of firms with a founder with an entrepreneurial background is reported 
in Figure 7.  Since 1995, this proportion is around 35% in the US and around 15% in 
Europe, with fairly small yearly variations.  Hence, we confirm that venture capitalists 
in the US seem to be able to dip into a deeper pool of experienced entrepreneurs. 
 
In Figure 8 we investigate the stigma of failure by looking at how many of the repeat 
entrepreneurs getting financing were unsuccessful in their previous venture.  Using 
this measure, there is no evidence for a larger stigma of failure in Europe relative to 
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the US – in fact, the proportion of firms with entrepreneurs who previously failed is 
larger in Europe than the US. 
 
Figure 9 shows success rates (combining IPOs and trade sales) for first time 
entrepreneurs and serial entrepreneurs in the two regions.  Success rates are somewhat 
higher for repeat entrepreneurs (in their later ventures) both in Europe and in the US.  
The figures also show that the first venture of entrepreneurs who later become repeat 
entrepreneurs do much better on average than other first ventures.  This is not 
surprising, as unsuccessful first time entrepreneurs are less likely to get financing for 
a second venture.  The pattern looks similar in Europe and the US, and is consistent 
with a story in which venture capitalists rationally update their beliefs about the talent 
of entrepreneurs after observing their first venture.   
 
We go on to examine the extent to which entrepreneurial characteristics can explain 
the difference in success rates between the US and Europe in a regression framework. 
Table 9 reports the results.  Note that we have to restrict the analysis to the subset of 
data where we have enough information about founders, which reduces the set of firms 
from 35,798 to 34,887.  Although the set of firms without founder data have lower 
success rates on average, dropping these observations does not seem to affect our 
general results. 
 
In Specification 1, we include experience of the founders of a firm, and, for the set of 
firms that have founders that are serial entrepreneurs and where data availability 
allows, whether previous ventures where successful or not.  Founder experience is 
strongly related to success. For the observations where we have data on the success on 
previous ventures, we confirm the result in Gompers et al (2010) that the better 
performance of serial entrepreneurs is mostly driven by the previously successful 
serial entrepreneurs. Including the entrepreneurial variables partly explains the 
difference between the US and Europe (the coefficient on the Europe dummy goes 
from negative 0.265 in Specification 3 of Table 8 to negative 0.229, which corresponds 
to a decrease in the difference in success rates from 9.1 percentage points to 8.3 
percentage points).  
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In Specifications 2 and 3, we split the sample into the set of firms with experienced 
founders (Specification 2) and inexperienced founders (Specification 3).  For the set 
of firms with experienced founders, there is no difference in success rates between 
Europe and the US. The difference comes entirely from the set of firms with 
inexperienced founders, where Europe does significantly worse. 
 
In Specification 4, we introduce other characteristics of entrepreneurs, as well as 
interaction terms on explanatory variables with the European dummy to investigate 
whether entrepreneurial characteristics have the same effect in Europe as in the US.  
Founders with a PhD or an MD degree are associated with lower success rates, 
especially in Europe.  Female founders are also associated with significantly lower 
success rates.  This is consistent with venture capitalists being more willing to finance 
marginal ventures backed by highly educated or female founders than other founders.  
Founder experience is significantly more strongly associated with success in Europe 
than in the US.  Finally, in Specifications 5 and 6, we run competing risk models for 
exit via IPO and trade sales separately.  Here, we use as a measure for success on 
previous venture only exits via IPOs in Specification 5 and only exit via trade sales in 
Specification 6.  As before, IPOs are no less likely in Europe than in the US, whereas 
trade sales are less likely in Europe. For IPOs, the main differences to the regressions 
on aggregate exits are that all experience and success measures seem more significant, 
and that having a founder with a PhD or MD is now significantly positively related to 
success.  For trade sales, the opposite seems to hold. 
 
Table 9b reports the results when we regress IPO and trade sale PMEs on the same 
explanatory variables. The European dummy is very close to zero when we use 
specifications with actual returns, while it remains negative when imputed trade sales 
are included. Experience of the entrepreneur seems to have a positive effect on 
performance also conditional on a successful exit, while previous success does not. 
Hence, previous success seems mostly important for increasing the likelihood of a 
successful exit, not for increasing performance conditional on a successful exit. 
 
Column 4 of Table 12c shows a regression of total PMEs on entrepreneurial 
characteristics. All variables have the same effect as for exit probabilities, and the 
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European dummy increases from -0.0891 to -0.0685 when entrepreneurial 
characteristics are included, consistent with our exit analysis.  
 
IIIB. Venture capitalist and contracting variables 
 
It has been shown in several studies that venture capitalist experience is related to the 
success of ventures (see Sorensen (2007), Gompers et al (2010), Gompers, Kovner, 
and Lerner (2009), and Hochberg, Ljungquist, and Lu (2007)).  This could be either 
because of influence (experienced VCs are better at bringing firms to exit through 
value-added advice, monitoring, or resources) or sorting (experienced VCs are better 
at picking good firms to invest in, or the good firms choose to go with the more 
experienced VCs).  For our main purpose, which is to check the extent to which the 
degree of VC sophistication can explain differences in success rates between the US 
and Europe, it is not crucial to distinguish between the influence and the sorting 
channel.   
 
We follow Gompers et al (2010) and define experience for a particular VC with board 
representation at a company as the log of one plus the number of prior companies in 
which the VC has invested minus one plus the average number of previous 
investments undertaken by venture capital firms in the year of the investment.  If there 
is more than one venture capital firm represented on the board, we define VC 
experience for that firm as the maximum of the experience amongst the different VCs.  
We also create an individual-specific measure of experience for the particular partner 
of the VC firm represented on the board to investigate whether VC firm experience or 
particular partner experience seems more important. 
 
Following Gompers, Kovner, and Lerner (2009), we also measure the extent to which 
VC or partner specialisation is related to success.  We measure specialisation as the 
fraction of previous deals done by the venture capitalist or partner in the same industry 
as the current company, out of all deals done by the venture capitalist or partner 
previously.  If there are several VCs / partners represented on the board, we take the 
maximum across these.  We require that a VC / partner has done at least 5 / 3 deals 
previously in total, otherwise we set specialisation to zero.  
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We also measure whether a firm is financed by a syndicate or not, as syndication has 
been related to success in previous studies (see e.g. Hege, Palomino, and 
Schwienbacher (2009), and Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2008)).  Finally, Venture 
Source sometimes has information about whether VCs use preferred shares or not.  
Kaplan, Martel, and Strömberg (2007) argue that what they term “US style contracts”, 
which prominently includes relying on convertible preferred securities rather than 
straight equity for the venture capitalist, is a better way of contracting and leads to 
higher success rates.  We do not know exactly what type of contracts are captured by 
Venture Source’s classification of “preferred shares”, and this information is also 
missing for a large set of companies, but our results (see below) are in line with the 
findings in Kaplan, Martel, and Strömberg. 
 
Table 10 shows the number of distinct venture capital organisations represented in our 
dataset across the two regions and across time in our dataset, as well as the number of 
deals associated with each organisations.  Note that we only have this information for 
VCs that are represented on the board of companies.  In total, 5,131 distinct US VC 
organisations and 2,388 European VC organisations were active during some part of 
the period covered by our data. 
 
Figure 10 shows the median VC experience measure over time for the two regions, as 
well as the interquartile range.  The US has on average higher experience, but the 
difference has become smaller over time.  Still, in 2010, the median experience for 
European VCs was as small as the 25th percentile of US VCs, whereas the 75th 
percentile European VC was no more experienced than the median US VC. 
 
Table 11 shows the results of a multivariate regression of success including VC 
characteristics as explanatory variables.  One problem is that we can only calculate 
VC characteristics when we have board data, and this information is missing for 8,940 
out of our 35,798 portfolio companies.  To investigate whether the remaining 
observations constitute a biased sample, we first run a regression over the whole 
sample including a dummy for whether we have board data or not (Specification 1 of 
Table 11).  The observations without board data have significantly lower success rates.  
Furthermore, once we control for whether we have board data or not, the European 
dummy goes up significantly (from negative 0.265 to negative 0.226).  This is partly 
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due to the fact that proportionately more of the European deals have missing board 
data.  However, we also show that Europe seems to be doing proportionately worse 
on these deals relative to the deals with board data.  In Specification 2 we run the same 
regression on only the observations with board data, and here the European dummy 
goes up to negative 0.178 but is still highly significant.  In Specification 3 we run the 
same regression for the subsample without board data, where the European dummy 
goes down to negative 0.492.  Columns 3 and 5 of Table 12c show the same pattern 
in total PMEs; firms with board data tend to have higher PMEs and Europe has fewer 
firms with board data. To summarise, this means that our investigation of the 
subsample with board data is likely to underestimate the difference between Europe 
and the US in the total sample.  Bearing this in mind, we go on to investigate the 
explanatory power of venture capitalist variables for success rates. 
 
Specification 4 of Table 11 shows our main result, which is that once we control for 
whether the VC has a seat on the board or not, and if so, how experienced the VC is, 
there is no difference in success rates between Europe and the US.  Having VC board 
representation and VC experience are both associated with success, and as is obvious 
from Figure 10, European venture capitalists have lower experience on average than 
US VCs. 
 
Specification 5 introduces VC specialisation, which is also positively related to 
success.  Specification 6 uses experience and specialisation measures for the 
individual partners sitting on the board instead of the VC firm they represent.  The 
results are qualitatively the same; partner experience and specialisation are positively 
related to success.  When we run both VC and partner variables together (Specification 
7), it appears that VC firm experience is more important than partner experience, 
whereas partner specialisation is more important than VC firm specialisation.  In the 
remaining tests we therefore keep these two explanatory variables.  In unreported 
regressions, we interact all variables with the European dummy, but these interaction 
variables are insignificant, indicating that explanatory variables have the same effect 
in Europe and the US. 
 
In Table 12, Specification 1,  we also include our entrepreneurial variables.  Although 
the direction of all variables is the same as before, the European dummy becomes 
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significantly positive once we control for both VC and entrepreneurial experience.  
This is even more so in Specification  2, where we also introduce dummies for whether 
the deal is syndicated and whether preferred shares are used (both variables are 
significantly related to success).  Specifications 3 and 4 do the same analysis for IPOs 
only.  European deals very strongly outperform with respect to IPOs once we control 
for VC and entrepreneurial experience.  However, as is shown in Specifications 5 and 
6, Europe still underperforms with respect to trade sales. 
 
Table 12b reports the effect the venture capitalist variables have on PMEs conditional 
on successful exits. What stands out here is that VC board representation and VC 
experience if anything have a negative effect on conditional performance, as opposed 
to the positive effect these variables have on the probability of a successful exit. This 
is not necessarily puzzling. It is possible that VC experience and board representation 
will make more marginal firms attain a successful exit, which can pull down 
performance conditional on exit even if the net effect on firms is beneficial. This 
hypothesis is corroborated in our regression of total PME measures on VC 
characteristics in Columns 6 and 7 of Table 12c, where all variables have the same 
impact as they have on successful exit probabilities. These specifications also show 
that the European dummy becomes significantly positive (at around 0.07) once VC 
experience is controlled for in the PME regressions.  
 
Finally, in Table 13, we introduce country fixed effects into the regression to see 
whether there are significant differences across different regions of Europe and 
whether accounting for these changes any of our previous conclusions.  The answer to 
both these questions is no; the coefficient on most country dummies stay close to the 
previously estimated coefficient on the European dummies, and all other variables 
have virtually the same coefficients.  The difference we do find is that the UK appears 
to do better than the median country in Europe, while Germany and the Benelux 
countries appear to do worse in most specifications.  However, Germany does 
extremely well when we look at IPOs only, perhaps related to the Neue Markt. 
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IV.  Conclusions 
 
We examine the determinants of success in venture capital transactions using 
the largest deal-level data set to date, with special emphasis on comparing European 
to US transactions.  Using survival analysis, we show that for both regions the 
probability of exit via initial public offering (IPO) has gone down significantly over 
the last decade, while the time to IPO has gone up – in contrast, the probability of exit 
via trade sales and the average time to trade sales do not change much over time. 
Contrary to perceived wisdom, there is no difference in the likelihood or profitability 
of IPOs between European and US deals from the same vintage year. However, 
European trade sales are less likely and less profitable than US trade sales. Venture 
success has the same determinants in both Europe and US, with more experienced 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists being associated with higher success.  The fact 
that repeat or ‘serial’ entrepreneurs are less common in Europe and that European VCs 
lag US VCs in terms of experience completely explains any difference in performance 
between Europe and the US. Also, contrary to perceived wisdom, we find no evidence 
of a stigma of failure for entrepreneurs in Europe. 
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Table 1: VC investment amount per year (Million US dollars) 
The table shows current US dollar amounts (in millions) invested by venture capitalists in a given year, 
as captured by Venture Source, the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA), and the North 
American Venture Capital Association (NVCA). 
 Europe United States 
Year Venture Source EVCA Venture Source NVCA 
1980     7   
1981 0   74   
1982     267   
1983 9   1498   
1984 0   1711   
1985 3   1996   
1986 8   1967   
1987 7   2123   
1988 17   2072   
1989 13 2336 2409   
1990 21 2980 2727   
1991 10 3417 2729   
1992 29 3146 3480   
1993 53 2443 3833   
1994 60 3089 4654   
1995 136 3390 6703 7313 
1996 334 3952 9664 10568 
1997 562 4618 12941 14137 
1998 1444 6703 17413 19780 
1999 5567 11369 48058 51329 
2000 18270 18140 91903 99158 
2001 9043 10912 35702 38065 
2002 4870 9255 21779 20850 
2003 3842 9470 19369 18614 
2004 4868 12776 22447 22355 
2005 4808 15791 23806 22946 
2006 5656 21677 29730 26594 
2007 6378 8491 32023 30826 
2008 6927 10087 30879 30546 
2009 4750 5748 23969 19746 
2010 6210 4978 29511 23263 
2011 4153   22730 28425 
     
Total 88048 174767 510172 484516 
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Table 2: Industry and Stage composition across regions 
The table shows fraction of deals across regions that fall into different industries and into different 
stages of investments. 
  Europe US Europe & US 
Industry Group 
# of 
deals 
% of 
total 
# of 
deals 
% of 
total 
# of 
deals 
% of 
total 
Biotech and health care 2,251 18.1% 4,881 20.8% 7,132 19.8% 
Business services 1,260 10.1% 2,052 8.7% 3,312 9.2% 
Business/industrial 638 5.1% 596 2.5% 1,234 3.4% 
Communications and 
electronics 1,660 13.3% 4,404 18.7% 6,064 16.9% 
Consumer 873 7.0% 1,266 5.4% 2,139 5.9% 
Energy 395 3.2% 404 1.7% 799 2.2% 
Financial services 303 2.4% 671 2.9% 974 2.7% 
Internet and computer 5,011 40.2% 9,156 39.0% 14,167 39.4% 
Other 66 0.5% 76 0.3% 142 0.4% 
Total 12,457 100.0% 23,506 100% 35,963 100.0% 
Stage of investment             
Startup 1,864 15.0% 3,940 16.8% 5,804 16.1% 
Product Development 3,111 25.0% 7,748 33.0% 10,859 30.2% 
Product In Beta Test 143 1.1% 693 2.9% 836 2.3% 
Generating Revenue 6,965 55.9% 9,257 39.4% 16,222 45.1% 
Profitable 371 3.0% 914 3.9% 1,285 3.6% 
Restart 3 0.0% 50 0.2% 53 0.1% 
N/A 0 0.0% 904 3.8% 904 2.5% 
Total 12,457 100.0% 23,506 100.0% 35,963 100.0% 
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Table 3: Investment amounts and valuations across regions (2005 million 
US dollars) 
The top panel shows the amount invested by VCs in the first round of financing by VCs in 2005 US 
dollars (millions).  The bottom panel shows post-money valuations, where available, at the first round 
of VC financing. 
Panel A: Funds invested at the time of the first VC financing round (in millions 2005 USD) 
  Europe US 
  percentile   # of percentile   # of 
Stage of 
investment 25th 50th 75th mean  deals 25th 50th 75th mean  deals 
Startup 0.30 0.75 1.85 2.38 1472 0.61 1.32 3.26 2.84 3500 
Product 
Development 0.52 1.28 3.14 3.34 2458 1.41 3.45 6.87 6.15 7118 
Product In 
Beta Test 0.46 1.30 3.07 3.05 101 1.74 3.10 5.51 4.34 632 
Generating 
Revenue 0.55 1.34 3.11 3.11 4960 1.67 3.55 7.19 6.49 8088 
Profitable 0.80 1.94 4.39 3.98 313 2.34 5.07 10.53 10.10 839 
Restart 0.27 1.88 1.89 1.35 3 1.19 2.25 5.19 3.76 48 
N/A         0 0.93 2.24 4.39 3.32 788 
Total 0.49 1.24 2.95 3.09 9307 1.29 3.06 6.32 5.72 21013 
Panel B: Valuations at the time of the first VC financing round (in millions 2005 USD) 
  Europe US 
  percentile   # of percentile   # of 
Stage of 
investment 25th 50th 75th mean  deals 25th 50th 75th mean  deals 
Startup 1.08 2.63 5.79 7.05 711 2.37 4.56 8.77 7.83 1234 
Product 
Development 1.92 4.34 10.07 9.11 979 5.27 9.63 16.75 15.25 2886 
Product In 
Beta Test 1.75 4.22 9.12 9.96 33 5.26 9.99 17.55 13.31 239 
Generating 
Revenue 2.30 5.34 11.93 12.07 2032 6.38 12.24 24.28 23.24 2928 
Profitable 3.69 8.43 18.42 26.86 162 8.77 17.55 41.58 36.73 367 
Restart 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 1 3.23 4.75 10.53 6.89 27 
N/A         0 3.78 7.09 13.55 12.75 88 
Total 1.90 4.53 10.45 11.01 3918 4.92 9.65 18.42 17.98 7769 
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Table 4: Success rates across regions and years 
The table shows fraction of deals for a given investment year that subsequently underwent an IPO or a trade sale, and the fraction of IPOs and trade sales for which we can calculate PME 
measures.  The last two columns tests the difference in means between Europe and the US for IPOs and trade sales, respectively.  A positive  (negative) t-statistic with absolute value larger 
than 2 means that Europe has a higher (lower) success rate at the 95% significance level.  The t-tests in the last row is for difference in means for total success rates across times. 
 Europe US t-test of means 
Year # deals IPO Trade Sales 
%IPO w. 
PME 
%Trade Sales 
w. PME # deals IPO 
Trade 
Sales 
%IPO w. 
PME 
%Trade 
Sales w. 
PME IPO 
Trade 
Sales 
<1980 1 0.0% 100.0%  0.0% 23 69.6% 26.1% 5.9% 0.0% . . 
1980 1 100.0% 0.0%   18 83.3% 5.6% 46.7% 0.0% . . 
1981 2 0.0% 100.0%  0.0% 54 38.9% 22.2% 52.4% 60.0% -1.108 2.913 
1982 0      141 29.1% 34.8% 50.0% 43.8%     
1983 3 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 340 20.3% 34.7% 62.1% 39.4% -0.871 0.025 
1984 1 0.0% 100.0%  0.0% 328 22.6% 41.8% 63.9% 37.7% . . 
1985 4 100.0% 0.0% 33.3% 100.0% 324 25.3% 34.9% 78.2% 29.4% 3.425 -1.400 
1986 4 0.0% 25.0%  100.0% 278 29.9% 35.6% 89.2% 34.8% -1.300 -0.341 
1987 3 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 278 30.9% 37.1% 88.4% 45.5% 0.089 -1.294 
1988 8 50.0% 37.5% 50.0% 66.7% 248 40.3% 35.5% 92.0% 45.6% 0.547 0.336 
1989 14 42.9% 35.7% 33.3% 0.0% 260 37.3% 38.5% 92.6% 42.7% 0.416 0.025 
1990 11 27.3% 18.2% 100.0% 50.0% 269 27.5% 39.0% 91.7% 50.0% -0.017 -1.215 
1991 12 25.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 249 39.8% 36.5% 94.6% 60.2% -1.022 -0.652 
1992 20 30.0% 30.0% 66.7% 0.0% 341 31.1% 43.4% 95.1% 59.3% -0.102 -1.003 
1993 24 37.5% 25.0% 66.7% 40.0% 367 28.6% 38.4% 98.0% 66.4% 0.927 -0.986 
1994 34 11.8% 47.1% 33.3% 21.4% 417 27.8% 39.6% 97.3% 73.4% -2.042 1.026 
1995 71 18.3% 32.4% 75.0% 40.0% 561 23.5% 42.2% 97.7% 59.3% -0.985 -1.428 
1996 116 19.0% 36.2% 50.0% 35.1% 808 22.5% 45.5% 98.8% 70.7% -0.864 -1.523 
1997 241 14.9% 31.1% 86.7% 32.4% 911 16.2% 45.0% 98.6% 69.1% -0.493 -3.661 
1998 520 12.9% 39.6% 77.0% 34.8% 1,073 12.6% 44.4% 97.8% 66.2% 0.170 -1.401 
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1999 1,170 11.2% 34.7% 82.1% 41.2% 2,086 5.8% 42.1% 98.3% 52.9% 5.553 -4.011 
2000 2,539 5.0% 29.7% 85.2% 31.0% 2,897 2.9% 37.1% 98.8% 47.8% 4.009 -5.778 
2001 1,201 3.3% 26.8% 88.4% 27.6% 1,101 4.2% 36.1% 97.6% 46.7% -1.071 -4.204 
2002 606 4.3% 28.2% 88.9% 35.3% 715 4.8% 34.4% 100.0% 50.2% -0.404 -2.359 
2003 522 4.6% 24.5% 70.8% 37.0% 691 2.5% 34.9% 94.4% 53.4% 2.041 -3.684 
2004 556 4.0% 18.5% 80.0% 42.9% 867 3.3% 29.4% 93.5% 45.2% 0.606 -4.217 
2005 586 1.5% 16.7% 55.6% 27.8% 984 1.7% 22.0% 100.0% 43.3% -0.288 -2.442 
2006 739 1.8% 11.8% 54.5% 33.3% 1,168 1.5% 21.7% 100.0% 46.6% 0.519 -5.197 
2007 943 0.5% 10.7% 16.7% 30.4% 1,399 0.9% 12.9% 71.4% 34.3% -0.916 -1.555 
2008 786 0.8% 4.2% 83.3% 17.1% 1,400 0.2% 9.9% 100.0% 36.9% 1.925 -4.654 
2009 611 0.7% 2.3% 100.0% 28.6% 994 0.2% 7.5% 100.0% 33.3% 1.445 -4.364 
2010 649 0.2% 1.5% 0.0% 33.3% 1,059 0.4% 2.7% 50.0% 34.6% -0.830 -1.733 
2011 459 0.0% 0.0%     857 0.0% 0.6%   0.0% . -1.640 
                     
total  12,457  4.7% 21.0% 77.4% 33.2% 23,506 9.2% 29.6% 90.6% 52.0% -15.342 -17.532 
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Table 5: Summary success rates and exit times across regions and years 
Panel A shows estimated probability of exit within a certain time frame from first round of VC financing. Probabilities are estimated using a Kaplan-Meier estimator for each 
specific region and time frame.  Panel B shows median exit times in months conditional on exit within a certain time frame, together with the interquartile range (25th percentile 
and 75th percentile). 
Panel A 
   IPO probability Trade Sale probability 
   US Europe US Europe 
  Prob. st.error Prob. st.error Prob. st.error Prob. st.error 
Ever: Whole sample 13.1% (0.31%) 6.2% (0.30%) 43.7% (0.52%) 34.0% (1.35%) 
Within 10 Whole sample 11.0% (0.24%) 5.6% (0.24%) 35.8% (0.37%) 27.9% (0.50%) 
years: 1995-1999 vintages 12.5% (0.45%) 12.2% (0.71%) 40.0% (0.66%) 32.2% (1.01%) 
 2000-2003 vintages 3.1% (0.24%) 4.4% (0.30%) 35.5% (0.66%) 27.8% (0.65%) 
Within 5  Whole sample 6.9% (0.18%) 3.5% (0.18%) 21.2% (0.29%) 14.8% (0.35%) 
years: 1995-1999 vintages 10.2% (0.41%) 8.3% (0.60%) 26.3% (0.60%) 14.4% (0.76%) 
 2000-2003 vintages 1.4% (0.16%) 2.9% (0.24%) 20.9% (0.55%) 17.1% (0.54%) 
 2004-2007 vintages 1.2% (0.18%) 1.7% (0.24%) 18.3% (0.61%) 12.5% (0.65%) 
Within 2  Whole sample 2.3% (0.10%) 1.7% (0.12%) 7.0% (0.17%) 4.0% (0.18%) 
years: 1995-1999 vintages 4.8% (0.29%) 5.1% (0.48%) 10.5% (0.42%) 4.2% (0.44%) 
 2000-2003 vintages 0.2% (0.06%) 1.2% (0.15%) 6.9% (0.35%) 4.9% (0.31%) 
 2004-2007 vintages 0.1% (0.06%) 1.1% (0.19%) 5.0% (0.33%) 3.5% (0.34%) 
 2008-2011 vintages 0.2% (0.08%) 0.5% (0.17%) 6.1% (0.46%) 2.2% (0.36%) 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Panel B 
   IPO time to exit (months) Trade Sale time to exit (months) 
   US Europe US Europe 
  Med. (25;75) Med. (25;75) Med. (25;75) Med. (25;75) 
Ever: Whole sample 46 (26;73) 37 (18;70) 49 (27;78) 52 (30;78) 
Within 10 Whole sample 43 (25;66) 36 (17;66) 45 (26;70) 50 (29;74) 
years: 1995-1999 vintages 32 (18;49) 30 (14;73) 45 (24;73) 65 (38;89) 
 2000-2003 vintages 62 (48;83) 51 (24;66) 52 (29;76) 50 (30;74) 
Within 5  Whole sample 32 (21;44) 24 (12;39) 32 (20;45) 34 (21;46) 
years: 1995-1999 vintages 25 (15;38) 21 (12;31) 30 (18;44) 36 (22;48) 
 2000-2003 vintages 46.5 (34;55) 36 (15;51) 33 (20;47) 35 (22;47) 
 2004-2007 vintages 43 (31;53) 22 (12;33) 36 (22;46) 33 (22;44) 
Within 2  Whole sample 16 (11;22) 13 (7;19) 17 (12;20) 16 (11;20) 
years: 1995-1999 vintages 15 (10;20) 13 (9;19) 16 (11;20) 16 (12;20) 
 2000-2003 vintages 23 (15;23) 9.5 (3;19.5) 17 (12;20) 16 (11;21) 
 2004-2007 vintages 8.5 (7;11) 14 (9;22) 17 (12;20) 15.5 (11;20) 
 2008-2011 vintages 10 (10;19) 18 (7.5;20) 17 (11;20) 17 (9;20) 
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Table 6: PME descriptive statistics 
The table shows pooled and deal level PMEs for IPOs and trade sales across the two regions. 
 
  IPOs Trade Sales 
 Pooled Deal level (median) Pooled Deal level (median) 
vintage Europe US Europe US Europe US Europe US 
bef1980  1.31  1.31      
1980  0.91  1.40      
1981  0.95  0.96   1.81  1.79 
1982  1.90  1.20   1.23  1.01 
1983  1.65  1.41   0.56  0.48 
1984  1.48  1.26   0.97  0.64 
1985 0.87 1.82 0.87 1.67   1.07  0.78 
1986  2.07  1.89   2.26  1.13 
1987  2.13  1.70   1.09  0.83 
1988 3.05 2.03 2.18 1.92   1.36  1.00 
1989 11.94 2.42 42.88 2.34   1.13  0.75 
1990 1.60 2.67 1.60 2.72 1.52 1.79 1.52 1.30 
1991  2.77  2.73   1.33  0.97 
1992 1.39 2.61 3.51 2.20   2.55  1.43 
1993 7.89 2.97 10.26 2.46 0.08 1.55 1.34 1.10 
1994 5.40 3.64 5.40 2.41 0.08 1.50 0.06 0.98 
1995 7.05 3.39 3.80 3.08 1.00 1.55 0.84 1.08 
1996 7.07 4.31 5.00 3.82 0.74 1.83 0.73 1.23 
1997 3.68 5.21 4.21 4.22 2.56 3.01 1.10 1.52 
1998 3.54 5.87 3.20 4.34 0.76 2.66 0.61 1.41 
1999 3.09 4.27 3.18 3.03 1.82 1.44 1.20 0.97 
2000 2.51 2.77 2.30 2.54 1.25 1.30 0.90 0.82 
2001 1.74 3.42 2.41 2.74 1.84 1.78 1.29 1.23 
2002 1.73 2.35 2.39 2.52 3.68 1.73 1.69 1.36 
2003 2.20 3.53 2.00 2.27 1.27 2.21 1.15 1.53 
2004 4.28 2.75 2.38 2.68 1.24 1.96 1.21 1.25 
2005 1.32 2.47 2.57 2.17 2.76 2.61 1.94 1.96 
2006 4.38 8.20 1.50 1.47 0.96 1.71 1.37 1.30 
2007 2.47 5.01 2.47 5.79 1.84 2.05 1.67 2.16 
2008 1.26 7.28 1.36 5.63 1.68 3.73 2.26 2.72 
2009 0.96 1.46 1.33 1.46 2.08 3.04 2.12 2.78 
2010  0.62  0.62 2.79 5.57 0.96 5.06 
2011          
Total 
pooled: 3.18 3.12     1.59 1.74     
Difference Europe vs. US: -0.62  0.46   -0.15  -0.06 
 t-stat: -1.41   0.46   -0.73   -0.64 
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Table 7: Trade sales buyer types 
The table shows the distribution of buyer types in trade sales, the fraction of deals for which we have PME measures, and summary statistics for PMEs within buyer 
categories. 
 
  Europe US 
    PME percentile    PME percentile 
Buyer Type #deals % of total Has PME 25th 50th 75th #deals % of total Has PME 25th 50th 75th 
Tiny buyer 43 1.7% 18.6% 0.04 0.11 0.77 66 1.0% 25.8% 0.12 0.18 0.48 
Small buyer 762 30.8% 47.8% 0.23 0.76 1.68 1,787 27.3% 59.1% 0.18 0.49 1.25 
Medium buyer 528 21.3% 46.6% 0.76 1.71 3.42 2,055 31.3% 71.1% 0.60 1.49 3.15 
Big buyer 235 9.5% 44.7% 0.91 2.21 4.32 1,239 18.9% 55.4% 1.12 2.41 5.58 
Seems dead 159 6.4% 0.0% . . . 191 2.9% 0.5% 0.01 0.01 0.01 
No info 20 0.8% 0.0% . . . 155 2.4% 0.6% 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Still VC owned 149 6.0% 10.1% 0.17 0.74 1.60 394 6.0% 11.2% 0.09 0.26 0.60 
VC chain success 104 4.2% 13.5% 0.31 0.47 1.12 405 6.2% 15.3% 0.11 0.38 0.77 
Management 399 16.1% 9.0% 0.13 0.36 0.97 109 1.7% 7.3% 0.02 0.05 0.36 
Big PE 47 1.9% 46.8% 1.67 2.97 7.18 97 1.5% 49.5% 1.10 2.01 4.41 
Other PE 30 1.2% 40.0% 0.38 0.79 1.97 58 0.9% 41.4% 0.26 0.91 2.52 
 Europe after 1996 US after 1996 
    PME percentile    PME percentile 
Buyer Type #deals % of total Has PME 25th 50th 75th #deals % of total Has PME 25th 50th 75th 
Tiny buyer 42 1.8% 19.0% 0.04 0.11 0.77 42 0.9% 16.7% 0.12 0.41 1.91 
Small buyer 733 30.9% 48.3% 0.23 0.76 1.68 1,161 25.2% 56.0% 0.15 0.42 1.19 
Medium buyer 509 21.4% 46.8% 0.79 1.72 3.42 1,431 31.1% 71.1% 0.58 1.49 3.18 
Big buyer 226 9.5% 45.1% 0.91 2.23 4.32 952 20.7% 56.9% 1.23 2.53 5.80 
Seems dead 153 6.4% 0.0% . . . 153 3.3% 0.7% 0.01 0.01 0.01 
No info 20 0.8% 0.0% . . . 8 0.2% 12.5% 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Still VC owned 143 6.0% 10.5% 0.17 0.74 1.60 346 7.5% 11.0% 0.07 0.26 0.62 
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VC chain success 99 4.2% 12.1% 0.32 0.55 1.18 330 7.2% 10.9% 0.09 0.34 0.91 
Management 380 16.0% 8.7% 0.17 0.38 1.07 69 1.5% 8.7% 0.03 0.16 0.43 
Big PE 43 1.8% 46.5% 1.67 2.56 5.14 66 1.4% 45.5% 1.51 2.11 4.81 
Other PE 27 1.1% 33.3% 0.47 0.56 1.51 43 0.9% 34.9% 0.14 0.33 1.70 
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Table 8: Regression of exit hazard with time, industry, and deal type fixed effects   
The table shows regressions using a Cox proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is the hazard rate of IPO or trade sale exit. The unit of observation is the firm-year 
to reflect the possibility that the firm can potentially exit in any year. Europe is a dummy equal to one for European deals. Year fixed effects are controlled by respective 
dummies. Industry and stage classifications are reported in Table 2.  Round fixed effects refer to the round number of financing when VC invested for the first time. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
IPOs & Trade 
sales 
IPOs & Trade 
sales 
IPOs & Trade 
sales IPOs IPOs IPOs Trade sales Trade sales Trade sales 
          
Europe -0.447*** -0.274*** -0.265*** -0.695*** 0.102* 0.131** -0.335*** -0.360*** -0.359*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.048) (0.052) (0.053) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
          
Calendar year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry, stage, and round No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
fixed effects          
Observations 273,212 273,212 273,212 273,212 273,212 273,212 273,212 273,212 273,212 
Log likelihood -120896 -119985 -119723 -27212 -25675 -25456 -94815 -94663 -94447 
Chi squared 494.2 2315 2839 209.8 2689 3395 212.5 502.9 906.9 
Number of deals 35798 35798 35798 35798 35798 35798 35798 35798 35798 
Number of exits 12221 12221 12221 2697 2697 2697 9524 9524 9524 
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Table 8b: Regression of PMEs with time, industry, and deal type fixed effects   
The table shows OLS regressions with the log of the public market equivalent (PME) measure as dependent variable. PMEs are conditional on IPO (columns 1-3) or trade sale 
(columns 4-6). Columns 7-9 use imputed PMEs for trade sales where we do not have a PME measure, by taking the median PME for the buyer category of the trade sale in 
Table I. Year fixed effects are controlled by respective dummies. Industry and stage classifications are reported in Table 2.  Round fixed effects refer to the round number of 
financing when VC invested for the first time. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Log IPO PME Log IPO PME Log IPO PME 
Log Trade 
sale PME 
Log Trade 
sale PME 
Log Trade 
sale PME 
Log imputed 
T.S. PME 
Log imputed 
T.S. PME 
Log imputed 
T.S. PME 
          
Europe 0.0925** 0.0272 0.00465 -0.00792 -0.000902 -0.00474 -0.0764*** -0.0712*** -0.0679*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0422) (0.0416) (0.0295) (0.0306) (0.0309) (0.0146) (0.0153) (0.0155) 
          
Calendar year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry, stage, and round No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
fixed effects          
Observations 2,326 2,326 2,326 4,232 4,232 4,232 9,032 9,032 9,032 
R-squared 0.003 0.105 0.154 0.000 0.031 0.041 0.003 0.028 0.038 
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Table 9: Entrepreneurial experience and characteristics: Exits 
The table shows regressions using a Cox proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is the hazard rate of IPO or trade sale exit. The unit of observation is the 
firm-year to reflect the possibility that the firm can potentially exit in any year. Europe is a dummy equal to one for European deals. Founder experience is a dummy equal to 
one if any of the firm’s founders founded another business. Data on previous venture is a dummy equal to one if any of the firm’s founders founded a VC-funded venture that 
is recorded by Venture Source. Success on previous venture is a dummy equal to one if a previously VC-funded venture was successful. PhD or MD Founder is a dummy equal 
to one if any of the firm’s founders has a doctorate degree. Female founder is a dummy equal to one if any of the firm’s founders is a female. Year fixed effects are controlled 
by respective dummies. Industry and stage classifications are reported in Table 2.  Round fixed effects refer to the round number of financing when VC invested for the first 
time. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
IPOs & Trade 
sales 
IPOs & Trade 
sales 
IPOs & Trade 
sales 
IPOs & Trade 
sales IPOs Trade sales 
       
Europe -0.229*** -0.0671 -0.277*** -0.248*** 0.0951 -0.360*** 
 (0.0228) (0.047) (0.026) (0.028) (0.0693) (0.03) 
Founder experience 0.196***   0.160*** 0.405*** 0.0141 
 -0.0233   (0.0263) (0.0544) (0.0303) 
Data on previous venture -0.165** -0.162**  -0.153** -0.478*** -0.0603 
 (0.0664) (0.0672)  (0.0733) (0.113) (0.0608) 
Success on previous venture 0.179** 0.191***  0.184** 0.746*** 0.169** 
 (0.0728) (0.0732)  (0.0792) (0.153) (0.0735) 
PhD or MD Founder    -0.0386 0.225*** -0.131*** 
    (0.0304) (0.0581) (0.0347) 
Female founder    -0.113** -0.216** -0.0816* 
    (0.0441) (0.108) (0.0479) 
Europe*Founder experience    0.193*** 0.494*** 0.108* 
    (0.0559) (0.116) (0.0647) 
Europe*Data on previous venture    -0.0616 -0.0959 -0.0981 
    (0.172) (0.298) (0.174) 
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Europe*Success on previous venture    0.0259 -0.289 0.197 
    (0.215) (0.56) (0.232) 
Europe*PhD or MD Founder    -0.115** -0.148 -0.0586 
    (0.0543) (0.113) (0.0609) 
Europe*Female founder    0.0559 -0.0659 0.0564 
    (0.0844) (0.224) (0.0912) 
       
Year, Industry, stage, and round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
fixed effects       
Observations 262138 65679 196459 262138 262138 262138 
Log likelihood -116825 -29498 -80064 -116810 -92308 -24643 
Chi squared 3001 826.9 2151 3031 903.8 3612 
Number of deals 34887 9297 25590 34887 34887 34887 
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Table 9b: Entrepreneurial experience and characteristics: PMEs 
The table shows OLS regressions with the log of the public market equivalent (PME) measure as dependent variable. PMEs are conditional on IPO (columns 1-3) or trade sale 
(columns 4-6). Columns 7-9 use imputed PMEs for trade sales where we do not have a PME measure, by taking the median PME for the buyer category of the trade sale in 
Table I. Europe is a dummy equal to one for European deals. Founder experience is a dummy equal to one if any of the firm’s founders founded another business. Data on 
previous venture is a dummy equal to one if any of the firm’s founders founded a VC-funded venture that is recorded by Venture Source. Success on previous venture is a 
dummy equal to one if a previously VC-funded venture was successful. PhD or MD Founder is a dummy equal to one if any of the firm’s founders has a doctorate degree. 
Female founder is a dummy equal to one if any of the firm’s founders is a female. Year fixed effects are controlled by respective dummies. Industry and stage classifications 
are reported in Table 2.  Round fixed effects refer to the round number of financing when VC invested for the first time. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Log IPO 
PME 
Log IPO 
PME 
Log IPO 
PME 
Log Trade 
sale PME 
Log Trade 
sale PME 
Log Trade 
sale PME 
Log 
imputed 
T.S. PME 
Log 
imputed 
T.S. PME 
Log 
imputed 
T.S. PME 
          
Europe -0.0108 -0.0104 -0.0109 -0.00411 -0.00511 -0.0350 -0.059*** -0.06*** -0.082*** 
 (0.0434) (0.0433) (0.0575) (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0392) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0192) 
Founder experience 0.100*** 0.106*** 0.114*** 0.0582** 0.0576** 0.0350 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.0364* 
 (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0369) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0314) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0189) 
Data on previous venture -0.215* -0.197 -0.292** -0.0193 -0.0195 -0.00496 -0.0408 -0.0440 -0.0277 
 (0.128) (0.128) (0.144) (0.0832) (0.0832) (0.0874) (0.0457) (0.0457) (0.0504) 
Success on previous venture 0.201 0.189 0.285* -0.0505 -0.0513 -0.0529 0.0223 0.0232 0.0180 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.150) (0.0895) (0.0895) (0.0935) (0.0503) (0.0503) (0.0546) 
PhD or MD Founder  -0.125*** -0.129***  -0.000688 0.00969  0.0373** 0.0392* 
  (0.0374) (0.0414)  (0.0319) (0.0347)  (0.0185) (0.0210) 
Female founder  0.0143 -0.000693  -0.0456 -0.0863*  -0.0577** -0.070*** 
  (0.0604) (0.0678)  (0.0464) (0.0506)  (0.0237) (0.0271) 
Europe*Founder experience   -0.0442   0.116   0.105** 
   (0.0838)   (0.0746)   (0.0409) 
Europe*Data on previous venture   0.463   -0.0586   -0.0829 
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   (0.317)   (0.286)   (0.119) 
Europe*Success on previous 
venture   -0.527   0.00442   0.0652 
   (0.383)   (0.324)   (0.149) 
Europe*PhD or MD Founder   0.0191   -0.0450   -0.00550 
   (0.0803)   (0.0722)   (0.0388) 
Europe*Female founder   0.0835   0.240*   0.0490 
   (0.151)   (0.127)   (0.0560) 
          
Year, Industry, stage, and round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
fixed effects          
Observations 2,305 2,305 2,305 4,219 4,219 4,219 8,974 8,974 8,974 
R-squared 0.160 0.164 0.165 0.043 0.043 0.044 0.040 0.041 0.041 
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Table 10: Number of VC organization and deals per VC organization 
The table shows the number of distinct VC organizations active on the board in the year of the first 
round of VC financing in each region where Venture Source has data on boards. For each active VC 
firm the total number of previous deals in which it was active on the board was computed and the mean 
and median statistics are reported for all VC firms active in a given year for both regions.  The total 
number of active VC firms represents the set of distinct VC organizations that were active at least once 
in our dataset. 
 US  Europe 
  # previous deals by VC   # previous deals by VC 
Year 
# VCs 
active Mean Median  
# VCs 
active Mean Median 
1980 34 0.1764706 0  1 0 0 
1981 66 0.3636364 0  0 . . 
1982 134 0.4402985 0  0 . . 
1983 212 0.9622642 0  0 . . 
1984 263 1.81749 1  0 . . 
1985 304 2.414474 1  4 4.25 2 
1986 311 3.33119 2  2 14.5 14.5 
1987 367 3.749319 2  0 . . 
1988 374 4.713904 2.5  10 0.1 0 
1989 395 5.177215 3  10 0.5 0 
1990 393 6.312977 3  8 1.25 0 
1991 410 7.063415 4  7 0.2857143 0 
1992 534 6.544944 3  16 0.4375 0 
1993 539 7.187384 3  22 1.454545 0 
1994 657 7.022831 2  53 3.264151 0 
1995 783 7.366539 2  59 1.508475 0 
1996 1144 6.541958 2  130 2.569231 0 
1997 1333 7.042011 2  258 3.003876 0 
1998 1471 7.906186 3  513 4.081871 1 
1999 2029 7.648103 2  805 4.73913 1 
2000 2399 9.025427 3  1253 6.261772 2 
2001 1391 16.20489 7  809 8.490729 4 
2002 1076 20.65149 10  494 12.58502 5 
2003 995 23.02714 10  370 14.92703 7 
2004 1051 23.86965 11  341 17.74487 8 
2005 1029 24.90379 11  310 21.53871 9 
2006 1022 25.96771 11  352 21.41193 9 
2007 966 26.89234 10  364 23.6456 8 
2008 800 31.3475 13  221 20.83258 9 
2009 619 37.02908 14  186 20.87097 8 
2010 567 38.3157 15  178 18.85393 7 
2011 343 47.7551 19  92 38.02174 15.5 
        
Total VCs 5,131    2,388   
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Table 11: Venture capitalist experience and characteristics: Exits 
The table shows regressions using a Cox proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is the hazard rate of IPO or trade sale exit. The unit of observation is the 
firm-year to reflect the possibility that the firm can potentially exit in any year. Europe is a dummy equal to one for European deals. Has board date is a dummy equal to one 
if the firm’s board data is present. VC board representation is a dummy equal to one if the firm has at least one VC board member. VC experience is the difference between the 
log of one plus the number of active investments made by the venture capital organization prior to year t and the average in year t of the log of one plus the number of active 
investments made by all organizations prior to year t. Partner experience is the difference between the log of one plus the number of board seats in different VC-funded ventures 
prior to year t and the average in year t of the log of one plus the number of board seats in different VC-funded ventures by all partners prior to year t. VC specialization is a 
fraction of past active VC investments done in the same industry as the industry of the current investment. Partner specialization is the fraction of past board seats that were in 
the same industry as the industry of the current investment. Year fixed effects are controlled by respective dummies. Industry and stage classifications are reported in Table 2.  
Round fixed effects refer to the round number of financing when VC invested for the first time. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Hazard for IPOs & Trade sales (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Europe -0.226*** -0.178*** -0.492*** 0.0325 0.0338 0.00179 0.0403 
 (0.0227) (0.0251) (0.0527) (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0282) (0.0285) 
Has board data 0.213***       
 (0.0269)       
VC board representation    0.129*** 0.109*** 0.181*** 0.105** 
    (0.0410) (0.0421) (0.0414) (0.0425) 
VC experience    0.148*** 0.139***  0.133*** 
    (0.00858) (0.00975)  (0.0120) 
Partner experience      0.116*** -0.00209 
      (0.0149) (0.0179) 
VC specialization     0.0878**  0.0185 
     (0.0410)  (0.0483) 
Partner specialization      0.165*** 0.110** 
      (0.0368) (0.0428) 
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Year, Industry, stage, and round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
fixed effects        
Observations 273,212 215,175 58,037 215,175 215,175 215,175 215,175 
Log likelihood -119700 -99739 -14839 -99563 -99561 -99623 -99557 
Chi squared 2886 2346 631.4 2696 2701 2577 2708 
Number of deals 35798 26858 8940 26858 26858 26858 26858 
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Table 11b: Venture capitalist experience and characteristics: PMEs 
The table shows OLS regressions with the log of the public market equivalent (PME) measure as dependent variable. PMEs are conditional on IPO (columns 1-3) or 
trade sale (columns 4-6). Columns 7-9 use imputed PMEs for trade sales where we do not have a PME measure, by taking the median PME for the buyer category of the trade 
sale in Table I. Europe is a dummy equal to one for European deals. VC board representation is a dummy equal to one if the firm has at least one VC board member. VC 
experience is the difference between the log of one plus the number of active investments made by the venture capital organization prior to year t and the average in year t of 
the log of one plus the number of active investments made by all organizations prior to year t. Partner experience is the difference between the log of one plus the number of 
board seats in different VC-funded ventures prior to year t and the average in year t of the log of one plus the number of board seats in different VC-funded ventures by all 
partners prior to year t. VC specialization is a fraction of past active VC investments done in the same industry as the industry of the current investment. Partner specialization 
is the fraction of past board seats that were in the same industry as the industry of the current investment. Year fixed effects are controlled by respective dummies. Industry and 
stage classifications are reported in Table 2.  Round fixed effects refer to the round number of financing when VC invested for the first time. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Log IPO PME Log IPO PME Log IPO PME 
Log Trade 
sale PME 
Log Trade 
sale PME 
Log Trade 
sale PME 
Log imputed 
T.S. PME 
Log imputed 
T.S. PME 
Log imputed 
T.S. PME 
Europe -0.00720 -0.0101 -0.00692 -0.0499 -0.0507 -0.0411 -0.0207 -0.0202 -0.0139 
 (0.0500) (0.0499) (0.0514) (0.0354) (0.0355) (0.0364) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0200) 
VC board representation -0.0837 -0.0553 -0.0521 -0.238*** -0.231*** -0.226*** -0.0207 -0.0265 -0.0228 
 (0.0659) (0.0668) (0.0679) (0.0604) (0.0617) (0.0621) (0.0296) (0.0305) (0.0308) 
VC experience 0.0115 0.0277* 0.0248 -0.0191* -0.0167 -0.0262* 0.0185*** 0.0160** 0.00979 
 (0.0135) (0.0149) (0.0187) (0.0106) (0.0116) (0.0142) (0.00612) (0.00687) (0.00844) 
Partner experience  -0.137** -0.136**  -0.0260 -0.0455  0.0243 0.0100 
  (0.0545) (0.0641)  (0.0506) (0.0588)  (0.0309) (0.0358) 
VC specialization   0.00761   0.0200   0.0129 
   (0.0277)   (0.0213)   (0.0127) 
Partner specialization   -0.00592   0.0173   0.0136 
   (0.0604)   (0.0500)   (0.0306) 
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Year, Industry, stage, and 
round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
fixed effects          
Observations 2,259 2,259 2,259 3,826 3,826 3,826 7,547 7,547 7,547 
R-squared 0.159 0.161 0.161 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.042 0.042 0.042 
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Table 12: Venture capitalist experience and characteristics, part 2: Exits   
The table shows regressions using a Cox proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is the hazard rate of IPO or trade sale exit. The unit of observation is the 
firm-year to reflect the possibility that the firm can potentially exit in any year. Europe is a dummy equal to one for European deals. VC board representation is a dummy equal 
to one if the firm has at least one VC board member. VC experience is the difference between the log of one plus the number of active investments made by the venture capital 
organization prior to year t and the average in year t of the log of one plus the number of active investments made by all organizations prior to year t. Partner specialization is 
a fraction of past board seats that were in the same industry as the industry of the current investment. Founder experience is a dummy equal to one if any of the firm’s founders 
founded another business. Data on previous venture is a dummy equal to one if any of the firm’s founders founded a VC-funded venture that is recorded by Venture Source. 
Success on previous venture is a dummy equal to one if a previously VC-funded venture was successful. Preferred Shares is a dummy equal to one if preferred shares were 
issued in the first VC financing round. Syndicated is a dummy equal to one if more than one VC organization invested in the first round. Year fixed effects are controlled by 
respective dummies. Industry and stage classifications are reported in Table 2.  Round fixed effects refer to the round number of financing when VC invested for the first time. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IPOs & 
Trade sales 
IPOs & Trade 
sales 
IPOs IPOs Trade sales Trade sales 
       
Europe 0.0557** 0.136*** 0.597*** 0.768*** -0.167*** -0.114*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0305) (0.0599) (0.0644) (0.0305) (0.0331) 
VC board representation 0.104** 0.0727 -0.0115 -0.0158 0.218*** 0.180*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0451) (0.0903) (0.0999) (0.0494) (0.0535) 
VC experience 0.130*** 0.119*** 0.184*** 0.181*** 0.0778*** 0.0646*** 
 (0.00970) (0.0105) (0.0214) (0.0232) (0.0108) (0.0117) 
Partner specialization 0.111*** 0.0775** 0.0565 0.0355 0.0456 0.00765 
 (0.0335) (0.0359) (0.0651) (0.0699) (0.0397) (0.0425) 
Founder experience 0.154*** 0.140*** 0.419*** 0.415*** -0.00743 -0.0211 
 (0.0245) (0.0263) (0.0495) (0.0531) (0.0285) (0.0304) 
Data on previous venture -0.176** -0.185** -0.549*** -0.530*** -0.107* -0.0984 
 (0.0705) (0.0753) (0.106) (0.113) (0.0601) (0.0637) 
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Success on previous venture 0.122 0.135 0.727*** 0.758*** 0.164** 0.122 
 (0.0769) (0.0819) (0.147) (0.152) (0.0732) (0.0777) 
Preferred Shares  0.404***  0.651***  0.273*** 
  (0.0303)  (0.0614)  (0.0322) 
Syndicated  0.106***  0.00166  0.151*** 
  (0.0219)  (0.0457)  (0.0251) 
       
Year, Industry, stage, and round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
fixed effects       
Observations 215,175 188,471 212,158 185,539 212,158 185,539 
Log likelihood -99537 -86612 -22909 -19632 -75905 -66271 
Chi squared 2750 2583 3295 3077 780.2 805.4 
Number of deals 26858 23472 26614 23239 26614 23239 
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Table 12b: Venture capitalist experience and characteristics, part 2: PMEs   
The table shows OLS regressions with the log of the public market equivalent (PME) measure as dependent variable. PMEs are conditional on IPO (columns 1 and 4) 
or trade sale (columns 2 and 5). Columns 3 and 6 uses imputed PMEs for trade sales where we do not have a PME measure, by taking the median PME for the buyer category 
of the trade sale in Table I. Europe is a dummy equal to one for European deals. VC board representation is a dummy equal to one if the firm has at least one VC board member. 
VC experience is the difference between the log of one plus the number of active investments made by the venture capital organization prior to year t and the average in year t 
of the log of one plus the number of active investments made by all organizations prior to year t. Partner specialization is a fraction of past board seats that were in the same 
industry as the industry of the current investment. Founder experience is a dummy equal to one if any of the firm’s founders founded another business. Data on previous venture 
is a dummy equal to one if any of the firm’s founders founded a VC-funded venture that is recorded by Venture Source. Success on previous venture is a dummy equal to one 
if a previously VC-funded venture was successful. Syndicated is a dummy equal to one if more than one VC organization invested in the first round. Year fixed effects are 
controlled by respective dummies. Industry and stage classifications are reported in Table 2.  Round fixed effects refer to the round number of financing when VC invested for 
the first time. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Log IPO PME 
Log Trade sale 
PME 
Log imputed T.S. 
PME Log IPO PME Log Trade sale PME 
Log imputed T.S. 
PME 
Europe -0.0119 -0.0414 -0.0107 -0.0395 -0.0228 0.00224 
 (0.0509) (0.0358) (0.0197) (0.0543) (0.0381) (0.0210) 
VC board representation -0.0447 -0.252*** -0.0296 -0.0476 -0.244*** -0.0261 
 (0.0691) (0.0620) (0.0305) (0.0753) (0.0684) (0.0329) 
VC experience 0.0178 -0.0222* 0.0139** 0.0190 -0.0213* 0.0159** 
 (0.0149) (0.0117) (0.00680) (0.0160) (0.0125) (0.00730) 
Partner specialization -0.0633 0.0154 0.0271 -0.0806 0.0162 0.0220 
 (0.0474) (0.0396) (0.0241) (0.0506) (0.0423) (0.0257) 
Founder experience 0.102*** 0.0724** 0.0615*** 0.109*** 0.0749** 0.0676*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0289) (0.0178) (0.0356) (0.0306) (0.0191) 
Data on previous venture -0.209 -0.0160 -0.0312 -0.201 -0.0349 -0.0450 
 (0.128) (0.0827) (0.0489) (0.137) (0.0885) (0.0523) 
Success on previous venture 0.199 -0.0370 0.00311 0.211 -0.0265 0.00492 
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 (0.135) (0.0890) (0.0534) (0.144) (0.0951) (0.0570) 
Syndicated    -0.0827*** -0.0350 -0.00033 
    (0.0310) (0.0263) (0.0158) 
Year, Industry, stage, and round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
fixed effects       
Observations 2,245 3,818 7,520 1,956 3,396 6,663 
R-squared 0.164 0.054 0.044 0.173 0.054 0.044 
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Table 12c: Venture capitalist experience and characteristics, part 2: PMEs   
The table shows OLS regressions with the log of the public market equivalent (PME) measure as dependent variable. PMEs are actual PMEs for IPOs and Trade Sales 
where we have the data, imputed PMEs for IPOs and Trade Sales where the data is missing (imputed IPO PMEs are median actual IPO PMEs for corresponding vintage year 
and region), and zero for deals considered to be failures (no financing round in the last 5 years or Venture Source explicitly states that the firm is out of business). Europe is a 
dummy equal to one for European deals. Has board date is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s board data is present. VC board representation is a dummy equal to one if the 
firm has at least one VC board member. VC experience is the difference between the log of one plus the number of active investments made by the venture capital organization 
prior to year t and the average in year t of the log of one plus the number of active investments made by all organizations prior to year t. VC specialization is a fraction of past 
active VC investments done in the same industry as the industry of the current investment. Partner experience is the difference between the log of one plus the number of board 
seats in different VC-funded ventures prior to year t and the average in year t of the log of one plus the number of board seats in different VC-funded ventures by all partners 
prior to year t. Partner specialization is a fraction of past board seats that were in the same industry as the industry of the current investment. Founder experience is a dummy 
equal to one if any of the firm’s founders founded another business. Data on previous venture is a dummy equal to one if any of the firm’s founders founded a VC-funded 
venture that is recorded by Venture Source. Success on previous venture is a dummy equal to one if a previously VC-funded venture was successful. Year fixed effects are 
controlled by respective dummies. Industry and stage classifications are reported in Table 2.  Round fixed effects refer to the round number of financing when VC invested for 
the first time. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Table 8b:1 Table 8b:3  Table 9b:1 Table 11:1 Table 11b:3 Table 12b:1 Table 12b:1 
Europe -0.191*** -0.0891*** -0.0547*** -0.0685*** -0.0607*** 0.0636*** 0.0697*** 0.0301** 
 (0.00925) (0.00982) (0.0118) (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0125) 
Has board data     0.144***    
     (0.0114)    
VC board representation      0.0356** 0.0379** 0.0212 
      (0.0181) (0.0176) (0.0178) 
VC experience      0.0634*** 0.0676***  
      (0.00589) (0.00460)  
VC local experience        0.0999*** 
        (0.00563) 
VC specialization      0.0335   
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      (0.0245)   
Partner experience      0.0136   
      (0.00898)   
Partner specialization      0.0603*** 0.0830***  
      (0.0219) (0.0170)  
Founder experience    0.133***   0.114*** 0.116*** 
    (0.0113)   (0.0123) (0.0123) 
Data on previous venture    -0.128***   -0.135*** -0.136*** 
    (0.0309)   (0.0340) (0.0340) 
Success on previous venture    0.146***   0.113*** 0.125*** 
    (0.0346)   (0.0377) (0.0378) 
         
Year, Industry, stage, and round No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
fixed effects         
Observations 22,543 22,543 18,068 22,378 22,543 18,068 17,993 17,993 
R-squared 0.019 0.086 0.080 0.093 0.093 0.103 0.108 0.105 
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Table 13: Country fixed effects: Exits   
The table shows regressions using a Cox proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is the hazard rate of IPO or trade sale exit. The unit of observation is the firm-year 
to reflect the possibility that the firm can potentially exit in any year. “Corresponding specification” refers to the same regression using the European dummy instead of country 
fixed effects.  We do not report coefficients and standard errors for explanatory variables other than country fixed effects, as these are virtually unchanged relative to the 
corresponding specifications. Year fixed effects are controlled by respective dummies. Industry and stage classifications are reported in Table 2.  Round fixed effects refer to 
the round number of financing when VC invested for the first time. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corresponding specification 
IPOs & Trade 
sales 
IPOs & Trade 
sales 
IPOs & Trade 
sales 
IPOs & Trade 
sales IPOs Trade Sales 
 Table 8:3 Table 9:1 Table 11:4 Table 12:2 Table 12:3 Table 12:5 
European dummy from -0.265*** -0.229*** 0.0325 0.136*** 0.597*** -0.167*** 
corresponding specification (0.022) (0.0228) (0.0276) (0.0305) (0.0599) (0.0305) 
Country fixed effects:       
Austria, Liechtenstein , Switzerland  -0.235*** -0.198** 0.0335 0.118 0.463** -0.142 
 (0.0884) (0.0889) (0.102) (0.111) (0.227) (0.115) 
Belgium , Luxembourg , Netherlands -0.428*** -0.399*** -0.166* -0.0586 0.334 -0.328*** 
 (0.0722) (0.0725) (0.0907) (0.0958) (0.207) (0.0991) 
Germany  -0.450*** -0.420*** -0.0697 -0.00828 0.906*** -0.402*** 
 (0.0463) (0.0469) (0.0586) (0.0631) (0.109) (0.0689) 
France, Monaco -0.213*** -0.175*** 0.0912* 0.210*** 0.844*** -0.168*** 
 (0.0456) (0.0459) (0.0541) (0.0569) (0.114) (0.0598) 
Sweden -0.227*** -0.188*** -0.0621 0.0818 0.360** -0.183** 
 (0.0599) (0.0604) (0.0676) (0.0715) (0.158) (0.0737) 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland , Norway  -0.161*** -0.121** 0.0427 0.141** 0.388** -0.107 
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 (0.0543) (0.0548) (0.0632) (0.0670) (0.157) (0.0675) 
Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain -0.381*** -0.312*** -0.0503 0.111 0.665*** -0.304** 
 (0.0858) (0.0859) (0.108) (0.113) (0.246) (0.121) 
Ireland, United Kingdom  -0.173*** -0.142*** 0.128*** 0.224*** 0.494*** -0.0379 
 (0.0357) (0.0361) (0.0409) (0.0444) (0.0953) (0.0442) 
Other -0.325** -0.255* -0.000323 0.159 0.661* -0.229 
 (0.137) (0.138) (0.176) (0.181) (0.362) (0.201) 
       
Observations 273,212 262,138 215,175 185,539 212,158 212,158 
Log likelihood -119713 -116806 -99554 -85615 -22899 -75890 
Chi squared 2860 3040 2715 2632 3305 802.5 
Number of deals 35798 34887 26858 23239 26614 26614 
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Table 13b: Country fixed effects: PMEs   
The table shows OLS regressions with the log of the public market equivalent (PME) measure as dependent variable. PMEs are conditional on IPO (columns 1 and 2) or trade 
sale (columns 3 and 4). Columns 5 and 6 uses imputed PMEs for trade sales where we do not have a PME measure, by taking the median PME for the buyer category of the 
trade sale in Table I. “Corresponding specification” refers to the same regression using the European dummy instead of country fixed effects.  We do not report coefficients 
and standard errors for explanatory variables other than country fixed effects, as these are virtually unchanged relative to the corresponding specifications. Year fixed effects 
are controlled by respective dummies. Industry and stage classifications are reported in Table 2.  Round fixed effects refer to the round number of financing when VC invested 
for the first time. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corresponding specification Log IPO PME 
Log Trade sale 
PME 
Log imputed T.S. 
PME Log IPO PME 
Log Trade sale 
PME 
Log imputed T.S. 
PME 
 Table 8b:3 Table 8b:6 Table 8b:9 Table 12b:1 Table 12b:2 Table 12b:3 
European dummy from 0.00465 -0.00474 -0.0679*** -0.0119 -0.0414 -0.0107 
corresponding specification (0.0416) (0.0309) (0.0155) (0.0509) (0.0358) (0.0197) 
Country fixed effects:       
Austria, Liechtenstein , Switzerland  0.286* -0.185 -0.151** 0.173 -0.206 -0.128* 
 (0.149) (0.130) (0.0615) (0.157) (0.140) (0.0714) 
Belgium , Luxembourg , Netherlands -0.275* 0.402*** -0.00396 -0.278* 0.447*** 0.0795 
 (0.142) (0.115) (0.0474) (0.150) (0.133) (0.0615) 
Germany  0.210** 0.0868 -0.0626* 0.244*** -0.000659 0.0147 
 (0.0826) (0.0803) (0.0333) (0.0915) (0.0929) (0.0439) 
France, Monaco -0.0459 -0.00350 -0.0289 -0.0442 -0.0181 0.0174 
 (0.0787) (0.0633) (0.0315) (0.0851) (0.0716) (0.0384) 
Sweden -0.279** 0.00266 -0.125*** -0.223* -0.0344 -0.0540 
 (0.123) (0.0928) (0.0413) (0.133) (0.0958) (0.0472) 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland , Norway  -0.0619 0.0657 -0.122*** -0.0925 -0.0346 -0.0828* 
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 (0.106) (0.0939) (0.0368) (0.114) (0.103) (0.0437) 
Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain 0.245 -0.148 -0.179*** 0.257 -0.0295 -0.0648 
 (0.167) (0.130) (0.0582) (0.173) (0.148) (0.0741) 
Ireland, United Kingdom  -0.0390 -0.0810* -0.0491** -0.0963 -0.108** 0.00299 
 (0.0622) (0.0447) (0.0245) (0.0728) (0.0483) (0.0287) 
Other 0.628*** 0.450* 0.0956 0.870*** 0.318 0.163 
 (0.235) (0.238) (0.0950) (0.269) (0.259) (0.121) 
       
Observations 2,326 4,232 9,032 2,245 3,818 7,520 
R-squared 0.165 0.046 0.039 0.176 0.059 0.045 
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Figure 1: Number of deals per year per region 
Figure 1 shows the number of venture deals over time and across regions covered in our sample. 
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Figure 2: IPO and Trade Sales success rates per region. 
Figure 2 shows the time series of IPO and Trade sale exit rates across years of the first VC investment 
for the two regions. 
  
  
 
  
61 
 
 
Figure 3: Estimated cumulative density of exits per region 
Figure 3a shows the Kaplan-Meier estimator of the cumulative density of exits (IPOs or trade sales) for 
the US (blue line) and Europe (red line). Below each graph the Number at risk table shows for different 
time periods the total number of deals that could potentially exit.  Time period is in months from the 
time when the firm received the first round of VC financing. Confidence bands represent 95% 
confidence intervals of the Kaplan-Meier estimator.  Figures 3b and 3c show the estimated cumulative 
incidence function for IPOs and trade sales, respectively. Cumulative incidence functions were 
computed treating the alternative exit route as a competing risk, i.e. they represent cumulative density 
functions for a particular exit route allowing for the existence of the alternative exit route. 95% 
confidence intervals are plotted as dotted lines. The unconditional estimated exit probability within 200 
months from the first round of VC financing is 40% for Europe and 56% for the US. 
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Figure 4: Estimated cumulative density of exits per region per year 
Figure 4 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimator of the cumulative density of exits (IPOs or trade sales) for 
the US (blue line) and Europe (red line), for each vintage year from 1996 to 2006. 95% confidence 
intervals are also plotted.   
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Figure 4, continued: Estimated cumulative density of exits per region per 
year 
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Figure 4, continued: Estimated cumulative density of exits per region per 
year 
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Figure 5: Estimated cumulative density of exits per region per year 
Figure 5 shows the estimated cumulative incidence function for IPOs and trade sales for both regions 
separately. Cumulative incidence functions were computed treating the alternative exit route as a 
competing risk, i.e. they represent cumulative density functions for a particular exit route allowing for 
the existence of the alternative exit route.  
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Figure 5 continued: Estimated cumulative density of exits per region per 
year 
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Figure 5 continued: Estimated cumulative density of exits per region per 
year 
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Figure 6: Calendar year dummies for IPO and Trade sale hazard rates 
Figure 6 shows the calendar year dummy coefficients from Specifications (5) and (8) in Table 8. 
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Figure 7: Serial entrepreneurship 
Figure 7 shows the fraction out of all firms receiving their first round of VC financing in year t that has 
at least one founder with previous entrepreneurial experience.  Entrepreneurial experience is identified 
by information in Venture Source about the background of entrepreneurs. 
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Figure 8: Stigma of failure 
Figure 8 shows by the first year of VC financing the fraction of firms with founder(s) who founded a 
VC-backed venture before without successful exit (IPO or Trade Sale) out of all firms with at least one 
founder who founded a VC-backed venture before. 
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Figure 9: Success of serial entrepreneurs 
Figure 9 shows for the two regions time series of success rates (IPO or Trade Sale) by year of first VC 
financing for different types of firms. The red line represents firms with no founders who founded a 
VC-backed venture before and who never founded another VC-backed venture in the future. The blue 
line represents firms with no founders who founded a VC-backed venture before but at least one of the 
founders founded another VC-backed venture in the future. The black line represents firms with at least 
one founder who founded VC-backed venture before.  
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Figure 10: Experience of Venture Capitalists in US vs. Europe 
Figure 10 shows the time series of VC experience by year of first VC financing. VC experience is the 
difference between the log of one plus the number of active investments made by a venture capital 
organization prior to year t and the average in year t of the log of one plus the number of active 
investments made by all organizations prior to year t. 
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Figure 11: Pooled IPO PMEs 
The figure shows the PME of the portfolio of deals in each vintage year and region that went IPO. 
Gray lines are number of IPOs in each vintage year and region.  
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Figure 12: Deal level IPO PMEs 
The figure shows median, upper quartile, and lower quartile PMEs for deals in each region and 
vintage year that subsequently went IPO.  
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Figure 13: Deal level IPO IRRs and Alphas 
The figure shows median, upper quartile, and lower quartile IRRs (upper panel) and alphas (lower 
panel) for deals in each region and vintage year that subsequently went IPO. Alphas are calculated by 
taking the yearly addition to market returns that sets PMEs to 1. 
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Figure 14: Pooled Trade sale PMEs 
The figure shows the PME of the portfolio of deals in each vintage year and region that subsequently 
resulted in a trade sale. Gray lines are number of trade sales in each vintage year and region.  
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Figure 15: Deal level Trade sale PMEs 
The figure shows median, upper quartile, and lower quartile PMEs for deals in each region and 
vintage year that subsequently resulted in a trade sale. 
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Figure 16: Deal level Trade Sale IRRs and Alphas 
The figure shows median, upper quartile, and lower quartile IRRs (upper panel) and alphas (lower 
panel) for deals in each region and vintage year that subsequently resulted in a trade sale. Alphas are 
calculated by taking the yearly addition to market returns that sets PMEs to 1. 
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Figure 17: PMEs by buyer type 
The figure shows median PMEs for IPOs and for different size buyers in trade sales. 
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Figure 18: Average PMEs by region 
The figure shows average PMEs by region, together with upper and lower quartile PMEs. For IPOs 
and trade sales where we do not have cash flow information, PMEs are imputed as described in the 
text. Failed deals have a PME of zero. For deals that are not reported as failed by 2006, we designate 
them as failed if no other round of financing had happened by 2011. 
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Abstract 
Association of insiders’ selling decision of VC-backed initial public offerings 
(IPOs) with the post-IPO long-run performance is analyzed. I find that the selling 
decision by insiders, measured as a fraction of shares sold by the selling stockholders 
to total shares sold in the offering, has significant positive association with the long-
run profitability and negative association with the risk after the IPO. Furthermore, 
when venture capitalists sell shares in the IPO there is positive concave parabolic 
association between the selling decision and the post-IPO long-run market 
performance. However, venture capitalists selling of over-allotted shares and stock 
redemptions are not associated with superior post-IPO performance. Evidence on 
selling decision of venture capitalists confirms the importance of reputation as a factor 
affecting insiders’ selling decisions. 
 
I. Introduction 
Secondary shares sales of insiders during the initial public offerings (IPOs) 
convey a signal to market participants regarding the true value of underlying assets. 
Both theory and evidence suggest that due to asymmetric information market 
participants seek premium when trading with insiders. Even if insiders have to disclose 
in advance their selling decision, such as in public offerings, information asymmetry 
concerns reduce their ability to sell, even when insiders are not acting 
opportunistically. For example, prior IPO studies have shown that insider selling 
decision and ownership structure affect the magnitude of underpricing (Ljungqvist and 
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Wilhelm (2003)). Ritter (1991) and Lougrhan and Ritter (1995) argue that the sale of 
secondary shares indicate that existing shareholders behave opportunistically by 
selling overpriced shares. To the extent that such information asymmetry costs are 
possible to mitigate, there are incentives to design appropriate institutional structures.   
In this paper, I focus on insiders selling during IPOs of Venture Capital (VC) 
backed issuers, particularly on secondary sales by VC investors and company 
founders. Venture capitalists are early investors and insiders that typically have a 
board representation in their portfolio companies and thereby provide monitoring and 
advisory services. In deciding whether to sell in the IPO, venture capitalists balance 
the costs of continued ownership against the adverse market reaction to selling1. Costs 
of adverse market reaction to selling are particularly high for venture capitalists who 
are identifiable insiders and repeat players in the IPO market. As Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) show, institutional holdings of equity after an IPO are significantly 
higher for VC-backed IPOs vs non-VC-backed IPOs, increasing the importance of VC 
reputation on selling decision due to a repeated game between venture capitalists and 
institutional investors. Therefore, venture capitalists will seek to limit the impact of 
adverse reaction of selling on their reputation. Such reputation contributes to the 
ability of the venture capitalists to redeploy capital repeatedly and successfully 
participate in future IPOs of its portfolio companies. On the other hand, continued 
ownership interest of venture capitalists restrains their abilities to redeploy capital and 
advisory talent, as partners are limited in committing their talent. Moreover, venture 
capitalists preference for liquidating their stake in the IPO is motivated by their fund 
performance. By selling shares in the IPO, venture capitalists can return the capital 
back to their limited partners sooner, thereby generating higher IRR (internal rate of 
return) for the investment and the fund2. Given that the fund’s IRR is positively 
associated with future fund raisings, repeated interaction between venture capitalists 
and their limited partners incentivizes them to liquidate their stakes early. Finally, 
negative private signal regarding future business prospects, or alternatively, 
                                                            
1 Even if VC investors are not selling shares in the IPO they can influence the selling decision of other 
insiders. 
2 For venture capital investments that go IPO IRRs are significantly higher than the average public 
market returns, therefore earlier exit from the investment will generate higher IRR. A simple example 
can illustrate this: for median IPO deal (3.9 years investment period) IRR of venture investment is 78% 
(assuming full stake liquidation at the IPO), however liquidating the stake 1 year (2 years) after the IPO 
reduces the IRR to 62% (52%), assuming 10% annual stock return. 
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overpricing by the market, could influence the selling decision as well. As Lin and 
Smith (1998) point out, in discussions venture capitalists indicate that they prefer to 
sell as much of their position as possible in the IPO since remaining shares cannot be 
traded for several months3. Therefore, the selling decision depends on the interaction 
of several factors.  
My primary goal is to investigate the association between secondary sales of 
venture capitalists during the IPOs and long-run performance measure of VC-backed 
IPOs. I also consider venture capitalists sales of over-allotted shares and stock 
redemptions during the IPO, which I refer to as the additional selling. There is an 
ample of evidence that VC-backed IPOs outperform non-VC-backed IPOs (Brav and 
Gompers (1997), Lin and Smith (1998), Brau et al. (2007), Krishnan et al. (2011)), 
hence impact of the secondary sales on the post-IPO long-run performance for VC-
backed IPOs only is of interest. Particularly, due to high reputation concerns of venture 
capitalists, the selling decision during the IPOs and the post-IPO performance of VC-
backed issuers has an impact on selling shareholders, which is less profound in non-
VC-backed issuers. Moreover, the post-IPO long-run performance is important not 
only to IPO investors, but to venture capitalists as well, that typically hold stock 
beyond the lock-up period (Field and Hanka (2001)) and to limited partners who 
frequently receive shares after the IPO as distribution from the VC fund they invested 
in. Therefore, selling by venture capitalists in the IPO provides comprehensive 
understanding of the motivation for IPO secondary share sales and can be extended to 
any setting with significant reputation concerns. In addition, the analysis improves our 
understanding of relations between venture capitalists and their limited partners, 
institutional investors and underwriters. 
In summary, the motivation for the secondary share sales in the IPOs gives rise 
to following testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between secondary share 
sales and post-IPO performance:  
1. Secondary share sales are associated with poor post-IPO performance since 
selling stockholders are able to sell overpriced shares.   
                                                            
3 Except for sales during the offering, underwriting agreements typically include lock-up agreement 
that prevents sale or distribution of shares by insiders for usually 180 days, but sometimes up to 2 years, 
after the offering. 
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2. The sale of secondary shares is not associated with poor post-IPO performance 
as selling is driven by motivations other than overpricing, e.g. liquidity or 
diversification. 
3. Venture capitalists balance their reputation against selling by offering shares in 
IPO issuers with higher likelihood of future superior performance. Moreover, 
venture capitalists’ reputation has an indirect effect on selling decision of other 
stockholders.  
4. Sales of over-allotted shares and stock redemptions have lower reputation 
impact as they conceal the selling. Venture capitalists sell over-allotted shares 
in IPO issuers that do not have superior post-IPO performance. . 
The evidence confirms the importance of reputation as a factor affecting the 
selling decision of venture capitalists. Although, most venture capitalists do not sell 
shares in the IPO, I find that selling secondary shares by venture capitalists is 
positively associated with long-run performance measure. Moreover, I provide 
evidence of positive association between long-run post-IPO performance and selling 
decision of company founders. However, sales of over-allotted shares and stock 
redemptions during the IPO are not associated with superior post-IPO performance 
and there is some evidence that venture capitalists behave opportunistically by selling 
short-term overpriced shares. The result that secondary sales is positively associated 
with long-run performance is in contrast with prior research (Brau et al., (2007)). Brau 
et al. (2007) analyze all US IPOs (not only VC backed) from 1980-2001 and show that 
secondary sales have no impact on long-run post-IPO performance, moreover selling 
by insiders (founders, directors and managers) has a negative impact on the long-run 
post-IPO performance. Brau et al. (2007) conclude that: It is secondary shares sales 
by information-advantaged insiders, and not secondary shares sales in general, that 
appear to be opportunistic. The tendency of insiders for secondary sales may be 
motivated by simple diversification and liquidity needs, due to selling restrictions on 
the secondary market post IPO. Kahl et al. (2003) argue that holding restricted shares 
increases shareholder portfolio risk and generally reduces portfolio value. To the 
extent that tendencies of non-VC insiders to sell shares is homogeneous across VC 
and non-VC backed IPOs, my results indicate that venture capitalists exert influence 
on selling decision of other insiders, supporting secondary sales for those issues that 
have higher probability of superior performance. Therefore, given the reputation 
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concerns of venture capitalists4 of adverse market reaction to opportunistic behavior, 
venture capitalists mitigate opportunism by selling secondary shares in IPO issuers 
with superior post-IPO performance.  
For IPO issuers with more than one VC investor I examine selling decision by 
lead venture capitalist as well as all other venture capitalists. Following Lin and Smith 
(1998), Hochberg et al. (2007) and Krishnan et al. (2011), I define a lead venture 
capitalist as having the largest stake in the issuing firm among all venture capitalists. 
Following Lin and Smith (1998), selling decision is defined as a fraction of shares sold 
to total shares sold in the offering. However, I consider alternative specifications of 
selling decision: a fraction of shares to total shares held before the IPO by the seller 
or as a dummy variable. Although, alternative specifications of selling variable 
produce similar results, they are not as robust as for the fraction of shares sold in the 
offering. The rationale of using this measure over alternative is that the size of the IPO 
is determined by demand. Brau et al. (2007) results show that secondary share sales 
are often revised depending on the IPO demand. Consequently, total capital raised in 
the IPO is the limiting factor and therefore share of new liquidity that is absorbed by 
selling stockholders seems as a better selling decision measure. 
 I examine the association of selling decision with issuing company’s long-run 
performance measures after going public, using the following performance standards: 
i) industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) (Krishnan et al. (2011); ii) excess returns 
over Fama-French 4 factor model (Field and Karpoff (2002), Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003)); iii) long-run risk of IPO issuers; iv) public market equivalent (PME) 
(Kaplan and Schoar (2005)). I find that the selling decision by venture capitalists as 
well as other shareholders has positive association with return on assets and negative 
association with risk after controlling for observable IPO characteristics and VC 
experience. Moreover, selling decision by venture capitalists is positively associated 
with market performance measures, i.e. excess return and PME, albeit the relationship 
is non-linear. Separate analysis for dotcom bubble years (1999 and 2000) shows that 
the positive association between venture capitalists selling and post-IPO performance 
is not observed during the dotcom bubble. However, this is not surprising given that 
there was very little selling by venture capitalists during this period. Thus, I conclude 
                                                            
4 Reputation of venture capitalists is indirectly associated with selling decision of other insiders, i.e. 
even if venture capitalists refrain from selling they might exert influence over other insiders. 
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that secondary sales during the IPO is a decision that conveys positive private 
information regarding the issuer. Venture capitalists make the selling decision when 
their private information regarding future prospects is positive, thereby mitigating 
adverse market reaction to behavioral opportunism. 
My focus on insiders’ selling during the IPO (venture capitalist, founders, 
other insiders and other shareholders) is different from the focus of Gompers and 
Lerner (1998), who examine venture capitalists distribution of shares after the IPO to 
their limited partners. They provide evidence of market inefficiency: venture 
capitalists time distributions and market underreacts to distributions (which are private 
transactions). My paper is closely related to Lin and Smith (1998), who examine 
determinants of selling decision of venture capitalists and their reputation (measured 
by experience). Their data sample consists of all US VC-backed and non-VC-backed 
IPOs from 1979-1990. Their main findings are that more reputable VCs engage in 
secondary sales and that VCs do not exhibit opportunism, i.e. secondary sales by more 
reputable VCs are associated with higher underpricing. In my work, I do not find 
evidence of higher underpricing if venture capitalists decide to sell secondary shares 
nor do I find association between secondary sales and venture capitalists experience 
(our samples do not overlap, which could explain the difference in findings). 
Although, Lin and Smith do not focus on post-IPO long-run performance nor do they 
examine it for non-VC secondary sales, Table 10 in their work indicates that, 
regardless of reputation secondary sales by venture capitalists are associated with 
better long-run post-IPO performance 1 year after the IPO. My work is also related to 
Krishnan et al. (2011), who examine association of a VC firm’s reputation with the 
post-IPO long-run performance. They examine all US VC-backed and non-VC-
backed IPOs from 1993-2004 period and find evidence that VC reputation (as 
measured by IPO market share) is positively associated with 4 distinct post-IPO long-
run performance measures. I do not replicate their findings that VC reputation measure 
is positively associated with post-IPO long-run performance measure. My results 
show that VC reputation, as measured by past IPO market share, is not associated with 
any post-IPO long-run performance measure. Our samples cover different periods, 
however, which could explain the difference.  
A strand of literature examines the association between secondary sales during 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and post-IPO performance. Mikkelson et al. (1997) 
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find that the operating performance is unrelated to the ownership of directors and 
management within the first ten years of public trading. Jain and Kini (1994) show 
that the post-IPO performance is positively associated with the equity stake retained 
by company’s founders. Clarke et al. (2004) find negative association between long-
run returns and secondary share sales only when insiders are selling. Seasoned equity 
offerings literature generally finds that secondary sales are not positively associated 
with long-run performance measure. Moreover, insiders selling is negatively 
associated with long-run performance. Finally, Brau et al. (2007) examine secondary 
sales during IPO for all US IPOs (without specifically focusing on VC-backed IPOs) 
and find evidence that secondary sales do not have an impact on post-IPO long-run 
performance. Moreover, insiders selling is negatively associated with long-run 
performance.  
My work is also related to broader venture capital literature and determinants 
of venture capital exits. Furthermore, I contribute to the post-IPO long-run 
performance literature by introducing performance measure which is the extension of 
public market equivalent measure (Kaplan and Schoar (2005)), named total PME. 
Total PME is a ratio of company’s stock total holding period return, from the IPO 
date, and the market holding period return5. Given that more than half of VC-backed 
IPOs in my sample were acquired or merged before the end of observation period, 
holding period return should be corrected for acquisitions that involve shares of the 
acquiring firm. Therefore, I define total issue holding period return as the augmented 
standard holding period return by the holding period return of the acquiring firm. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the 
data. Section III provides descriptive statistics. Section IV analyzes the association 
between secondary sales and long-run IPO performance measures. Section V performs 
robustness checks. Section VI concludes.  
 
 
 
                                                            
5 Holding period return is a buy and hold return for an IPO investor from the IPO data until the end of 
the observation period. 
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II. Data 
A. IPO sample 
My sample consists of all US-domiciled VC-backed IPOs completed during 
the 1997-2011 period in the US. Information on issuing firms and venture capitalists 
comes from Dow Jones’ Venture Source (previously called Venture One).  Venture 
Source, established in 1987, collects data on firms that have obtained venture capital 
financing. Firms that have received early-stage financing exclusively from individual 
investors, federally chartered Small Business Investment Companies, and corporate 
development groups are not included in the database. The companies are initially 
identified from a wide variety of sources, including trade publications, company Web 
pages, and telephone contacts with venture investors. Venture Source then collects 
information about the businesses through interviews with both venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs. The data include the identity of the key founders, as well as the 
industry, strategy, employment, financial history, and revenues of the company. Data 
on the firms are updated and validated through monthly contacts with investors and 
companies6. Venture Source claims to have complete coverage of US venture capital 
activity from 1993 onward. My sample starts from 1997 because in computing VC 
reputation measures (experience and IPO market share) I use at least 3 years prior data 
on previous VC financing deals and VC-backed IPOs. I end my sample in 2011 in 
order to allow enough time to evaluate post-IPO long-run performance measures, 
which are measured 3 years after the IPO. This leaves me with a sample of 1074 US-
domiciled VC-backed IPOs. From this set, I exclude the following: i) 32 non-US IPOs, 
i.e. VC-backed firm is domiciled in the US, however, the IPO was conducted oversees, 
e.g. 15 were listed in London on AIM or LSE; ii) 2 issues not listed on 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX; iii) 1 reverse-merger issue. After these exclusions, there are 
1039 IPOs left in the sample. Certain IPO issuer characteristics, e.g. age, come from 
the Venture Source database. I complement Venture Source database of venture 
                                                            
6 The description in this paragraph of Venture Source is borrowed from Gompers, Lerner, and 
Scharfstein (2010) 
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capitalists with CapitalIQ database by linking distinct entities in Venture Source 
database if they belong to the same corporate parent7.  
IPO prospectuses are hand collected from SEC and NASDAQ websites and 
each prospectus is manually processed. The following information is collected from 
each prospectus from the corresponding section: i) Summary (IPO price, ticker, 
exchange, underwriter, underwriting discount, buying by existing shareholders, over-
allotment option (primary and secondary)); ii) The Offering (primary and secondary 
shares offered, number of shares outstanding, outstanding options and warrants and 
other equity-type instruments and their corresponding strike prices); iii) Use of 
Proceeds (net proceeds to the issuer, amount of proceeds used to retire existing shares); 
iv) Principal Stockholders (number of shares held before the offering, number of 
shares sold in the offering, number of shares sold if over-allotment option is exercised 
– these numbers are recorded for each investor that is present in Venture Source 
database, for company founders and for directors and officers as a group); v) Shares 
eligible for future sales (lockup period, number of shares eligible for sale immediately 
after the IPO and 90 days after the IPO). 
Each issuer is linked to Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
CompuStat databases based on Company Name and IPO date. I use CRSP Daily Stock 
file for daily closing prices, daily returns, daily volume and shares outstanding. CRSP 
data is complemented with CRSP/CompuStat merged database of daily prices. I 
complement CRSP with CRSP/CompuStat in order to have the latest available price 
(which is necessary for PME computation) for an issue even after it has been delisted 
from a major exchange. Quarterly financial data of IPO issuers comes from 
CompuStat.  
I use CapitalIQ and SEC filings for details of mergers and acquisitions of IPO 
issuers. Type of acquisition is recorded and the composition of payment. Acquiring 
firm is linked to CRSP and CompuStat databases and its PME is computed.  
 
                                                            
7 This is particularly the case for Corporate Venture Capital and Financial Institutions, e.g. Intel and 
Intel Capital are treated as separate entities in Venture Source database, however IPO prospectuses 
typically only report Intel as a shareholder. 
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B. Post-IPO long-run performance measures 
First post-IPO long-run performance measure is industry-adjusted return on 
assets (ROA). ROA is defined as the ratio of the trailing 12 months net income to total 
assets. Following Krishnan et al. (2011), each IPO issuer is matched to a sample of 
non-equity issuers based on the issuer’s 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) code, if there are less than 5 matches, IPO issuer is matched based on 3-digit (or 
2-digit) SIC codes so that there are at least 5 matches. The median ROA of the matched 
sample is subtracted from the ROA of the IPO issue. Industry-adjusted return on assets 
is measured at the end of the third year following the IPO. If the IPO issuer does not 
survive for 3 years after the IPO the latest available quarter is used. Industry-adjusted 
ROA is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the effects of outliers.  
Second post-IPO long-run performance measure is long-run abnormal market 
return. Following the existing IPO literature (e.g. Brav and Gompers (1997), Krishnan 
et al. (2011)), long-run abnormal market return is defined as 4-factor-adjusted 
abnormal stock return measured over 3 years from the IPO date or until delisting, 
whichever comes first. The factors used are the 3 Fama and French (1992) factors and 
the Carhart (1997) momentum factor8. Due to strong size and book-to-market effects 
in returns of IPO issuers (Brav and Gompers (1997)) it is important to adjust returns 
for the corresponding factors. I compute long-run stock returns using weekly data that 
are computed by compounding daily returns. I choose weekly returns in order to have 
enough observations for all IPO issuers (23% are delisted within 3 years after the IPO) 
and to avoid daily volatility in low liquid securities9. Following Cochrane (2005), 
abnormal stock returns are computed using logarithmic market model due to 
particularly high skewness in returns of IPO issuers. Logarithmic alphas are converted 
to arithmetic alphas for the ease of interpretation. I use the following logarithmic 
market model when computing long-run abnormal returns: 
                                                            
8 Daily factor returns are obtained from Ken French’s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html 
9 Results using daily returns instead of weekly are qualitatively the same. 
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 ln(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − ln�𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖�= 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚�ln(𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) − ln�𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖��+ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠 ln(1 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖)+ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ln(1 + ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ln(1 + 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 ,𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 represent gross return of issue 𝑖𝑖 , gross return of the market and 
gross return of the risk-free rate over period 𝑡𝑡 respectively; 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ,ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 ,𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 are 
size, value and momentum factors over period 𝑡𝑡 respectively. Arithmetic intercepts 
are reported as continuous time limits of the discreet market model in levels10.  
Third post-IPO performance measure is the long-run risk of the IPO issuer. I 
define long-run risk of the IPO issuer as either total risk measured by volatility of the 
IPO issuer returns or as idiosyncratic risk measured by standard deviation of the error 
term from equation (1). Arithmetic analogs of above describe logarithmic long-run 
risk measure are identical in the case of continuous time limits of the discreet market 
model in levels.  
Fourth post-IPO performance measure is the ratio of the holding period return 
of the IPO issue to the holding period return of the benchmark over different horizons. 
I use 3 year, 5 years, 7 years and the end of observation period horizons. In Brav and 
Gompers (1997) the ratio is called Wealth Relative and they show that the choice of 
the benchmark11 over the 5-year horizon for cross-sectional analysis is irrelevant. 
Similarly, Brau et al. (2007) show that the choice of benchmark is irrelevant over the 
3-year horizon period; however, their post-IPO long-run performance variable is the 
difference in holding period returns and not the ratio. I use NASDAQ as the 
benchmark for two reasons: i) almost 95% of IPO issues are listed on NASDAQ; ii) 
                                                            
10 The model in levels is defined as: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
In continuous time limit case, parameters of the model in levels are found using the following 
relationship: 𝛽𝛽 = 𝛿𝛿,𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖 = 𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈  
𝛼𝛼 = 𝛾𝛾 + 12 𝛿𝛿𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿𝑚𝑚 − 1)𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚2 + 12 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠(𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠 − 1)𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠2 + 12 𝛿𝛿ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 1)𝜎𝜎ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2+ 12 𝛿𝛿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 1)𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2 + 12𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2 
 
11 Brav and Gompers (1997) consider the following benchmarks: CRSP value-weighted index, 
NASDAQ or size and book-to-market adjusted 
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NASDAQ has similar loadings on 4-factor market model to most IPO issues. Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005), who term the ratio Public Market Equivalent (PME), use it to 
analyze private equity fund performances. In this paper, I will refer to the ratio as the 
PME.  
Since 23% and 39% of all IPO issues are delisted within the first 3 years and 
5 years respectively, and given that majority of delisting is due to merger or acquisition 
activity, for IPO issuer shareholders post-IPO long-run performance measure should 
take into account the performance of the acquiring firm if the acquisition is financed 
by acquiring firm’s stocks. Taking into account performance of the acquiring firm is 
relevant because very often newly issued shares of the acquiring firm are restricted 
and IPO issuer shareholders could not easily liquidate them. Therefore, I define total 
PME long-run performance measure of the IPO issuer as the weighted average of the 
PME performance measure of the acquiree (i.e. IPO issuer) and acquirer: 
 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎= 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠ℎ(%) × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + �1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠ℎ(%)�× 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
(2) 
 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠ℎ(%) is the cash proportion of the merger or acquisition transaction. Cash 
proportion of the transaction is obtained from CapitalIQ and SEC filings. PME of the 
acquiring firm is computed as defined above.  
 
C. Selling Decision 
I define the selling decision variable as the fraction of total shares sold by 
selling shareholders' group to the total shares sold in the offering. Although, I do 
consider alternative selling variable specifications, including fraction of shares sold to 
total shares held prior to the IPO and a dummy variable, preference for the former is 
supported by the inelasticity of the IPO size to supply. Prior literature on selling shares 
during the IPO is based on secondary shares sales only. However, there are two 
additional forms of selling shares during the IPO that are of interest. Firstly, almost all 
IPOs involve over-allotment option (in my sample only 5 IPOs are without such 
option). Over-allotment option is a free option granted to underwriters by the IPO 
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issuer or the selling stockholders. The option, typically granted for 30 days, allows 
underwriters to buy 10-15% more shares than the initial offering at the IPO price. 
Although widely considered as a price-stabilizing mechanism, over-allotment option 
is another way for existing shareholders to sell their shares in the IPO. In my dataset, 
more than 20% of all IPOs involve selling over-allotted shares by the existing 
shareholders. Secondly, existing shareholders could sell their shares back to the IPO 
issuer (which would then be retired) concurrently with the IPO offering. Although, 
technically those redemptions are not part of the IPO, in most cases IPO proceeds are 
used to finance share redemptions. To the extent that the redemptions are performed 
on the same terms as the IPO, for the selling stockholders they are no different from 
the secondary share sale. For each IPO I record the use of proceeds and in case when 
the proceeds are used to finance the redemption, I record the identity of the selling 
stockholder. Therefore, I expand the definition of selling by existing shareholders in 
the IPO by adding over-allotment selling and IPO financed redemptions to the 
secondary share sales. Throughout the paper, I perform analysis with the “narrower”, 
i.e. only secondary sales, and “broader”, i.e. secondary sales, over-allotment sales and 
redemptions, definitions of shares sales.  
 
D. Control Variables 
I control for the effects of observable issue characteristics on the post-IPO 
long-run performance measures. To the extent that these observable issue 
characteristics affect selling decision, marginal effect of the selling decision on post-
IPO long-run performance should primarily capture unobservable issue characteristics 
that I will broadly define as issuer’s quality. 
Previous studies find that VC reputation12 measure affects selling decision and 
post-IPO performance. Lin and Smith (1998) find that VC selling decision is more 
likely when the VC has established reputation and Krishnan et al. (2011) find that VCs 
that are more reputable are associated with higher post-IPO long-run performance. 
Following previous studies, I use two VC reputation measures: i) IPO market share 
computed as VC’s dollar market share of all venture-backed IPOs in the preceding 3 
                                                            
12 Here I refer to VC reputation as a specific measure of the VC reputation used in the literature.   
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calendar years (Krishnan et al. (2011) or  from the beginning of the sample until the 
IPO year (Nahata (2008)); ii) VC experience computed as the difference between the 
log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization prior to the 
IPO year  and the log of the average number of investments made by all venture capital 
organizations prior to the IPO year (Gompers et al. (2009)).  
Previous studies find that lead underwriter reputation effects post-IPO long-
run performance measure (Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998)). If venture capitalists 
decide to sell the shares in the IPO, hiring more reputable underwriter in order to 
mitigate asymmetric information concerns and behavioral opportunism seems very 
plausible. Therefore, it is necessary to control for the lead underwriter reputation. I 
use modified Carter and Manaster ranking of underwriters that is maintained by Jay 
Ritter13. 
I use the following IPO issuer and IPO issue characteristics to control for 
observables. More established and financially stronger firms have larger IPOs (Carter 
et al. (1998)), thus IPO proceeds should be a control. Another proxy for more 
established firms is the age of the IPO issuer at the time of the IPO. Lin and Smith 
(1998) control for more established firms and size by controlling for total assets and 
the ratio of revenue to assets. I order to reduce skewness due to outliers, I use log 
transformation of these controls. Additional set of controls is suggested in the 
literature (see Krishnan et al. (2011)) that control for IPO issuer’s quality: i) 
underpricing, defined as the first day return; ii) IPO issuer market capitalization, 
defined as the offer price multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding; iii) IPO 
issuer’s book-to-market ratio, which measures firm’s growth opportunities. I also 
control for industry and year-fixed effects. Following Gompers et al. (2006) I use 
broad group of 8 industries that is standard in venture capital literature. The industry 
groups are: i) Internet and Computers, ii) Communications and Electronics, iii) 
Business and Industrial, iv) Consumer Products, v) Energy, vi) Biotech and 
Healthcare, vii) Financial Services, and viii) Business Services. 
Finally, I control for profitability measures of existing stockholders. Venture 
source data claims to have close to 100% coverage of all venture capital financing 
rounds in the US since 1993. I use round to round information to compute venture 
                                                            
13 The ranking is available from the Jay Ritter’s website: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/Ritter/rank.pdf 
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capital PME from the date of the first VC investment until the IPO date (Axelson and 
Martinovic (2015), working paper). The venture capital PME measures how profitable 
is the investment for the VC. If venture capitalists behave opportunistically, prior 
investment profitability might influence selling decision. By selling shares in their 
most profitable investments, VC would show good fund performance to their limited 
partners, which influences VC’s ability to raise a new fund. Additionally, I control for 
how profitable is the investment for all existing stockholders at the IPO date. The 
information on the average price per share paid for existing stockholders is in the 
Dilution section of the IPO prospectus. Higher profitability of initial investment might 
translate to less diversification of a shareholder (since more wealth is concentrated in 
the investment). If insider’s selling decision is driven by diversification, then 
profitability could influence insider’s selling decision.  
 
III. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
A. IPO issuer characteristics 
My sample of VC-backed US IPOs spans from 1997-2011, including two 
recessions with very low level of IPO activity. Table 1 reports the IPO frequency 
distribution over time for the full sample and subsamples. I consider 4 subsamples 
depending on the identity of the selling 
shareholders. In particular, I analyze selling by: i) lead venture capitalist; ii) any 
venture capitalist; iii) IPO issuer founders; iv) selling by any shareholder. Depending 
on the definition of the selling decision, i.e. “narrower” (secondary sales only) or 
“broader” (secondary sales, over-allotment sales or redemptions), each subsample has 
two specifications. Two years of highest activity during the dotcom bubble, 1999 and 
2000, account for 44.1% of all IPOs and four years preceding the dotcom bubble burst 
in 2001 account for 61.6% of all IPOs.  
VC selling frequency significantly varies over time. Only 1.3% of all IPOs 
(5.5% in the “broader” selling definition sense) involve selling by the lead VC during 
the dotcom bubble period and 15.8% (21.7%) otherwise. This shift in selling during 
the dotcom bubble is not unique to venture capitalists, as it is present in the selling 
pattern of IPO issuer’s founders and any shareholders, albeit the shift is less 
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pronounced. For example, percent of VC-backed IPOs involving selling of any 
shareholders in the “broader” definition increases from 20.1% during the dotcom 
bubble to 44.9% outside the bubble. Since many dotcom bubble IPOs performed 
poorly in the long-run and selling is more prevalent in the non-dotcom period, it is 
important to control for the dotcom bubble effect.   
Table 2 compares the characteristics of IPO issuers without and with secondary 
offering conditional on the selling shareholders identity. Table 2 is based on the 
“narrower” definition of the secondary offering, i.e. includes only secondary sales. 
Consistent with prior research, IPO issuers with secondary offerings (regardless of the 
identity of the selling shareholders) are older and more established firms. Average IPO 
issuer with secondary offering is around 10 years old at the time of the IPO, whereas 
average IPO issuer with primary offering only is almost 4 years younger. Average 
trailing 12 month revenue leading up to the IPO for secondary offerings is more than 
3 times higher than for primary offerings. Total assets of IPO issuers with secondary 
offerings are double the assets of IPO issuers with primary offerings and book-to-
market for secondary offerings is 50% higher than for primary offerings. IPO issuers 
with secondary offerings are older firms, with more assets and higher revenue, 
however with less growth potential. Lower growth potential translates to lower fund 
needs, as evidenced by lower IPO proceeds for secondary offerings. There is no 
apparent difference in market capitalization between primary and secondary offerings, 
confirming that main difference between primary and secondary IPO issuers is the 
growth potential. Moreover, underpricing, i.e. the first trading day return after the IPO, 
is significantly higher for primary IPO issuers. Higher underpricing could be attributed 
to higher asymmetric information in growth firms vs value firms. Alternatively, higher 
underpricing could be attributed to behavioral opportunism of selling stockholders, 
i.e. stockholders are selling shares only when they are relatively overpriced, i.e. 
underpricing is lower. However, as shown in Table 1, cyclicality of primary/secondary 
IPO offerings distribution, especially pronounced during the dotcom bubble, is a 
caveat in univariate analysis. For example, it is well documented that IPO underpricing 
was particularly pronounced during the dotcom bubble, therefore mechanically 
increasing the underpricing for primary IPO issuers.  
Venture capital experience, measured as IPO market share 3 years before the 
IPO date, in general, is not significantly different between primary and secondary IPO 
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offerings, and it is only marginally lower when lead venture capital investors sell 
shares. Lin and Smith (1998) report that in their sample venture capital experience is 
strongly associated with selling decision of lead venture capitalist, however I do not 
find this association in my dataset14. Their dataset ends in 1990 and mine starts in 
1997, i.e. we are covering different periods over which venture capital industry has 
experienced significant changes. Venture capital industry during 80s was just starting 
to emerge with number of funds dramatically increasing towards the end of the decade. 
Prominence of the venture capital industry came during the dotcom bubble with many 
new funds incepted. Among other factors, change in venture capital industry landscape 
could explain the change in association between selling decision and experience of 
venture capital firms.  
Interestingly, there is no significant difference in profitability of venture 
capital investments, measured by Venture capital PME (results not reported), between 
primary and secondary IPO issuers. However, for all existing shareholders, secondary 
IPOs are significantly more profitable than primary IPOs. 1 dollar invested in a 
secondary IPO issuer by existing shareholders returns on average more than 10 dollars 
at the time of the IPO vs 7 dollars for primary IPOs. Finally, there is no significant 
difference in underwriter’s reputation between primary and secondary IPOs, 
indicating that selling shareholders are not trying to mitigate adverse reaction to the 
selling decision by hiring more reputable underwriter. However, since the highest 
underwriter’s ranking is 9.1 and the average underwriter’s ranking for both groups of 
IPOs is above 8.1 (which is the second highest underwriter ranking possible), VC-
backed IPOs are hiring the most reputable underwriters regardless of the selling 
decision. Most VC-backed IPOs are underwritten by a handful of underwriters: top 3 
underwriters (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse) account for 1/3 of 
all IPOs and top 10 account for 2/3. 
Table 3 compares the same IPO issue characteristics as in Table 2, however 
for the “broader” definition of selling decision, i.e. selling includes secondary sales, 
over-allotment sales and redemptions. Qualitatively results in Table 3 are very similar 
to Table 2, i.e. variables that were significantly different between No selling and 
various selling identities are still significantly different for the “broader” definition of 
                                                            
14 IPO market share measure is different from Lin and Smith (1998) VC experience measure, however 
the results are virtually unchanged if I use VC experience measure. 
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selling. However, comparison of IPO issuer characteristics between two selling groups 
(results not reported) reveals that IPO proceeds are significantly higher for the 
“broader” group. Trailing 12 month revenues and assets are smaller for the “broader” 
group, whereas underpricing is slightly higher. In general, these changes in IPO 
characteristics between the “broader” selling group and the “narrower” selling group 
suggest that IPO characteristics of issuers with over-allotment sales and/or stock 
redemptions are closer to issuers with primary offerings only. Given that the over-
allotment selling and stock redemptions do not constitute direct selling to outside 
investors (in over-allotment, existing shareholders sell their shares to underwriters; in 
stock redemptions, shares are sold back to the IPO issuer), market’s adverse reaction 
to these selling decisions might be less negative compared to the secondary sales. 
Therefore, behavioral opportunism is less of a concern for selling stockholders and 
they are willing to sell shares in less established companies.  
 
B. Univariate analysis of long-run performance measures 
To fully analyze long-run post-IPO performance, I consider operational 
(industry-adjusted ROA) as well as market performances (return and risk over a 3-
year horizon and PME over a range of horizons). Table 4 presents univariate results 
of IPO issuers’ long-run performance without and with secondary offering conditional 
on the selling shareholders identity. Industry-adjusted return on assets is significantly 
higher for secondary offerings compared to primary offerings. For secondary 
offerings, average ROA is from 3-8 percentage points below the industry median, 
depending on the selling identity group, whereas for primary offerings only ROA is 
on average more than 50 percentage points below the industry median. Alpha from 
the logarithmic market model is significantly higher for the secondary offerings 
compared with the primary offering. Alpha is the highest when lead venture capitalist 
sells shares. However, higher logarithmic alphas do not translate into higher arithmetic 
alphas. There is no statistical difference between primary and secondary offerings 
arithmetic alpha. Arithmetic alphas for primary offerings are high because 
idiosyncratic risk is high – average annualized idiosyncratic risk of primary offerings 
is above 100%, significantly higher than the idiosyncratic risk of secondary offerings. 
Average factor loadings of primary and secondary offerings (results not reported) are 
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not significantly different. Loadings have expected signs and magnitude: i) average 
loadings on the market and smb factors are slightly higher than unity, indicating that 
VC-backed IPO firms are smaller firms with average market exposure; ii) hml and 
momentum loadings are negative, implying that IPO issuers are growth companies 
and are not momentum play. Public market equivalent long-run measures are 
significantly higher for secondary offerings compared to primary offerings. The 
highest PME is observed when lead venture capitalists are selling shares. Total PME 
measure confirms that primary offerings preform significantly worse compared to 
secondary offerings. Compared to PME, total PME has lower estimates of the public 
market equivalent for all groups, implying that acquiring firms on average 
underperform the market if the acquisition is equity financed. Interestingly, by 
increasing time horizon from 3 to 7 years total PME declines substantially for primary 
offerings and slightly changes for secondary offerings, implying that primary offerings 
underperformance increases through time.  
Table 5 repeats the analysis from Table 4, however for the “broader” definition 
of selling. Primary offerings have significantly lower industry adjusted return on 
assets, logarithmic alpha, volatility and PMEs. Arithmetic alphas are not significantly 
different between primary and secondary offerings due to significantly higher 
idiosyncratic risk of primary offerings. As in the Table 4, total PME declines through 
time rather quickly for primary offerings and there is almost no change in total PME 
for secondary offerings. Comparison of long-run performance measures between two 
selling groups (“narrower”, Table 4 and “broader”, Table 5) shows that return on 
assets, logarithmic alpha and PMEs are higher for the “narrower” selling group. 
Conversely, IPO issuers of the “broader” selling group have long-run performance 
measures closer to the primary offerings IPOs, implying that over-allotment sales 
and/or stock redemptions are associated with less establishes firms. 
However, as Tables 2 and 3 show, IPO issues with primary offerings only have 
different characteristics than IPO issues with secondary offerings. Moreover, primary 
offerings are overrepresented during the dotcom bubble period. Therefore, higher risk 
and underperformance of primary offerings possibly could be explained by differences 
in firm characteristics and timing only. In order to investigate whether marginally 
selling decision is associated with better long-run performance and lower risk I turn 
to multivariate analysis. 
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IV. Multivariate Analysis 
A. Selling decision determinants 
Analysis from the previous sections shows that decision to sell shares in the 
IPO is presumably related to observable firm characteristics. To assess this 
relationship I use the following Tobit regression specification across my sample of 
VC-backed IPO issuers: 
 Selling∗ = 𝑇𝑇0 + 𝑇𝑇1 IPO Market Share + 𝑇𝑇2Age + 𝑇𝑇3Sales/Assets+ 𝑇𝑇4IPO Proceeds + 𝑇𝑇5Book to Market + 𝑇𝑇6Ranking+ 𝑇𝑇7Multipl𝑒𝑒existing + 𝑇𝑇8Dotcom + 𝐛𝐛industry + 𝜖𝜖  
 Selling = max(Selling∗, 0) 
(3) 
 
where Selling is the fraction of total shares sold by selling shareholders' group to the 
total shares sold in the offering, IPO Market Share is 3-year measure of VC 
experience; Age, Sales/Assets, IPO Proceeds, Book to Market are IPO issuer 
characteristics in logs; Ranking is modified Carter and Manaster underwriters’ 
ranking; Multipleexisting is the ratio of the IPO price and the average price paid by 
existing shareholders and Dotcom is a dummy equal to one if IPO year is 1999 or 
2000; bindustry is the vector of industry fixed effects to control for differences across 
industries. Table 6 reports results for different selling shareholders’ identities and for 
two specifications of selling decision – “narrower” (only secondary sales) and 
“broader” (secondary sales, over-allotment sales or stock redemptions). The table 
reports coefficients estimates and t-statistics based on standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity and industry clustering. For the period from 1997-2011 VC 
experience is negatively associated with the selling decision of lead venture capitalists 
and weakly negative associated with the selling decision of other shareholders. The 
negative relation between VC selling decision and experience is particularly strong for 
the non-bubble period (results not reported), i.e. less experienced venture capitalists 
tend to sell more shares as a fraction of the IPO offering. IPO issuer age, sales to assets 
ratio and book-to-market ratio, i.e. proxies for firm’s development stage, have 
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statistically significant positive association with the selling decision in all 
specifications, confirming the univariate findings, i.e. venture capitalists and other 
insiders are selling more shares in established firms. IPO proceeds are negatively 
associated with the selling decision, however the relation is not robust in all 
specifications. Underwriters’ ranking is weakly positively associated with the selling 
decision of founders and other shareholders but not with the selling of venture 
capitalists. Venture capitalists do not perceive underwriters’ certification role as a 
mechanism to reduce adverse market reaction and refrain from marginally selling 
more shares when underwriters are more reputable. Interestingly, profitability of 
existing shareholders at the IPO, measured as the ratio of the IPO price to the average 
price paid by all pre-IPO shareholders, is significantly positively associated with the 
selling decision in all specifications, however profitability of venture capitalists is not 
associated with the selling decision15. The results show that hen investment 
profitability of existing shareholders as a group at the IPO is high they sell more shares 
in the IPO, regardless of the profitability of any subgroup, i.e. venture capitalists. 
Finally, as observed in frequency distributions, selling was significantly less prevalent 
during the dotcom bubble period as confirmed by highly significant negative 
coefficient on the dotcom bubble dummy.  
 
B. Underpricing 
Underpricing, defined as the first day return after the IPO, is an immediate 
indicator of under- or over-pricing of the IPO. Univariate analysis shows that 
underpricing is significantly higher of primary offerings only, however in order to 
properly control for time effects and other observable characteristics I consider the 
following specification: 
                                                            
15 PME of venture capital investments, a measure of profitability, is not included in the regression 
specification because in 18 IPO issuers PME is not computed due to lack of data. However, as 
previously stated, PME of venture capital investments is not significantly different between selling and 
no selling group in any specification. 
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 Undepricing = 𝑇𝑇0 + 𝑇𝑇1 Selling + 𝑇𝑇2 IPO Market Share + 𝑇𝑇3Age+ 𝑇𝑇4Sales/Assets + 𝑇𝑇5IPO Proceeds+ 𝑇𝑇6Book to Market + 𝑇𝑇7Ranking+ 𝑇𝑇8Multipl𝑒𝑒existing + 𝑇𝑇9Dotcom + 𝐛𝐛industry + 𝜖𝜖  
 
(4) 
where underpricing is measured in logs and all other variables are the same as in (3). 
Table 7 reports results for different selling shareholders’ identities and for two 
specifications of selling decision – “narrower” (only secondary sales) and “broader” 
(secondary sales, over-allotment sales or stock redemptions). Selling decision by 
venture capitalists is not associated with underpricing, however there is weakly 
significant negative association with the selling decision when founders are selling 
shares. These two results imply that venture capitalist tend to sell shares in established 
firms that are not overpriced, i.e. when underpricing is not low. On the other hand, 
founders are less concerned and sell shares in somewhat overpriced firms, i.e. when 
underpricing is low. However, in the dotcom bubble subsample (results not reported) 
there is some evidence of lower underpricing when venture capitalists sell shares, i.e. 
venture capitalists behaved opportunistically by selling overpriced shares, although 
very few were selling during the dotcom bubble. The results generally confirm the 
hypothesis that venture capitalists have reputation concerns and tend to mitigate 
market’s adverse reaction to behavioral opportunism by not selling overpriced shares. 
 IPO issuer age is significantly negatively associated with the underpricing in 
all specifications, whereas sales-to-assets and book-to-market ratios, although 
negatively associated, are not statistically significant. As expected from the univariate 
analysis, more established IPO issuers have lower underpricing since information 
asymmetry is less profound. The size of the offering is significantly positively related 
to the underpricing, i.e. larger deals require bigger discount in order to be completed. 
Underwriters’ ranking is not associated with underpricing and VC experience, 
although positively associated with underpricing, is not statistically significant. 
Profitability of existing stockholders is significantly positively associated with 
underpricing, indicating that, although very profitable for early investors, these IPO 
issues are still undervalued by underwriters. As expected, the underpricing was 
particularly high during the dotcom bubble period as evidenced by statistically 
significant estimates for the dotcom bubble dummy. 
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C. Return on assets 
Information contained in the selling decision of existing shareholders should 
manifest itself in post-IPO long-run performance measure, if there is one. I assess the 
power of the selling decision to predict long-run performance by using the following 
regression specification: 
 P = 𝑇𝑇0 + 𝑇𝑇1Selling + 𝑇𝑇2 IPO Market Share + 𝑇𝑇3Age+ 𝑇𝑇4Sales/Assets + 𝑇𝑇5IPO Proceeds+ 𝑇𝑇6Book to Market + 𝑇𝑇7Underpricing + 𝑇𝑇8Ranking+ 𝑇𝑇9Multipl𝑒𝑒existing + 𝑇𝑇10Dotcom + 𝐛𝐛industry + 𝜖𝜖  
(5) 
 
where P is one of the long-run performance measures: industry adjusted return on 
assets, logarithmic excess return, idiosyncratic risk, or total PME; Selling is the 
fraction of total shares sold by selling shareholders' group to the total shares sold in 
the offering; other explanatory variables are identical as in equation (3). In all 
specifications, standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for 
industry clustering. I consider 4 selling shareholder’s groups (selling by lead VC, any 
VC, Founders and Any shareholder) and within each group there are two 
specifications depending on the definition of the selling variable, i.e. “narrower” or 
“broader”. 
Ex ante, there is no reason to believe that long-run performance measure and 
selling decision are linearly related, therefore I consider the following non-linear 
regression specification: 
 P = 𝑇𝑇0 + 𝑇𝑇1Selling + 𝑏𝑏1Selling2 + 𝑇𝑇2 IPO Market Share + 𝑇𝑇3Age+ 𝑇𝑇4Sales/Assets + 𝑇𝑇5IPO Proceeds+ 𝑇𝑇6Book to Market + 𝑇𝑇7Underpricing + 𝑇𝑇8Ranking+ 𝑇𝑇9Multipl𝑒𝑒existing + 𝑇𝑇10Dotcom + 𝐛𝐛industry + 𝜖𝜖  
(6) 
 
where 𝑇𝑇1and 𝑏𝑏1are parameters of interest that describe non-linear relationship between 
the selling decision and the long-run post-IPO performance. For each specification, 
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Panel A corresponds to linear model and Panel B corresponds to non-linear model. 
Other explanatory variables are the same as in equation (5). 
Table 8 Panel A reports cross-sectional regression of industry adjusted return 
on assets. The selling decision variable has statistically significant positive association 
with return on assets in all specifications. The association is strongest when IPO 
issuer’s founders are selling the shares. Economically, the magnitude of the 
association is significant as well: when lead VC, any VC, founders or any shareholders 
as a group decide to sell secondary shares on average they sell 14%, 16%, 7% and 
25% of the total offering, respectively. This average selling, conditional on keeping 
other control variables fixed, translates into increasing industry adjusted return on 
assets from -50% to -40%, -39%, 41%, and -35% respectively, i.e. selling is associate 
with lowering return on assets underperformance of IPO issues relative to their 
industry peers by 20% on average.  
Examining other control variables, IPO market share as a measure of VC 
experience is not significant in any specification. IPO issuer characteristics: age, asset 
turnover ratio (i.e. sales-to- assets ratio), IPO proceeds and book-to-market are all 
statistically significant and positively associated with return on assets, as previously 
reported. Underpricing is not associated with return on assets measure and 
underwriters’ ranking is weakly positively associated. As expected, the dotcom period 
is significantly negatively associated with the return on assets, a mere reflection of the 
bubble burst. Finally, profitability of existing stockholders is positively related to post-
IPO return on assets, proving that not only were these issues very profitable for early 
investors but they continue to provide superior performance up to 3 years after the 
IPO. 
Panel B of Table 8 reports estimates of non-linear specification. The linear 
term is statistically significant and positively associated with return on assets with 
magnitudes comparable to the linear specification. The quadratic term although 
negative, is not statistically significant in all specifications except when founders sell 
shares. When founders are selling shares in the IPO there is non-linearity in 
relationship between return on assets and founders' selling decision. At the mean level 
of the selling variable when founders’ sell shares (7%) the effect of the quadratic term 
is small compared to the linear term. The maximum relation of founders’ selling 
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decision on return on assets is when founders sell −𝑇𝑇1/2𝑏𝑏1 =25% of the total offering. 
More selling by founders is associated with lower post-IPO return on assets. Other 
explanatory variables are virtually unchanged compared with the linear specification.  
 
D. Risk and return measures 
Table 9 Panel A reports regression estimates and t-statistics of annualized 
logarithmic excess returns, measured 3 years after the IPO or until delisting, whichever 
comes first. Contrary to the results from return on assets measure, there is no 
statistically significant difference in any specification when shareholders are selling 
shares in the IPO. The univariate difference in logarithmic excess returns from Tables 
4 and 5 is explained by control variables, leaving no statistical power for the selling 
decision. Although, the direction of the coefficient estimates for the Selling decision 
is positive, the magnitude is small. VC experience is also not associated with higher 
logarithmic alphas, however other control variables are. IPO issuer’s age and book-
to-market are weakly positively related to excess returns, whereas asset turnover ratio 
is significantly positively associated, implying that more established firms outperform 
less established ones and indicating a certain level of market inefficiency. IPO 
proceeds is negatively related to excess returns in all specifications, implying that 
larger IPO deals, keeping other controls fixed, underperform. As expected, 
underpricing is strongly positively associated with excess returns, however this 
relationship is partly mechanical since large first day return can influence long-term 
excess return. Underwriters’ ranking and existing shareholders’ profitability are 
strongly positively associated with excess returns. Underwriters’ certification role has 
a profound positive effect on post-IPO price performance. On the other hand, high 
investment returns for existing shareholders is not impediment for future performance, 
issues that were highly profitable for early investors continue to outperform their 
peers. Finally, dotcom dummy, as expected, is strongly negatively associated with 
excess returns. Predictability of post-IPO excess returns 3 years after the IPO by pre-
IPO issuer characteristics constitutes violation of market efficiency in semi-strong 
form. It is a puzzle that merits further research; however, it remains to be seen whether 
it is possible to take advantage of the mispricing since short selling IPOs is not possible 
and typically, short selling is very costly for newly listed equity issues immediately 
following the IPO.  
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Panel B of Table 9 reports estimates of the non-linear specification of log 
excess return regression. No association between excess return and selling decision 
reported in Panel A translates to quadratic relationship. In all specifications with 
secondary selling, except when founders sell, the relationship is parabolic which 
initially increases with more selling, reaches a peak and then decreases. The maximum 
association is at the following levels of the selling variable: 28%, 29%, and 34% for 
lead VC selling, any VC selling, and any shareholders selling respectively. These 
levels are above the average level of the selling decision variable of 14%, 16%, and 
25% respectively; however, the values are relatively close, implying that the average 
association of selling and excess return is positive and close to theoretical maximum. 
The magnitude of the association at the average level of selling is around 10% 
improvement of the excess return for all three selling groups, which is economically 
significant compared to the average excess return of more than -40% when there is no 
selling. The quadratic relationship between market performance and selling decision 
implies that private information contained in the selling decision is not priced by the 
market. IPO issuers in which existing shareholders sell shares outperform IPO issuers 
without selling, conditional on selling not being excessive. Remaining control 
variables in Table 9 Panel B preserve their relationship with excess return observed in 
Panel A. 
Univariate analysis shows that IPO issuers are very risky stocks, with average 
idiosyncratic risk close to 100% annually. High idiosyncratic risk is of interest on its 
own as it complements analysis of excess returns. Table 10 Panel A estimates the 
relation between annualized idiosyncratic risk and selling decision for linear 
specification and Panel B for non-linear specification. There is statistically strong 
negative association between the idiosyncratic risk and the selling decision for all 
selling groups. At the average level of selling, the impact of selling decision on the 
reduction in idiosyncratic risk is 8%, 9%, 4%, and 11% for lead VC selling, any VC 
selling, founder selling, and any shareholder selling, respectively. These correspond 
to around 10% reduction in idiosyncratic risk compared to the no selling group. All 4 
IPO issue characteristics (age, sales-to-assets, book-to-market and IPO size) are also 
strongly negatively associated with the idiosyncratic risk implying that more 
established firms are less risky. Underpricing and the dotcom bubble period, as 
expected, are strongly positively associated with the idiosyncratic risk. This is not 
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surprising given that many dotcom bubble stocks were very volatile. It is worth noting 
that predictability of idiosyncratic risk of VC-backed IPO issues is very strong with 
adjusted-R square close to 50% in all specifications. This should not come as a surprise 
given that predictability of risk is well documented in the literature, nevertheless it is 
intriguing to see highly predictable risk model.  
Panel B of Table 10 reports estimates for the non-linear specification of the 
idiosyncratic risk regression. Although, not in all selling groups, there is parabolic 
quadratic relationship between the selling decision and the idiosyncratic risk. The 
relationship is negative and for small levels of selling decision it declines further until 
the minimum is reached at the levels of selling variable of 63% and 75% for lead VC 
and any VC selling16, which are well above the average level of the selling decision 
variable of 14% and 16% respectively. Therefore, the average level of the selling 
decision variable if far from the optimal level for maximizing reduction in 
idiosyncratic risk. Estimated economic impact of the average selling decision is 
reduction of the idiosyncratic risk by around 12% for both VC selling groups, in line 
with the linear specification. Relationships and significances of other control variables 
is virtually unchanged between linear and non-linear specifications.  
 
E. Total PME measure 
Table 11 Panels A and B report estimates of the final post-IPO long-run 
performance measure – total PME measured relative to Nasdaq benchmark 3 years 
after the IPO date or until delisting, whichever comes first. Panel A estimates show 
that there is no statistically significant relationship between the selling decision and 
the total PME in linear specification. Sales-to-assets ratio and underwriters’ ranking, 
two variables that were good predictors of excess returns, are statistically significant 
and positively associated with the total PME. The dotcom bubble, as expected, is 
significantly negatively associated with the total PME measure, indicating that the 
underperforming IPO issuers are overrepresented in the dotcom period. Other control 
variables are not statistically significant, although respective signs point in the same 
direction in all specifications.  
                                                            
16 For founders and any shareholders selling the quadratic term is not statistically significant. 
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Results from Panel B confirm previous finding that the relationship between 
the selling decision and post-IPO PME measure is non-linear. Quadratic relationship 
is similar to the quadratic relationship from excess return regressions – relationship is 
positive and for small levels of the selling decision variable it is increasing until the 
maximum is reached, after which there is a decline in relationship. Quadratic 
relationship is statistically significant when venture capitalists are selling secondary 
shares only (specifications (1) and (3) from Panel B) and is not significant when 
founders sell shares. The level of the selling variable at which the maximum level of 
relationship between the selling decision and the total PME is reached is 39% and 43% 
for lead VC and any VC selling, respectively. These levels are above the average 
selling levels of 14% and 16% for lead VC and any VC selling, respectively, which 
correspond to increment of the total PME by 0.10 and 0.12 points, respectively. 
Economically, these increments are equivalent to improving the total PME by around 
15% relative to the no selling group. Of the remaining explanatory variables, only 
asset turnover and underwriters’ ranking are statistically significant and positively 
associated with the total PME. The dotcom bubble dummy, as expected, is statistically 
significant and negatively associated with the total PME. 
Univariate analysis showed that through time the total PME for primary issues 
declines, whereas no such trend is observed for secondary issues. Table 11 Panel C 
repeats the total PME non-linear cross-sectional regression estimates when the 
dependent variable is the total PME 7 years after the IPO or until delisting, whichever 
comes first. As suspected from the univariate analysis, the relationship between 7-year 
total PME and the selling decision variable is stronger than for 3-year case. Except for 
founders selling, selling by lead VC, any VC or any shareholder has strong quadratic 
relationship with 7-year total PME. The relationship increases for lower levels of 
selling decision and reaches a peak at the following levels of the selling decision 
variable: 34%, 37% and 42% respectively. At the average level of selling of secondary 
sales the impact on 7-year total PME is around 0.11 points in all three specifications. 
This represents economically significant 15% increase of base 7-year total PME when 
no selling occurs.  
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F. Over-allotment sales 
 Analysis of VC-backed post-IPO long-run performance shows that, although 
there is positive association between the selling decision in the “broader” sense and 
post-IPO performance measures, the relationship is weaker relative to the “narrower” 
definition of the selling decision. In order to test the relationship between the over-
allotment selling and redemptions only, i.e. the additional selling relative to the regular 
secondary sales, and post-IPO long-run performance I redefine the selling variable to 
reflect only additional sales when there is no secondary sales. Additional sales only 
constitute selling by insiders through over-allotment option or redemption of stock 
when there is no direct secondary selling in the IPO. The number of IPO issuers with 
additional sales is approximately 1/2 of the number of deals with secondary sales only, 
i.e. the frequency of additional selling is high enough to make statistical inferences 
regarding the relationship between the additional selling and post-IPO performance.  
Table 12 repeats estimates from Tables 6-11 when lead venture capitalists 
sells16. The association between the additional selling and IPO issue characteristics of 
established firms, i.e. age, sales-to-assets and book-to-market, is positive and 
statistically significant. Venture capital experience is negatively associated with the 
additional selling, whereas IPO size and underwriters’ reputation is not associated 
with the additional selling. Profitability of existing stockholders has positive 
relationship with the additional selling, i.e. more profitable investments for early 
investors induces more additional selling by lead venture capitalists. The estimate of 
the dotcom bubble dummy confirms that the additional selling is less pronounced 
during the dotcom bubble. In general, the additional selling determinants are very 
similar to the secondary selling determinants reported in Table 6. 
Post-IPO performance analysis, however, reveal the differences in association 
between post-IPO performance measures and the selling or additional selling 
decisions. Underpricing is negatively associated with the additional selling, implying 
that lead venture capitalists sell more when the IPO issue is relatively overpriced. This 
is in contrast to the absence of association between the underpricing and the secondary 
sales by lead venture capitalists. Moreover, there is no relationship between any long-
run post-IPO performance measure and the additional selling of the lead venture 
capitalists. Market performance coefficient estimates, albeit not statistically 
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significant, have even the opposite sign. The results show that the additional selling is 
not associated with better post-IPO performance and there is even evidence that lead 
venture capitalists behave opportunistically by additionally selling overpriced shares. 
However, the result is not contradicting prior findings, since the additional selling is 
different from the secondary sales. Given that the over-allotment selling and stock 
redemptions do not constitute direct selling to outside investors, market’s adverse 
reaction to these selling decisions is less negative compared to the secondary sales. 
Therefore, venture capitalists reputation concerns are lower and they behave 
somewhat opportunistically by selling relatively overpriced shares in the IPO issuers 
that are long-term not outperforming their peers. 
 
V. Robustness Analysis 
A. Alternative selling variables 
The choice of the selling variable is supported by the inelasticity of the IPO 
size to supply. However, I consider alternative selling variable definitions in order to 
check that the results are not driven only by the choice of the selling variable. I redefine 
the selling variable as the fraction of shares sold in the offering to total shares held 
prior to the IPO by the selling stockholders. Table 13 revisits regression estimates of 
Tables 6-11 with redefined selling variable when lead venture capitalists sell 
secondary shares only17. Similarly as reported previously, selling is associated 
positively with IPO issue characteristics of established firms, i.e. age, sales-to-assets 
and book-to-market ratios. It is positively associated with the profitability of existing 
stockholders and negatively with the dotcom bubble. There is no association between 
the selling decision and underpricing. The selling variable is significantly positively 
associated with the return on assets of the IPO issuer, however quadratic term, 
although negative, is not statistically significant. There is strong quadratic convex 
relationship between the selling variable and the idiosyncratic risk, replicating the 
results from Table 10B. Not only is the relationship between the selling decision and 
return on assets and idiosyncratic risk similar between different specifications of the 
selling decision variable, but the magnitude of the relationship is similar as well. The 
                                                            
17 Results when any VC, founders or any shareholder sells shares are qualitatively the same. 
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average level of the alternative selling decision variable is 19% when lead venture 
capitalists sell secondary shares and the magnitude of coefficient estimates are 
comparable between the two specifications, implying that the economic impact is 
similar. However, there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
alternative selling definition variable and two market post-IPO long-run performance 
measures, excess return and total PME. Although, the signs of the relationship 
between the alternative selling variable and the total PME is correct, there is not 
enough statistical power.  
These results show that although alternative selling decision variable is 
associated with some long-term post-IPO performance measures it is the fraction of 
shares sold in the IPO to total shares offered in the IPO that is consistently positively 
associated with the post-IPO performance measures.  
 
B. Additional time controls 
In all regression specifications, the dotcom bubble dummy captures specific 
time component of the analyzed period. I consider an alternative approach by splitting 
the sample into two – the dotcom bubble period, which covers 2 years (1999 and 2000) 
and 44% of all IPOs in the sample, and the non-dotcom bubble period. Given that there 
were only 6 cases of lead venture capitalists selling during the dotcom bubble period, 
which constitutes only 1.3% of all VC-backed IPO deals during this period, it is no 
surprise that there is no relationship between the selling decision and any post-IPO 
long-run performance measure. Table 14 presents the results for the complementary 
period of the dotcom bubble. The results are revisiting regression estimates of Tables 
6-11 when lead venture capitalists sell secondary shares only. Selling is negatively 
associated with the venture capitalists experience, as previously reported for the full 
sample, and positively with the IPO issue characteristics that capture firm 
establishment (age, sales-to-assets and book-to-market). Profitability of existing 
shareholders also has statistically significant and positive association with the selling 
decision.  
Full sample results on the relationship between post-IPO performance 
measures and the selling decision variable are confirmed in the subsample. There is 
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no relationship between underpricing and lead venture capitalists selling in the 
subsample. The association between lead venture capitalists selling and long-run 
return on assets is statistically significant and positive. The idiosyncratic risk is 
negatively related to the selling decision with positive and significant quadratic term. 
Finally, both market-based post-IPO measures, excess returns and total PME, are 
statistically significant and positively related to the selling decision with negative 
quadratic term. Moreover, the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates are comparable 
to the full sample results, implying that the economic significance of selling on post-
IPO long-run performance measures are replicated in the non-dotcom bubble 
subsample. 
Results from the subsample analysis confirm that the positive association 
between venture capitalists selling and post-IPO performance measures is not driven 
by the dotcom bubble period that has disproportionately more underperforming IPO 
issuers and almost no venture capital selling. 
 
C. Other controls 
First, I assess whether selling decision continues to be significantly positively 
associated with the post-IPO long-run performance measure if I do not winsorize 
dependent variables: return on assets, excess return and idiosyncratic risk. In 
unreported results, I find that selling decision continues to have strong positive 
association with the return on assets and strong negative association with the 
idiosyncratic risk at 1% level in linear specifications. The selling decision has 
quadratic relationship with non-winsorized excess returns similar to the one reported 
in Table 10 Panel B. I conclude that mitigating the effect of outliers by winsorizing 
long-run performance measures does not qualitatively change the results. 
Second, IPO market share is one possible measure of venture capital expertise. 
I replicate the analysis by using alternative venture capital experience measure defined 
as the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital 
organization prior to the IPO year and the log of the average number of investments 
made by all venture capital organizations prior to the IPO year. This alternative VC 
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experience measure does not change the results since in all specifications VC 
experience measure continues to be statistically not significant.  
  
VI. Conclusion 
Presence of market frictions impedes the unwinding of equity positions in the 
IPO. Adverse market reaction to insiders’ selling and behavioral opportunism limit 
the exit of equity positions by venture capitalist due to reputation concerns. I examine 
the impact of the selling decision by venture capitalists and other insiders during the 
IPO on post-IPO long-run performance.  
First, venture capitalists and other insiders sell shares in more established IPO 
issuers that are easier to evaluate, thereby limiting behavioral opportunism.  
Second, selling decision is positively associated with future profitability 
measured by industry adjusted return 3 years after the IPO and negatively associated 
with future idiosyncratic risk. The association is non-linear with excessive selling 
reducing the magnitude of the relationship. 
Third, market performance measured by excess returns and public market 
equivalent, are non-linearly associated when venture capitalists sell shares. Moreover, 
increasing the holding period increases the strength of the relationship. Average level 
of selling has positive association with market performance. However, excessive 
selling has lower or even negative association.  
Fourth, selling by founders has no impact on post-IPO long-run market 
performance.  
Fifth, over-allotment sales and redemption of stock with IPO proceeds is not 
associated with long-run post-IPO performance measures. Moreover, there is some 
evidence that venture capitalists behave opportunistically by selling overpriced shares.  
Overall, I conclude that the selling decision in the IPO conveys private 
information that is not fully reflected in market prices when venture capitalists sell 
and is a good predictor of future profitability and riskiness.  
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TABLE 1 
IPO Frequency by Year 
 
Table 1 reports the frequency of IPOs by year in the sample of VC backed IPOs from 1997 until 2011 (total of 1039) and the frequency of 
IPOs in which lead VC, any VC, founders or any shareholders are selling their shares. Two forms of selling are defined: i) Secondary Selling  
as directly selling in the form of secondary offering during the initial public offering; ii) Any type of selling as either selling in the secondary 
offering, through the underwriters' over-allotment option or retiring shares by using the IPO proceeds. 
Year 
  
All IPOs 
 
Lead VC investor sells Any VC investor sells  Founder sells Any shareholder sells   
  Secondary  Any  Secondary  Any  Secondary  Any  Secondary  Any  
              
                    
1997  112  15  25  23  34  15  25  34  47  
1998  70  7  11  10  15  16  27  24  34  
1999  254  5  18  12  27  22  38  36  65  
2000  204  1  7  1  9  3  18  7  27  
2001  23  0  1  0  1  1  2  2  3  
2002  20  4  7  4  7  1  4  5  8  
2003  22  3  5  5  6  3  4  7  8  
2004  71  8  10  17  18  9  12  21  24  
2005  42  8  10  10  12  10  12  14  17  
2006  48  5  10  12  16  10  12  16  20  
2007  75  13  15  20  25  19  28  31  39  
2008  8  3  3  4  4  1  2  6  7  
2009  10  4  5  6  7  6  7  7  9  
2010  46  14  14  22  23  18  20  23  24  
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2011  34  8  10  14  16  16  17  20  21  
                    
Total   1039   98   151   160   220   150   228   253   353   
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TABLE 2 
IPO issuer characteristics 
 
Comparison of VC backed IPOs with and without selling by lead VC, any VC, Founder and any shareholder (means and standard deviations 
in parenthesis). Selling shares is defined as directly selling in the form of secondary offering during the initial public offering. The data is 
based on the sample of 1039 VC-backed IPOs completed in 1997-2011 period. Issue Proceeds, Trailing 12 months revenue, Total Assets and 
Issuer Market Cap are reported in 2005 USD. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. *, **, and *** denote significant difference 
in the means between No selling and corresponding group at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
      
No selling 
  
Lead VC investor 
sells 
  
Any VC investor 
sells 
  
Founder sells 
  
Any shareholder 
sells        
              
             
Issue Proceeds   74.85  58.40***  59.01***  66.05*  62.03*** 
(millions of US$)   (54.49)  (47.38)  (46.88)  (51.41)  (45.79) 
             
Number of Years 
from   6.41  11.73***  10.91***  9.33***  9.82*** 
incorporation to the 
IPO (4.15)  (5.80)  (5.41)  (5.09)  (5.60) 
             
Trailing 12 months 
revenue 34.38  117.97***  122.58***  104.48***  103.63*** 
(millions of US$)   (65.66)  (109.52)  (121.06)  (105.78)  (112.74) 
             
Total Assets   66.49  137.45***  125.91***  102.57***  105.59*** 
(millions of US$) 
   (110.43)  (187.09)  (174.39)  (143.52)  (152.50) 
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Issuer Market Cap  470.98  445.10  459.99  503.22  452.46 
(millions of US$)   (502.91)  (491.71)  (526.15)  (515.25)  (480.86) 
             
Book-to-Market   .0604  .100***  .0965***  .0787**  .0856*** 
    (.0878)  (.119)  (.106)  (.0962)  (.101) 
             
Venture capital 
experience 2.12  1.50**  1.94  2.10  1.89 
3 years IPO market 
share (%) (2.49)  (1.89)  (2.52)  (2.54)  (2.36) 
             
Underpricing (%)   53.15  23.55***  23.85***  30.79***  31.16*** 
    (80.32)  (30.64)  (31.20)  (34.35)  (39.40) 
             
IPO price relative to  7.90  11.99***  10.39**  11.06***  10.71*** 
average price paid 
by  (10.00)  (17.83)  (15.73)  (14.73)  (15.09) 
existing 
shareholders           
    8.34  8.15  8.29  8.55*  8.38 
Underwriters' 
Ranking  (1.32)  (1.39)  (1.26)  (0.91)  (1.14) 
             
             
N       786   98   160   150   253 
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TABLE 3 
IPO issuer characteristics 
 
Comparison of VC backed IPOs with and without selling by lead VC, any VC, Founder and any shareholder (means and standard deviations 
in parenthesis). Selling shares is defined as either selling in the secondary offering, through the underwriters' over-allotment option or retiring 
shares by using the IPO proceeds. The data is based on the sample of 1039 VC-backed IPOs completed in 1997-2011 period. Issue Proceeds, 
Last 12 months revenue, Total Assets and Issuer Market Cap are reported in 2005 USD. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. *, 
**, and *** denote significant difference in the means between No selling and corresponding group at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Variable 
      
No selling 
  
Lead VC investor 
sells 
  
Any VC investor 
sells 
  
Founder sells 
  
Any shareholder 
sells        
              
             
Issue Proceeds   75.32  65.18**  64.34***  65.61**  64.74*** 
(millions of US$)   (56.38)  (46.99)  (47.23)  (47.66)  (44.18) 
             
Number of Years from   6.10  11.62***  10.69***  9.14***  9.44*** 
incorporation to the IPO (3.87)  (6.19)  (5.73)  (5.17)  (5.54) 
             
Trailing 12 months revenue 29.41  112.94***  112.00***  94.39***  93.67*** 
(millions of US$)   (56.16)  (114.81)  (118.31)  (111.81)  (111.58) 
             
Total Assets   66.07  122.02***  117.99***  91.13***  95.32*** 
(millions of US$)   (112.84)  (166.11)  (163.05)  (129.62)  (139.03) 
             
Issuer Market Cap  484.03  439.11  448.32  457.26  432.35 
(millions of US$)   (525.86)  (468.14)  (499.14)  (457.65)  (435.71) 
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Book-to-Market   .0599  .0916***  .0872***  .0777***  .0795*** 
    (.0848)  (.115)  (.107)  (.101)  (.103) 
             
Venture capital experience 2.13  1.63**  1.91  2.12  1.94 
3 years IPO market share 
(%) (2.51)  (1.84)  (2.34)  (2.52)  (2.35) 
             
Underpricing (%)   52.55  29.10***  29.02***  39.17**  38.57*** 
    (79.37)  (46.48)  (44.69)  (57.54)  (58.06) 
             
IPO price relative to  7.17  12.68***  11.40***  11.73***  11.32*** 
average price paid by  (8.73)  (17.58)  (16.32)  (15.23)  (15.19) 
existing shareholders           
    8.33  8.25  8.30  8.48  8.37 
Underwriters' Ranking  (1.36)  (1.27)  (1.20)  (1.00)  (1.10) 
             
             
N       686   151   220   228   353 
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TABLE 4 
Post-IPO long-run performance measures statistics 
 
Comparison of post-IPO long-run performance measures for VC backed IPOs with and without selling by lead VC, any VC, Founder and any 
shareholder (means and standard deviations in parenthesis). Selling shares is defined as directly selling in the form of secondary offering 
during the initial public offering. The data is based on the sample of 1039 VC-backed IPOs completed in 1997-2011 period. Return on Assets, 
Arithmetic excess return and multiples are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. Excess returns are annualized. *, **, and *** denote significant 
difference in the means between No selling and corresponding group at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
      
No selling 
  
Lead VC investor 
sells 
  
Any VC investor 
sells 
  
Founder sells 
  
Any shareholder 
sells        
              
             
Return on Assets   -.513  -.0356***  -.0538***  -.0695***  -.0795*** 
3 years after the IPO  (1.05)  (.336)  (.371)  (.387)  (.405) 
             
Logarithmic excess return (%) -.429  -.0292***  -.0885***  -.118***  -.115*** 
3 years after the IPO  (.738)  (.448)  (.539)  (.557)  (.58) 
             
Arithmetic excess return (%) .244  .227  .194  .254  .25 
3 years after the IPO  (.629)  (.405)  (.417)  (.454)  (.484) 
             
Total risk (%)   1.11  .668***  .699***  .795***  .795*** 
3 years after the IPO  (0.39)  (.276)  (.3)  (.349)  (.355) 
             
Idiosyncratic risk (%)  1.02  .616***  .645***  .726***  .728*** 
3 years after the IPO  (0.35)  (.254)  (.284)  (.324)  (.328) 
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PME, Nasdaq   .888  1.37***  1.33***  1.30***  1.40*** 
3 years after the IPO  (1.41)  (1.49)  (1.53)  (1.53)  (1.78) 
             
PME, Nasdaq   .833  1.28***  1.19***  1.24***  1.27*** 
until delisting   (1.46)  (1.35)  (1.27)  (1.48)  (1.60) 
             
Total PME, Nasdaq  .785  1.24***  1.23***  1.22***  1.24*** 
3 years after the IPO  (1.19)  (1.11)  (1.21)  (1.31)  (1.40) 
             
Total PME, Nasdaq  .735  1.29***  1.25***  1.20***  1.22*** 
5 years after the IPO  (1.11)  (1.28)  (1.29)  (1.34)  (1.38) 
             
Total PME, Nasdaq  .703  1.23***  1.18***  1.16***  1.15*** 
7 years after the IPO  (1.08)  (1.12)  (1.11)  (1.25)  (1.23) 
             
N       786   98   160   150   253 
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TABLE 5 
Post-IPO long-run performance measures statistics 
 
Comparison of post-IPO long-run performance measures for VC backed IPOs with and without selling by lead VC, any VC, Founder and any 
shareholder (means and standard deviations in parenthesis). Selling shares is defined as either selling in the secondary offering, through the 
underwriters' over-allotment option or retiring shares by using the IPO proceeds. The data is based on the sample of 1039 VC-backed IPOs 
completed in 1997-2011 period. Return on Assets, Arithmetic excess return and multiples are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. Excess returns 
are annualized. *, **, and *** denote significant difference in the means between No selling and corresponding group at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Variable 
      
No selling 
  
Lead VC 
investor sells 
  
Any VC investor 
sells 
  
Founder sells 
  
Any shareholder 
sells        
              
             
Return on Assets   -.546  -.112***  -.122***  -.0956***  -.139*** 
3 years after the IPO  (1.08)  (.479)  (.484)  (.399)  (.551) 
             
Logarithmic excess return (%) -.451  -.124***  -.144***  -.132***  -.161*** 
3 years after the IPO  (.757)  (.539)  (.544)  (.553)  (.583) 
             
Arithmetic excess return (%) .242  .213  .199  .288  .254 
3 years after the IPO  (.642)  (.443)  (.435)  (.483)  (.5) 
             
Total risk (%)   1.13  .758***  .768***  .859***  .855*** 
3 years after the IPO  (0.39)  (.324)  (.326)  (.369)  (.367) 
             
Idiosyncratic risk (%)  1.04  .7***  .709***  .782***  .784*** 
3 years after the IPO  (0.36)  (.3)  (.303)  (.336)  (.336) 
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PME, Nasdaq   .863  1.22***  1.20***  1.29***  1.30*** 
3 years after the IPO  (1.37)  (1.37)  (1.42)  (1.64)  (1.76) 
             
PME, Nasdaq   .808  1.22***  1.16***  1.16***  1.19*** 
until delisting   (1.45)  (1.48)  (1.46)  (1.46)  (1.58) 
             
Total PME, Nasdaq  .767  1.11***  1.12***  1.17***  1.15*** 
3 years after the IPO  (1.17)  (1.11)  (1.16)  (1.35)  (1.38) 
             
Total PME, Nasdaq  .699  1.21***  1.17***  1.14***  1.15*** 
5 years after the IPO  (1.06)  (1.31)  (1.29)  (1.36)  (1.37) 
             
Total PME, Nasdaq  .672  1.17***  1.12***  1.08***  1.09*** 
7 years after the IPO  (1.07)  (1.19)  (1.17)  (1.22)  (1.21) 
             
N       686   151   220   228   353 
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TABLE 6  
Selling Decision determinants 
  
Table 6 presents cross-sectional Tobit regression estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) that are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for 
industry clustering (8 industry groups). Dependent variable is the Selling Decision. The Selling is defined as the fraction of total shares sold by 
selling shareholders' group to the total shares sold in the offering. Two forms of selling are defined: i) Secondary Selling  as directly selling in the 
form of secondary offering during the initial public offering (specification number is odd); ii) Any type of selling as either selling in the secondary 
offering, through the underwriters' over-allotment option or retiring shares by using the IPO proceeds (specification number is even). *, **, and 
*** denote level of significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
          
Lead VC investor sells   Any VC investor sells   Founder sells   Any shareholder sells  
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)  
                     
3-year IPO market 
share  -2.01***  -1.34***  -0.64  -0.65  -0.37  -0.20  -1.10*  -0.81*  
     (-3.02)  (-2.78)  (-1.23)  (-1.56)  (-1.40)  (-1.01)  (-1.75)  (-1.79)  
                     
Log Age     0.13***  0.15***  0.14***  0.16***  0.019  0.027***  0.13***  0.15***  
     (4.81)  (5.98)  (5.87)  (7.09)  (1.53)  (2.66)  (5.37)  (7.39)  
                     
Log Sales/Assets    0.075*  0.094***  0.10***  0.10***  0.081***  0.067***  0.21***  0.17***  
     (1.83)  (2.98)  (2.85)  (3.39)  (3.38)  (3.66)  (4.75)  (5.42)  
                     
Log IPO Proceeds   -0.059  -0.024  -0.076**  -0.039  -0.014  -0.015*  
-
0.099***  
-
0.064***  
     (-1.51)  (-0.71)  (-2.53)  (-1.50)  (-1.36)  (-1.78)  (-3.58)  (-2.70)  
                     
Log Book-to-Market   0.43***  0.41***  0.44***  0.38***  0.23**  0.23***  0.71***  0.62***  
     (3.16)  (3.16)  (3.53)  (3.13)  (2.21)  (2.70)  (5.28)  (5.55)  
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Underwriters' 
Ranking   0.0016  -0.0011  0.014  0.0076  0.016**  0.0074  0.031**  0.017*  
     (0.13)  (-0.092)  (1.22)  (0.75)  (2.33)  (1.46)  (2.46)  (1.70)  
                     
Log Existing Shareholders 
Multiple 
0.063***  0.056***  0.048***  0.050***  0.025***  0.030***  0.070***  0.080*** 
 
     (3.74)  (3.51)  (3.42)  (3.62)  (3.12)  (4.45)  (4.62)  (5.98)  
                     
Dotcom Bubble 
Dummy  -0.26***  -0.14***  -0.25***  -0.17***  
-
0.097***  
-
0.065***  -0.26***  -0.18***  
     (-5.05)  (-4.72)  (-6.94)  (-6.64)  (-5.34)  (-5.16)  (-7.90)  (-7.78)  
                     
Log-likelihood    -122  -158  -149  -177  -89.1  -48.2  -265  -251  
                     
N         1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039  
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TABLE 7 
Underpricing determinants 
 
Table 7 presents cross-sectional regression estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) that are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for industry 
clustering (8 industry groups). Dependent variable is the Underpricing, defined as the first trading day return following the IPO. The Selling is 
defined as the fraction of total shares sold by selling shareholders' group to the total shares sold in the offering. Two forms of selling are defined: 
i) Secondary Selling  as directly selling in the form of secondary offering during the initial public offering (specification number is odd); ii) Any 
type of selling as either selling in the secondary offering, through the underwriters' over-allotment option or retiring shares by using the IPO 
proceeds (specification number is even). *, **, and *** denote level of significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
          
Lead VC investor sells   Any VC investor sells   Founder sells   Any shareholder sells 
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
                    
Selling     -0.038  -0.17  0.055  -0.056  -0.43**  -0.32*  0.048  -0.018 
     (-0.32)  (-1.37)  (0.60)  (-0.56)  (-2.30)  (-1.80)  (0.79)  (-0.27) 
                    
3-year IPO market 
share  0.41  0.39  0.41  0.40  0.39  0.40  0.42  0.41 
     (1.00)  (0.98)  (1.03)  (1.00)  (0.96)  (0.99)  (1.04)  (1.01) 
                    
Log Age     -0.054**  -0.051**  -0.057***  -0.053**  -0.055***  -0.054**  -0.057***  -0.054** 
     (-2.57)  (-2.40)  (-2.67)  (-2.49)  (-2.63)  (-2.58)  (-2.69)  (-2.50) 
                    
Log Sales/Assets    -0.011  -0.011  -0.011  -0.011  -0.0066  -0.0073  -0.012  -0.010 
     (-0.36)  (-0.35)  (-0.35)  (-0.35)  (-0.22)  (-0.24)  (-0.40)  (-0.33) 
                    
Log IPO Proceeds   0.089***  0.087***  0.091***  0.088***  0.088***  0.088***  0.092***  0.089*** 
     (4.69)  (4.67)  (4.75)  (4.70)  (4.72)  (4.73)  (4.79)  (4.70) 
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Log Book-to-Market   -0.086  -0.075  -0.095  -0.083  -0.068  -0.071  -0.10  -0.084 
     (-1.11)  (-0.95)  (-1.22)  (-1.05)  (-0.86)  (-0.89)  (-1.28)  (-1.05) 
                    
Underwriters' 
Ranking   0.0047  0.0047  0.0044  0.0048  0.0050  0.0047  0.0041  0.0048 
     (0.60)  (0.60)  (0.56)  (0.62)  (0.64)  (0.61)  (0.52)  (0.61) 
                    
Log Existing Shareholders 
Multiple 
0.095***  0.097***  0.093***  0.095***  0.097***  0.097***  0.093***  0.095*** 
     (4.95)  (4.98)  (4.94)  (5.00)  (5.00)  (4.94)  (4.87)  (4.91) 
                    
Dotcom Bubble 
Dummy  0.21***  0.21***  0.21***  0.21***  0.21***  0.21***  0.21***  0.21*** 
     (8.33)  (8.26)  (8.40)  (8.26)  (8.15)  (8.18)  (8.40)  (8.22) 
                    
Adjusted R2 (%)     33.2  33.2  33.2  33.2  33.3  33.3  33.2  33.2 
                    
N         1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039 
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TABLE 8 
Return on Assets and Selling Decision 
 
Table 8 presents cross-sectional regression estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) that are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for industry 
clustering (8 industry groups). Dependent variable is industry adjusted return on assets, defined as trailing 12 months net income divided by total 
assets, measured at 3 years after the IPO date or at delisting, whichever comes first, less SIC industry mean return on assets. Selling decision is 
defined as the fraction of total shares sold by selling shareholders' group to the total shares sold in the offering. Two forms of selling are defined: i) 
Secondary Selling  as directly selling in the form of secondary offering during the initial public offering (specification number is odd); ii) Any type 
of selling as either selling in the secondary offering, through the underwriters' over-allotment option or retiring shares by using the IPO proceeds 
(specification number is even). *, **, and *** denote level of significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
  
Lead VC investor sells   Any VC investor sells   Founder sells   Any shareholder sells 
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
                    
Selling     0.70***  0.54***  0.69***  0.55***  1.21***  1.37***  0.59***  0.51*** 
     (3.00)  (2.65)  (3.57)  (3.18)  (3.35)  (4.18)  (4.17)  (3.29) 
                    
3-year IPO market share  -0.96  -0.98  -0.97  -0.98  -0.97  -1.00  -0.93  -0.94 
     (-0.91)  (-0.94)  (-0.93)  (-0.93)  (-0.93)  (-0.96)  (-0.89)  (-0.90) 
                    
Log Age     0.12**  0.12**  0.12**  0.11**  0.13**  0.13**  0.11**  0.099* 
     (2.34)  (2.27)  (2.19)  (2.10)  (2.55)  (2.46)  (2.00)  (1.84) 
                    
Log Sales/Assets    0.42***  0.42***  0.42***  0.41***  0.40***  0.40***  0.40***  0.40*** 
     (5.16)  (5.13)  (5.15)  (5.12)  (5.01)  (4.98)  (4.99)  (4.96) 
                    
Log IPO Proceeds   0.12**  0.12**  0.13**  0.12**  0.11**  0.11**  0.14***  0.13** 
     (2.40)  (2.35)  (2.53)  (2.44)  (2.31)  (2.34)  (2.70)  (2.58) 
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Log Book-to-Market   0.73***  0.74***  0.71***  0.72***  0.73***  0.71***  0.65**  0.65** 
     (2.89)  (2.92)  (2.82)  (2.86)  (2.84)  (2.76)  (2.57)  (2.57) 
                    
Log Underpricing    -0.046  -0.044  -0.049  -0.045  -0.040  -0.039  -0.051  -0.045 
     (-0.44)  (-0.42)  (-0.47)  (-0.43)  (-0.38)  (-0.38)  (-0.49)  (-0.44) 
                    
Underwriters' 
Ranking   0.060*  0.060*  0.057*  0.058*  0.059*  0.060*  0.054*  0.057* 
     (1.84)  (1.86)  (1.77)  (1.80)  (1.82)  (1.84)  (1.67)  (1.75) 
                    
Log Existing Shareholders 
Multiple 
0.071**  0.071**  0.069**  0.068**  0.072***  0.067**  0.063**  0.059** 
     (2.53)  (2.54)  (2.48)  (2.44)  (2.60)  (2.44)  (2.27)  (2.08) 
                    
Dotcom Bubble 
Dummy  -0.29***  -0.29***  -0.28***  -0.28***  -0.29***  -0.29***  -0.26***  -0.26*** 
     (-4.26)  (-4.31)  (-4.08)  (-4.13)  (-4.28)  (-4.26)  (-3.73)  (-3.74) 
                    
Adjusted R2 (%)     9.89  9.87  10  9.96  9.97  10.1  10.3  10.2 
                    
N         1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
Return on Assets and Selling Decision 
 
Panel B. Return on Assets and Selling Decision, non-linear extension 
          
Lead VC investor sells   Any VC investor sells   Founder sells   Any shareholder sells 
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
                    
Selling     0.83**  0.55  0.75**  0.55*  2.47***  3.00***  0.64**  0.57 
     (2.27)  (1.54)  (2.37)  (1.71)  (2.65)  (3.87)  (2.21)  (1.55) 
                    
Selling2     -0.25  -0.031  -0.12  -0.0060  -5.16*  -6.22***  -0.082  -0.12 
     (-0.59)  (-0.063)  (-0.28)  (-0.012)  (-1.75)  (-2.76)  (-0.20)  (-0.24) 
                    
3-year IPO market 
share  -0.95  -0.98  -0.97  -0.98  -0.98  -1.04  -0.92  -0.93 
     (-0.91)  (-0.94)  (-0.93)  (-0.93)  (-0.94)  (-0.99)  (-0.87)  (-0.89) 
                    
Log Age     0.12**  0.12**  0.12**  0.11**  0.13**  0.12**  0.11**  0.098* 
     (2.30)  (2.24)  (2.15)  (2.06)  (2.51)  (2.34)  (1.98)  (1.80) 
                    
Log Sales/Assets    0.42***  0.42***  0.42***  0.41***  0.40***  0.40***  0.40***  0.39*** 
     (5.09)  (5.08)  (5.05)  (5.02)  (4.99)  (4.96)  (4.83)  (4.79) 
                    
Log IPO Proceeds   0.12**  0.12**  0.13**  0.12**  0.11**  0.12**  0.14**  0.13** 
     (2.33)  (2.30)  (2.46)  (2.38)  (2.32)  (2.38)  (2.54)  (2.42) 
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Log Book-to-Market   0.73***  0.74***  0.71***  0.72***  0.76***  0.74***  0.64**  0.65** 
     (2.82)  (2.87)  (2.75)  (2.80)  (2.89)  (2.86)  (2.51)  (2.48) 
                    
Log Underpricing    -0.046  -0.044  -0.049  -0.045  -0.039  -0.037  -0.050  -0.045 
     (-0.44)  (-0.42)  (-0.47)  (-0.43)  (-0.37)  (-0.36)  (-0.48)  (-0.43) 
                    
Underwriters' 
Ranking   0.060*  0.060*  0.057*  0.058*  0.057*  0.058*  0.055*  0.057* 
     (1.85)  (1.85)  (1.77)  (1.80)  (1.74)  (1.76)  (1.68)  (1.76) 
                    
Log Existing Shareholders 
Multiple 
0.071**  0.071**  0.069**  0.068**  0.069**  0.062**  0.063**  0.059** 
     (2.53)  (2.53)  (2.48)  (2.43)  (2.48)  (2.22)  (2.27)  (2.08) 
                    
Dotcom Bubble 
Dummy  -0.29***  -0.29***  -0.28***  -0.28***  -0.28***  -0.28***  -0.26***  -0.26*** 
     (-4.25)  (-4.32)  (-4.08)  (-4.13)  (-4.16)  (-4.15)  (-3.71)  (-3.69) 
                    
Adjusted R2 (%)     9.80  9.78  9.92  9.88  9.94  10.2  10.2  10.1 
                    
N         1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039 
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TABLE 9 
Log Excess Returns and Selling Decision 
 
Table 9 presents cross-sectional regression estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) that are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for industry 
clustering (8 industry groups). Dependent variable is annualized logarithmic excess return from 4 factor models in logs, measured at 3 years after 
the IPO date or at delisting, whichever comes first. Selling decision is defined as the fraction of total shares sold by selling shareholders' group to 
the total shares sold in the offering. Two forms of selling are defined: i) Secondary Selling  as directly selling in the form of secondary offering 
during the initial public offering (specification number is odd); ii) Any type of selling as either selling in the secondary offering, through the 
underwriters' over-allotment option or retiring shares by using the IPO proceeds (specification number is even). *, **, and *** denote level of 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
  
Lead VC investor sells   Any VC investor sells   Founder sells   Any shareholder sells 
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
                    
Selling     0.11  0.061  0.14  0.087  0.40  0.45  0.14  0.12 
     (0.31)  (0.22)  (0.62)  (0.43)  (0.91)  (1.22)  (1.04)  (0.92) 
                    
3-year IPO market share  0.47  0.46  0.47  0.46  0.47  0.46  0.48  0.48 
     (0.64)  (0.63)  (0.64)  (0.64)  (0.65)  (0.64)  (0.66)  (0.65) 
                    
Log Age     0.078*  0.079*  0.076*  0.077*  0.080**  0.078**  0.073*  0.071* 
     (1.93)  (1.93)  (1.86)  (1.84)  (2.01)  (1.97)  (1.79)  (1.71) 
                    
Log Sales/Assets    0.24***  0.24***  0.24***  0.24***  0.24***  0.23***  0.23***  0.23*** 
     (3.80)  (3.80)  (3.80)  (3.79)  (3.74)  (3.72)  (3.73)  (3.72) 
                    
Log IPO Proceeds   -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.11***  -0.12*** 
     (-3.13)  (-3.19)  (-3.01)  (-3.11)  (-3.19)  (-3.18)  (-2.97)  (-3.03) 
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Log Book-to-Market   0.38*  0.38*  0.37*  0.38*  0.37*  0.36*  0.36  0.35 
     (1.73)  (1.76)  (1.71)  (1.74)  (1.70)  (1.67)  (1.63)  (1.63) 
                    
Log Underpricing    0.45***  0.45***  0.45***  0.45***  0.45***  0.45***  0.45***  0.45*** 
     (6.10)  (6.10)  (6.09)  (6.10)  (6.13)  (6.13)  (6.09)  (6.10) 
                    
Underwriters' 
Ranking   0.082***  0.082***  0.082***  0.082***  0.082***  0.082***  0.081***  0.081*** 
     (4.11)  (4.12)  (4.08)  (4.10)  (4.10)  (4.12)  (4.04)  (4.08) 
                    
Log Existing Shareholders 
Multiple 
0.089***  0.089***  0.088***  0.089***  0.088***  0.086***  0.087***  0.085*** 
     (3.72)  (3.72)  (3.71)  (3.69)  (3.67)  (3.60)  (3.65)  (3.54) 
                    
Dotcom Bubble 
Dummy  -0.51***  -0.51***  -0.50***  -0.50***  -0.50***  -0.50***  -0.50***  -0.50*** 
     (-9.43)  (-9.49)  (-9.35)  (-9.40)  (-9.41)  (-9.45)  (-9.15)  (-9.19) 
                    
Adjusted R2 (%)     21.1  21.1  21.1  21.1  21.1  21.2  21.1  21.1 
                    
N         1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039 
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
Log Excess Returns and Selling Decision 
 
Panel B. Log Excess Return and Selling Decision, non-linear extension 
  
  
Lead VC investor sells   Any VC investor sells   Founder sells   Any shareholder sells 
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
                    
Selling     1.03***  0.73*  0.80**  0.63*  0.0011  0.77  0.71**  0.78** 
     (2.59)  (1.74)  (2.36)  (1.67)  (0.00097)  (0.85)  (2.44)  (2.48) 
                    
Selling2     -1.84***  -1.41***  -1.36***  -1.16**  1.65  -1.21  -1.05**  -1.18** 
     (-3.99)  (-2.59)  (-2.66)  (-1.96)  (0.43)  (-0.40)  (-2.24)  (-2.48) 
                    
3-year IPO market share  0.49  0.48  0.46  0.47  0.48  0.46  0.60  0.59 
     (0.67)  (0.65)  (0.64)  (0.64)  (0.65)  (0.63)  (0.82)  (0.81) 
                    
Log Age     0.071*  0.071*  0.069*  0.069*  0.081**  0.077*  0.069*  0.064 
     (1.76)  (1.73)  (1.68)  (1.66)  (2.04)  (1.94)  (1.69)  (1.53) 
                    
Log Sales/Assets    0.23***  0.23***  0.23***  0.23***  0.24***  0.23***  0.22***  0.21*** 
     (3.62)  (3.61)  (3.58)  (3.55)  (3.74)  (3.71)  (3.40)  (3.24) 
                    
Log IPO Proceeds   -0.13***  -0.13***  -0.13***  -0.13***  -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.13***  -0.14*** 
     (-3.40)  (-3.44)  (-3.21)  (-3.30)  (-3.20)  (-3.16)  (-3.51)  (-3.64) 
                    
Log Book-to-Market   0.33  0.35  0.33  0.34  0.36  0.37*  0.31  0.30 
     (1.52)  (1.59)  (1.49)  (1.55)  (1.63)  (1.68)  (1.43)  (1.35) 
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Log Underpricing    0.45***  0.45***  0.45***  0.45***  0.45***  0.45***  0.45***  0.46*** 
     (6.10)  (6.10)  (6.09)  (6.10)  (6.12)  (6.12)  (6.16)  (6.20) 
                    
Underwriters' 
Ranking   0.086***  0.086***  0.085***  0.085***  0.082***  0.082***  0.085***  0.087*** 
     (4.30)  (4.26)  (4.22)  (4.21)  (4.12)  (4.09)  (4.26)  (4.34) 
                    
Log Existing Shareholders 
Multiple 
0.090***  0.090***  0.089***  0.089***  0.089***  0.085***  0.087***  0.083*** 
     (3.79)  (3.75)  (3.79)  (3.76)  (3.68)  (3.53)  (3.72)  (3.47) 
                    
Dotcom Bubble 
Dummy  -0.50***  -0.50***  -0.49***  -0.50***  -0.50***  -0.50***  -0.48***  -0.49*** 
     (-9.26)  (-9.38)  (-9.13)  (-9.26)  (-9.34)  (-9.39)  (-8.83)  (-8.95) 
                    
Adjusted R2 (%)     21.3  21.2  21.2  21.2  21.1  21.1  21.3  21.4 
                    
N         1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039 
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TABLE 10 
Idiosyncratic Risk and Selling Decision 
 
Table 10 presents cross-sectional regression estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) that are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for industry 
clustering (8 industry groups). Dependent variable is annualized logarithmic idiosyncratic risk from 4 factor models in logs, measured at 3 years after 
the IPO date or at delisting, whichever comes first. Selling decision is defined as the fraction of total shares sold by selling shareholders' group to the 
total shares sold in the offering. Two forms of selling are defined: i) Secondary Selling  as directly selling in the form of secondary offering during 
the initial public offering (specification number is odd); ii) Any type of selling as either selling in the secondary offering, through the underwriters' 
over-allotment option or retiring shares by using the IPO proceeds (specification number is even). *, **, and *** denote level of significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
  
Lead VC investor sells   Any VC investor sells   Founder sells   Any shareholder sells 
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
                    
Selling     -0.59***  -0.41***  -0.61***  -0.47***  -0.63***  -0.50***  -0.45***  -0.40*** 
     (-3.98)  (-3.87)  (-6.17)  (-5.32)  (-3.25)  (-2.96)  (-8.25)  (-7.09) 
                    
3-year IPO market 
share  0.16  0.18  0.16  0.17  0.19  0.21  0.14  0.15 
     (0.47)  (0.55)  (0.51)  (0.53)  (0.57)  (0.63)  (0.44)  (0.47) 
                    
Log Age     -0.093***  -0.092***  -0.086***  -0.083***  -0.10***  -0.10***  -0.080***  -0.073*** 
     (-5.68)  (-5.54)  (-5.21)  (-4.96)  (-6.21)  (-6.10)  (-4.90)  (-4.42) 
                    
Log Sales/Assets    -0.17***  -0.16***  -0.16***  -0.16***  -0.16***  -0.16***  -0.15***  -0.15*** 
     (-6.70)  (-6.59)  (-6.71)  (-6.59)  (-6.31)  (-6.33)  (-6.30)  (-6.19) 
                    
Log IPO Proceeds   -0.092***  -0.087***  -0.099***  -0.092***  -0.084***  -0.084***  -0.10***  -0.097*** 
     (-6.22)  (-6.10)  (-6.87)  (-6.55)  (-6.19)  (-6.16)  (-7.61)  (-7.23) 
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Log Book-to-Market   -0.37***  -0.38***  -0.34***  -0.36***  -0.38***  -0.38***  -0.30***  -0.30*** 
     (-3.74)  (-3.86)  (-3.59)  (-3.72)  (-3.85)  (-3.86)  (-3.17)  (-3.17) 
                    
Log Underpricing    0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16*** 
     (5.73)  (5.62)  (5.83)  (5.67)  (5.60)  (5.61)  (5.90)  (5.71) 
                    
Underwriters' 
Ranking   -0.0017  -0.0022  0.00049  -0.00059  -0.0017  -0.0022  0.0023  0.00058 
     (-0.22)  (-0.28)  (0.064)  (-0.077)  (-0.22)  (-0.28)  (0.30)  (0.076) 
                    
Log Existing Shareholders 
Multiple 
-0.011  -0.012  -0.0095  -0.0091  -0.015  -0.014  -0.0062  -0.0022 
     (-1.12)  (-1.16)  (-0.96)  (-0.89)  (-1.38)  (-1.36)  (-0.59)  (-0.21) 
                    
Dotcom Bubble 
Dummy  0.33***  0.34***  0.33***  0.33***  0.34***  0.34***  0.31***  0.31*** 
     (15.8)  (15.9)  (15.3)  (15.3)  (16.0)  (16.1)  (14.7)  (14.6) 
                    
Adjusted R2 (%)     48.8  48.6  49.5  49.2  48.6  48.5  50.2  50 
                    
N         1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039 
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TABLE 10 (continued) 
Idiosyncratic Risk and Selling Decision 
 
Panel B. Idiosyncratic Risk and Selling Decision, non-linear extension 
          
Lead VC investor sells   Any VC investor sells   Founder sells   Any shareholder sells 
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
                    
Selling     -0.97***  -0.61***  -0.90***  -0.65***  -1.23***  -1.03***  -0.51***  -0.47*** 
     (-4.74)  (-3.05)  (-5.47)  (-3.81)  (-2.60)  (-2.58)  (-3.87)  (-3.47) 
                    
Selling2     0.77***  0.41*  0.60***  0.38*  2.42  2.04  0.10  0.12 
     (3.26)  (1.72)  (2.87)  (1.70)  (1.52)  (1.61)  (0.57)  (0.65) 
                    
3-year IPO market 
share  0.15  0.18  0.17  0.17  0.19  0.22  0.13  0.14 
     (0.45)  (0.53)  (0.52)  (0.53)  (0.58)  (0.66)  (0.40)  (0.43) 
                    
Log Age     -0.090***  -0.089***  -0.082***  -0.080***  -0.10***  -0.098***  -0.079***  -0.073*** 
     (-5.52)  (-5.40)  (-5.01)  (-4.78)  (-6.14)  (-5.93)  (-4.88)  (-4.36) 
                    
Log 
Sales/Assets    -0.16***  -0.16***  -0.16***  -0.16***  -0.16***  -0.16***  -0.15***  -0.15*** 
     (-6.52)  (-6.42)  (-6.48)  (-6.36)  (-6.30)  (-6.31)  (-6.13)  (-5.96) 
                    
Log IPO Proceeds   -0.087***  -0.084***  -0.094***  -0.088***  -0.084***  -0.084***  -0.10***  -0.095*** 
     (-5.92)  (-5.82)  (-6.54)  (-6.24)  (-6.25)  (-6.22)  (-6.89)  (-6.59) 
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Log Book-to-
Market   -0.35***  -0.37***  -0.32***  -0.34***  -0.39***  -0.39***  -0.30***  -0.30*** 
     (-3.53)  (-3.72)  (-3.33)  (-3.53)  (-3.92)  (-3.92)  (-3.08)  (-3.05) 
                    
Log 
Underpricing    0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16*** 
     (5.74)  (5.61)  (5.83)  (5.66)  (5.58)  (5.56)  (5.86)  (5.65) 
                    
Underwriters' 
Ranking   -0.0035  -0.0032  -0.0012  -0.0017  -0.00091  -0.0014  0.0018  -7.5e-06 
     (-0.44)  (-0.40)  (-0.15)  (-0.21)  (-0.12)  (-0.18)  (0.24)  (-0.00097) 
                    
Log Existing 
Shareholders Multiple 
-0.012  -0.012  -0.0099  -0.0093  -0.013  -0.013  -0.0063  -0.0020 
     (-1.17)  (-1.17)  (-1.00)  (-0.91)  (-1.24)  (-1.15)  (-0.60)  (-0.19) 
                    
Dotcom Bubble 
Dummy  0.33***  0.34***  0.32***  0.33***  0.34***  0.34***  0.31***  0.31*** 
     (15.5)  (15.7)  (15.0)  (15.1)  (15.7)  (15.9)  (14.3)  (14.3) 
                    
Adjusted R2 
(%)     48.9  48.6  49.6  49.2  48.6  48.5  50.2  49.9 
                    
N         1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039 
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TABLE 11 
Total PME and Selling Decision 
 
Table 11 presents cross-sectional regression estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) that are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for industry 
clustering (8 industry groups). Dependent variable is the log of total PME relative to Nasdaq, measured at 3 years after the IPO date or at delisting, 
whichever comes first. Selling decision is defined as the fraction of total shares sold by selling shareholders' group to the total shares sold in the 
offering. Two forms of selling are defined: i) Secondary Selling  as directly selling in the form of secondary offering during the initial public offering 
(specification number is odd); ii) Any type of selling as either selling in the secondary offering, through the underwriters' over-allotment option or 
retiring shares by using the IPO proceeds (specification number is even). *, **, and *** denote level of significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A 
  
Lead VC investor sells   Any VC investor sells   Founder sells   Any shareholder sells 
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
                    
Selling     0.32  0.14  0.42*  0.28  0.11  0.16  0.23*  0.20 
     (1.08)  (0.62)  (1.92)  (1.60)  (0.30)  (0.48)  (1.68)  (1.59) 
                    
3-year IPO market share  0.76  0.74  0.76  0.76  0.73  0.73  0.77  0.76 
     (1.11)  (1.08)  (1.12)  (1.10)  (1.07)  (1.07)  (1.12)  (1.11) 
                    
Log Age     0.033  0.035  0.026  0.026  0.038  0.037  0.027  0.024 
     (0.95)  (0.98)  (0.77)  (0.76)  (1.11)  (1.09)  (0.79)  (0.70) 
                    
Log Sales/Assets    0.18***  0.17***  0.18***  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***  0.17*** 
     (3.78)  (3.75)  (3.78)  (3.74)  (3.70)  (3.68)  (3.60)  (3.59) 
                    
Log IPO Proceeds   -0.030  -0.033  -0.023  -0.029  -0.035  -0.034  -0.024  -0.027 
     (-1.00)  (-1.14)  (-0.76)  (-0.97)  (-1.21)  (-1.20)  (-0.81)  (-0.92) 
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Log Book-to-Market   0.13  0.14  0.11  0.12  0.15  0.14  0.098  0.099 
     (0.61)  (0.67)  (0.52)  (0.58)  (0.70)  (0.68)  (0.48)  (0.48) 
                    
Log Underpricing    0.049  0.050  0.048  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.047  0.049 
     (1.12)  (1.13)  (1.09)  (1.13)  (1.12)  (1.13)  (1.08)  (1.12) 
                    
Underwriters' 
Ranking   0.041***  0.041***  0.039***  0.040***  0.041***  0.041***  0.039***  0.040*** 
     (3.17)  (3.21)  (3.01)  (3.10)  (3.21)  (3.22)  (2.98)  (3.07) 
                    
Log Existing Shareholders 
Multiple 
0.039  0.041*  0.037  0.037  0.042*  0.042*  0.037  0.035 
     (1.61)  (1.66)  (1.54)  (1.55)  (1.75)  (1.69)  (1.50)  (1.39) 
                    
Dotcom Bubble 
Dummy  -0.18***  -0.18***  -0.17***  -0.18***  -0.19***  -0.19***  -0.17***  -0.17*** 
     (-4.31)  (-4.38)  (-4.10)  (-4.17)  (-4.44)  (-4.44)  (-3.94)  (-3.93) 
                    
Adjusted R2 (%)     8.55  8.48  8.80  8.65  8.46  8.47  8.74  8.69 
                    
N         1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039 
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
Total PME and Selling Decision 
 
Panel B. Total PME and Selling Decision, non-linear extension 
          
Lead VC investor sells   Any VC investor sells   Founder sells   Any shareholder sells 
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
                    
Selling     0.89**  0.45  0.98***  0.61*  -0.17  0.44  0.54**  0.59** 
     (2.06)  (1.18)  (2.75)  (1.82)  (-0.19)  (0.52)  (2.08)  (2.27) 
                    
Selling2     -1.14**  -0.66  -1.14**  -0.70  1.16  -1.07  -0.57  -0.71* 
     (-2.41)  (-1.44)  (-2.43)  (-1.44)  (0.38)  (-0.39)  (-1.51)  (-1.90) 
                    
3-year IPO market 
share  0.77  0.75  0.76  0.76  0.74  0.73  0.83  0.83 
     (1.13)  (1.09)  (1.12)  (1.11)  (1.07)  (1.06)  (1.22)  (1.21) 
                    
Log Age     0.029  0.031  0.020  0.022  0.039  0.036  0.024  0.019 
     (0.82)  (0.88)  (0.60)  (0.64)  (1.13)  (1.05)  (0.72)  (0.57) 
                    
Log Sales/Assets    0.17***  0.17***  0.16***  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***  0.16***  0.15*** 
     (3.62)  (3.62)  (3.51)  (3.50)  (3.71)  (3.67)  (3.32)  (3.17) 
                    
Log IPO Proceeds   -0.037  -0.039  -0.033  -0.036  -0.035  -0.034  -0.035  -0.041 
     (-1.23)  (-1.29)  (-1.05)  (-1.16)  (-1.22)  (-1.18)  (-1.18)  (-1.36) 
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Log Book-to-Market   0.098  0.12  0.066  0.096  0.14  0.15  0.074  0.064 
     (0.47)  (0.59)  (0.32)  (0.47)  (0.66)  (0.70)  (0.36)  (0.31) 
                    
Log Underpricing    0.049  0.050  0.048  0.050  0.049  0.050  0.050  0.054 
     (1.11)  (1.14)  (1.09)  (1.14)  (1.12)  (1.14)  (1.15)  (1.23) 
                    
Underwriters' 
Ranking   0.043***  0.042***  0.042***  0.042***  0.041***  0.040***  0.041***  0.043*** 
     (3.35)  (3.31)  (3.20)  (3.22)  (3.21)  (3.17)  (3.16)  (3.34) 
                    
Log Existing Shareholders 
Multiple 
0.040*  0.041*  0.037  0.038  0.043*  0.041  0.037  0.034 
     (1.66)  (1.68)  (1.61)  (1.58)  (1.75)  (1.63)  (1.54)  (1.36) 
                    
Dotcom Bubble 
Dummy  -0.18***  -0.18***  -0.17***  -0.17***  -0.19***  -0.18***  -0.16***  -0.16*** 
     (-4.16)  (-4.31)  (-3.87)  (-4.04)  (-4.44)  (-4.40)  (-3.71)  (-3.72) 
                    
Adjusted R2 (%)     8.66  8.46  8.99  8.67  8.38  8.39  8.80  8.84 
                    
N         1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039 
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
Total PME and Selling Decision 
 
Panel C. 7-year Total PME and Selling Decision, non-linear extension 
          
Lead VC investor sells   Any VC investor sells   Founder sells   Any shareholder sells 
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
                    
Selling     1.18***  1.06***  0.87**  0.91***  0.26  0.76  0.66**  0.81*** 
     (2.94)  (2.85)  (2.51)  (2.74)  (0.27)  (0.88)  (2.49)  (2.95) 
                    
Selling2     -1.74***  -1.52***  -1.19**  -1.26**  0.38  -1.47  -0.79**  -0.98** 
     (-3.81)  (-3.04)  (-2.45)  (-2.48)  (0.12)  (-0.56)  (-2.07)  (-2.46) 
                    
3-year IPO market 
share  1.01  1.01  0.98  0.99  0.97  0.96  1.08  1.09 
     (1.40)  (1.40)  (1.37)  (1.39)  (1.36)  (1.33)  (1.53)  (1.54) 
                    
Log Age     0.042  0.037  0.040  0.033  0.054*  0.051  0.039  0.028 
     (1.31)  (1.15)  (1.22)  (1.03)  (1.65)  (1.56)  (1.21)  (0.88) 
                    
Log Sales/Assets    0.24***  0.23***  0.23***  0.23***  0.24***  0.24***  0.22***  0.21*** 
     (5.15)  (5.05)  (5.06)  (4.93)  (5.23)  (5.20)  (4.76)  (4.50) 
                    
Log IPO Proceeds   -0.018  -0.019  -0.014  -0.017  -0.010  -0.0094  -0.016  -0.019 
     (-0.61)  (-0.66)  (-0.46)  (-0.56)  (-0.36)  (-0.33)  (-0.54)  (-0.66) 
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Log Book-to-Market   0.18  0.18  0.18  0.17  0.23  0.24  0.16  0.13 
     (0.86)  (0.86)  (0.84)  (0.81)  (1.07)  (1.11)  (0.76)  (0.60) 
                    
Log Underpricing    0.048  0.051  0.048  0.049  0.050  0.051  0.051  0.055 
     (1.12)  (1.18)  (1.11)  (1.15)  (1.16)  (1.18)  (1.18)  (1.29) 
                    
Underwriters' 
Ranking   0.048***  0.048***  0.046***  0.047***  0.044***  0.044***  0.046***  0.047*** 
     (4.07)  (4.10)  (3.88)  (3.96)  (3.72)  (3.69)  (3.86)  (4.05) 
                    
Log Existing Shareholders 
Multiple 
0.034  0.031  0.033  0.031  0.034  0.032  0.031  0.024 
     (1.55)  (1.43)  (1.52)  (1.42)  (1.58)  (1.45)  (1.40)  (1.05) 
                    
Dotcom Bubble 
Dummy  -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.13***  -0.13***  -0.11**  -0.10** 
     (-2.77)  (-2.80)  (-2.63)  (-2.60)  (-3.00)  (-2.94)  (-2.37)  (-2.22) 
                    
Adjusted R2 (%)     9.94  9.96  9.86  9.99  9.46  9.52  9.97  10.3 
                    
N         1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039 
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TABLE 12  
Additional selling 
  
Table 12 revisits regressions estimates from Tables 6-11 using the additional selling only as a selling variable. The additional selling is defined 
as the fraction of over-allotment sales or stock redemptions when there are no secondary sales to total IPO offering. The table presents results 
when lead venture capitalists sells.  Table 6 (1) is a Tobit regression, other regression estimates are OLS.*, **, and *** denote level of 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
          Table 6 (1)   Table 7 (1)   Table 8B (1) Table 9B (1) Table 10B (1) Table 11B (1) Table 11C (1)  
                    
Additional Selling     -0.66**  0.66  -0.21  -0.27  -0.79  0.18   
       (-2.02)  (0.69)  (-0.20)  (-0.59)  (-0.95)  (0.19)   
                    
Additional Selling2       -0.90  1.04  -0.052  2.91  2.82   
         (-0.30)  (0.35)  (-0.036)  (1.31)  (0.98)   
                    
3-year IPO market 
share  -0.53**  0.41  -1.02  0.45  0.22  0.71  0.93   
     (-2.15)  (1.02)  (-0.98)  (0.61)  (0.66)  (1.03)  (1.30)   
                    
Log Age     0.092***  -0.046**  0.13**  0.081**  -0.099***  0.042  0.046   
     (5.55)  (-2.21)  (2.39)  (1.99)  (-5.87)  (1.21)  (1.43)   
                    
Log Sales/Assets    0.054***  -0.0088  0.41***  0.24***  -0.16***  0.18***  0.24***   
     (3.20)  (-0.29)  (5.11)  (3.79)  (-6.53)  (3.82)  (5.25)   
                    
Log IPO Proceeds   0.0081  0.090***  0.11**  -0.12***  -0.081***  -0.035  -0.013   
     (0.68)  (4.90)  (2.21)  (-3.23)  (-5.94)  (-1.23)  (-0.46)   
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Log Book-to-Market   0.16**  -0.078  0.78***  0.39*  -0.41***  0.16  0.25   
     (2.25)  (-1.00)  (3.02)  (1.80)  (-4.07)  (0.78)  (1.15)   
                    
Log Underpricing        -0.044  0.45***  0.16***  0.049  0.053   
         (-0.43)  (6.09)  (5.65)  (1.11)  (1.24)   
                    
Underwriters' 
Ranking   0.0014  0.0043  0.061*  0.082***  -0.0025  0.041***  0.045***   
     (0.23)  (0.55)  (1.86)  (4.10)  (-0.32)  (3.20)  (3.78)   
                    
Log Existing Shareholders 
Multiple 
0.025***  0.098***  0.077***  0.091***  -0.017*  0.045*  0.033  
 
     (3.29)  (4.99)  (2.78)  (3.78)  (-1.68)  (1.86)  (1.54)   
                    
Dotcom Bubble 
Dummy  -0.059***  0.21***  -0.30***  -0.51***  0.34***  -0.19***  -0.13***   
     (-3.43)  (8.36)  (-4.45)  (-9.57)  (16.3)  (-4.52)  (-3.08)   
                    
Log-likelihood/Adjusted 
R2 (%)  -77.9  33.4  9.69  21.0  48.2  8.42  9.64   
                    
N         1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039    
 
 
 
 
150 
 
TABLE 13 
Alternative selling variable 
 
Table 13 revisits regressions estimates from Tables 6-11 using alternative selling variable definition. The selling variable is defined as the 
fraction of shares sold in the IPO to total shares held prior to the IPO by selling stockholders. The table presents results when lead venture 
capitalists sell secondary shares only.  Table 6 (1) is a Tobit regression, other regression estimates are OLS.*, **, and *** denote level of 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
          Table 6 (1)   Table 7 (1)   Table 8B (1) Table 9B (1) Table 10B (1) Table 11B (1) Table 11C (1) 
                   
Selling       -0.081  0.92**  0.12  -0.93***  0.53  0.47  
       (-0.69)  (2.23)  (0.25)  (-3.77)  (1.17)  (1.10)  
                   
Selling2         -1.17  0.14  1.36***  -0.67  -0.36  
         (-1.46)  (0.14)  (2.92)  (-0.75)  (-0.51)  
                   
3-year IPO market 
share  -2.74***  0.40  -0.94  0.48  0.13  0.78  1.01  
     (-3.23)  (0.98)  (-0.89)  (0.66)  (0.40)  (1.14)  (1.41)  
                   
Log Age     0.19***  -0.053**  0.12**  0.077*  -0.089***  0.030  0.046  
     (5.16)  (-2.56)  (2.25)  (1.87)  (-5.37)  (0.86)  (1.41)  
                   
Log 
Sales/Assets    0.15**  -0.0097  0.42***  0.24***  -0.16***  0.17***  0.24***  
     (2.30)  (-0.32)  (5.11)  (3.75)  (-6.69)  (3.76)  (5.24)  
                   
Log IPO Proceeds   -0.027  0.089***  0.11**  -0.12***  -0.086***  -0.033  -0.0094  
     (-0.94)  (4.86)  (2.29)  (-3.18)  (-6.16)  (-1.13)  (-0.33)  
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Log Book-to-
Market   0.59***  -0.081  0.74***  0.37*  -0.37***  0.12  0.22  
     (3.57)  (-1.04)  (2.88)  (1.69)  (-3.71)  (0.59)  (1.02)  
                   
Log 
Underpricing        -0.045  0.45***  0.16***  0.050  0.049  
         (-0.43)  (6.11)  (5.68)  (1.14)  (1.15)  
                   
Underwriters' 
Ranking   -0.020  0.0041  0.061*  0.083***  -0.0028  0.042***  0.046***  
     (-1.33)  (0.53)  (1.87)  (4.15)  (-0.36)  (3.26)  (3.86)  
                   
Log Existing 
Shareholders Multiple 
0.077***  0.095***  0.072**  0.089***  -0.011  0.038  0.032  
     (3.90)  (5.15)  (2.53)  (3.66)  (-1.04)  (1.62)  (1.45)  
                   
Dotcom Bubble 
Dummy  -0.35***  0.21***  -0.29***  -0.50***  0.33***  -0.18***  -0.13***  
     (-5.33)  (8.35)  (-4.23)  (-9.35)  (15.4)  (-4.19)  (-2.87)  
                   
Log-likelihood/Adjusted 
R2 (%)  -157  33.2  9.77  21.0  48.8  8.50  9.57  
                   
N         1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   1039   
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TABLE 14 
Non-dotcom bubble subsample 
 
Table 14 revisits regressions estimates from Tables 6-11 for the non-dotcom bubble subsample, i.e. years 1999 and 2000 are excluded. The 
selling variable is defined as the fraction of shares sold in the IPO to total shares offered in the IPO. The table presents results when lead venture 
capitalists sell secondary shares only.  Table 6 (1) is a Tobit regression, other regression estimates are OLS.*, **, and *** denote level of 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
          Table 6 (1)   Table 7 (1)   Table 8B (1) Table 9B (1) Table 10B (1) Table 11B (1) Table 11C (1) 
                   
Selling       -0.081  0.92**  1.08***  -0.89***  0.58  0.96**  
       (-0.77)  (2.53)  (2.89)  (-4.56)  (1.27)  (2.33)  
                   
Selling2         0.082  -1.38***  0.56**  -0.44  -0.96**  
         (0.20)  (-3.15)  (2.39)  (-0.86)  (-1.97)  
                   
3-year IPO market 
share  -2.06***  0.074  1.07  0.73  0.30  0.87  1.12  
     (-2.88)  (0.23)  (1.17)  (0.97)  (0.75)  (0.90)  (1.06)  
                   
Log Age     0.14***  -0.028*  0.15**  0.044  -0.12***  0.035  0.039  
     (4.59)  (-1.66)  (2.41)  (1.05)  (-5.39)  (0.66)  (0.88)  
                   
Log 
Sales/Assets    0.074  0.030  0.37***  0.13**  -0.14***  0.079  0.22***  
     (1.58)  (1.17)  (4.37)  (2.06)  (-4.35)  (1.31)  (3.66)  
                   
Log IPO Proceeds   -0.065  0.031**  0.15***  -0.039  -0.11***  0.0024  0.051  
     (-1.62)  (2.29)  (2.83)  (-1.04)  (-5.79)  (0.064)  (1.52)  
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Log Book-to-
Market   0.43***  -0.016  0.69***  0.070  -0.26**  -0.11  0.060  
     (3.06)  (-0.26)  (2.64)  (0.32)  (-2.47)  (-0.45)  (0.24)  
                   
Log 
Underpricing        0.31**  0.60***  0.15**  0.46***  0.36**  
         (2.38)  (4.30)  (2.33)  (3.17)  (2.54)  
                   
Underwriters' 
Ranking   0.0044  0.0093  0.072*  0.073***  -0.0060  0.038**  0.034**  
     (0.33)  (1.45)  (1.93)  (3.36)  (-0.64)  (2.44)  (2.55)  
                   
Log Existing 
Shareholders Multiple 
0.068***  0.053***  0.0045  0.0027  0.020  -0.017  -0.018  
     (2.99)  (4.33)  (0.12)  (0.10)  (1.54)  (-0.56)  (-0.52)  
                   
                   
Log-likelihood/Adjusted 
R2 (%)  -104  15.2  14.5  13.9  21.4  6.29  10.8  
                   
N         581   581   581   581   581   581   581   
 
